netdev - Re: [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: Preserve xfrm interface secpath for packets forwarded

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAHsH6Gv1Vhr3unAsG-0WiJf5CD85NyrgDitLmMtxdphD4__aSA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 11 Apr 2023 19:40:55 +0300
From:   Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@...il.com>
To:     Martin Willi <martin@...ongswan.org>
Cc:     Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
        Benedict Wong <benedictwong@...gle.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: Preserve xfrm interface secpath for packets forwarded

Hi,

On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 7:35 PM Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@...il.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 10:54 AM Martin Willi <martin@...ongswan.org> wrote:
> >
> > The commit referenced below clears the secpath on packets received via
> > xfrm interfaces to support nested IPsec tunnels. This breaks Netfilter
> > policy matching using xt_policy in the FORWARD chain, as the secpath
> > is missing during forwarding. INPUT matching is not affected, as it is
> > done before secpath reset.
> >
> > A work-around could use XFRM input interface matching for such rules,
> > but this does not work if the XFRM interface is part of a VRF; the
> > Netfilter input interface is replaced by the VRF interface, making a
> > sufficient match for IPsec-protected packets difficult.
> >
> > So instead, limit the secpath reset to packets that are targeting the
> > local host, in the default or a specific VRF. This should allow nested
> > tunnels, but keeps the secpath intact on packets that are passed to
> > Netfilter chains with potential IPsec policy matches.
> >
> > Fixes: b0355dbbf13c ("Fix XFRM-I support for nested ESP tunnels")
> > Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@...ongswan.org>
> > ---
> >  include/net/xfrm.h     | 10 ++++++++++
> >  net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c |  2 +-
> >  2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
> > index 3e1f70e8e424..f16df2f07a83 100644
> > --- a/include/net/xfrm.h
> > +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
> > @@ -1349,6 +1349,16 @@ void xfrm_flowi_addr_get(const struct flowi *fl,
> >         }
> >  }
> >
> > +static inline bool xfrm_flowi_is_forwarding(struct net *net,
> > +                                           const struct flowi *fl)
> > +{
> > +       if (fl->flowi_oif == LOOPBACK_IFINDEX)
> > +               return false;
> > +       if (netif_index_is_l3_master(net, fl->flowi_oif))
> > +               return false;
> > +       return true;
> > +}
> > +
> >  static __inline__ int
> >  __xfrm4_state_addr_check(const struct xfrm_state *x,
> >                          const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr)
> > diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> > index 5c61ec04b839..4f49698eb29f 100644
> > --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> > +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> > @@ -3745,7 +3745,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
> >                         goto reject;
> >                 }
> >
> > -               if (if_id)
> > +               if (if_id && !xfrm_flowi_is_forwarding(net, &fl))
>
> At first I thought that "dir" would just be "XFRM_POLICY_FWD" from the
> forwarding path, so you could just do:
>
> if (if_id && dir != XFRM_POLICY_FWD)
> secpath_reset(skb);
>
> But I think the problem with this would be when the xfrmi is moved to a
> different NS in which case the policy check is done using XFRM_POLICY_IN
> right? if so maybe this can be passed somehow, maybe using a bit in the "dir"
> outside of XFRM_POLICY_MASK?
>
> something like:
>
> no_reset_sp = dir & XFRM_POLICY_NO_RESET_SP || dir == XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
> dir &= XFRM_POLICY_MASK;
>
> ...
> if (if_id && !no_reset_sp)
> secpath_reset(skb);
>
> The benefit I think is in not deducing whether we are in forwarding.
>
> Maybe there's some other logic that I'm missing?

After another look the secpath is reset in that case anyway.
So in that case, which flow is missing when just using:

if (if_id && dir != XFRM_POLICY_FWD)
    secpath_reset(skb);

Eyal.