netdev - [PATCH net-next v4 5/5] net/sched: act_pedit: rate limit datapath messages

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Message-Id: <20230418234354.582693-6-pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Date:   Tue, 18 Apr 2023 20:43:54 -0300
From:   Pedro Tammela <pctammela@...atatu.com>
To:     netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     jhs@...atatu.com, xiyou.wangcong@...il.com, jiri@...nulli.us,
        davem@...emloft.net, edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org,
        pabeni@...hat.com, simon.horman@...igine.com,
        Pedro Tammela <pctammela@...atatu.com>
Subject: [PATCH net-next v4 5/5] net/sched: act_pedit: rate limit datapath messages

Unbounded info messages in the pedit datapath can flood the printk
ring buffer quite easily depending on the action created.
As these messages are informational, usually printing some, not all,
is enough to bring attention to the real issue.

Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@...igine.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@...atatu.com>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 2eacada5dcbb..791144012c91 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -397,8 +397,8 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			u8 *d, _d;
 
 			if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + tkey->at)) {
-				pr_info("tc action pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
-					hoffset + tkey->at);
+				pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
+						    hoffset + tkey->at);
 				goto bad;
 			}
 			d = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + tkey->at,
@@ -408,14 +408,13 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 			offset += (*d & tkey->offmask) >> tkey->shift;
 			if (offset % 4) {
-				pr_info("tc action pedit offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
+				pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
 				goto bad;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
-			pr_info("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
-				hoffset + offset);
+			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n", hoffset + offset);
 			goto bad;
 		}
 
@@ -432,8 +431,7 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			val = (*ptr + tkey->val) & ~tkey->mask;
 			break;
 		default:
-			pr_info("tc action pedit bad command (%d)\n",
-				cmd);
+			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit bad command (%d)\n", cmd);
 			goto bad;
 		}
 
-- 
2.34.1