Message-ID: <a8561203-a4f3-4b3d-338a-06a60541bd6b@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 28 Apr 2023 17:13:07 +0200
From:   David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To:     Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@...il.com>
Cc:     linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@...nelisnetworks.com>,
        Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>,
        Christian Benvenuti <benve@...co.com>,
        Nelson Escobar <neescoba@...co.com>,
        Bernard Metzler <bmt@...ich.ibm.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Ian Rogers <irogers@...gle.com>,
        Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
        Bjorn Topel <bjorn@...nel.org>,
        Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@...el.com>,
        Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@...el.com>,
        Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@...il.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
        Richard Cochran <richardcochran@...il.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@...nel.org>,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>,
        John Hubbard <jhubbard@...dia.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@...il.com>,
        Mika Penttila <mpenttil@...hat.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] mm/gup: disallow GUP writing to file-backed mappings
 by default

[...]

>> This change has the potential to break existing setups. Simple example:
>> libvirt domains configured for file-backed VM memory that also has a vfio
>> device configured. It can easily be configured by users (evolving VM
>> configuration, copy-paste etc.). And it works from a VM perspective, because
>> the guest memory is essentially stale once the VM is shutdown and the pages
>> were unpinned. At least we're not concerned about stale data on disk.
>>
>> With your changes, such VMs would no longer start, breaking existing user
>> setups with a kernel update.
> 
> Which vfio vm_ops are we talking about? vfio_pci_mmap_ops for example
> doesn't specify page_mkwrite or pfn_mkwrite. Unless you mean some arbitrary
> file system in the guest?

Sorry, you define a VM to have its memory backed by VM memory and, at 
the same time, define a vfio-pci device for your VM, which will end up 
long-term pinning the VM memory.

> 
> I may well be missing context on this so forgive me if I'm being a little
> dumb here, but it'd be good to get a specific example.

I was giving to little details ;)

[...]

>>
>> I know, Jason und John will disagree, but I don't think we want to be very
>> careful with changing the default.
>>
>> Sure, we could warn, or convert individual users using a flag (io_uring).
>> But maybe we should invest more energy on a fix?
> 
> This is proactively blocking a cleanup (eliminating vmas) that I believe
> will be useful in moving things forward. I am not against an opt-in option
> (I have been responding to community feedback in adapting my approach),
> which is the way I implemented it all the way back then :)

There are alternatives: just use a flag as Jason initially suggested and 
use that in io_uring code. Then, you can also bail out on the GUP-fast 
path as "cannot support it right now, never do GUP-fast".

IMHO, this patch is not a prereq.

> 
> But given we know this is both entirely broken and a potential security
> issue, and FOLL_LONGTERM is about as egregious as you can get (user
> explicitly saying they'll hold write access indefinitely) I feel it is an
> important improvement and makes clear that this is not an acceptable usage.
> 
> I see Jason has said more on this also :)
> 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@...il.com>
>>> ---
>>>    include/linux/mm.h |  1 +
>>>    mm/gup.c           | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>    mm/mmap.c          | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
>>>    3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
>>> index 37554b08bb28..f7da02fc89c6 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
>>> @@ -2433,6 +2433,7 @@ extern unsigned long move_page_tables(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>>>    #define  MM_CP_UFFD_WP_ALL                 (MM_CP_UFFD_WP | \
>>>    					    MM_CP_UFFD_WP_RESOLVE)
>>>
>>> +bool vma_needs_dirty_tracking(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
>>>    int vma_wants_writenotify(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t vm_page_prot);
>>>    static inline bool vma_wants_manual_pte_write_upgrade(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>>>    {
>>> diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
>>> index 1f72a717232b..d36a5db9feb1 100644
>>> --- a/mm/gup.c
>>> +++ b/mm/gup.c
>>> @@ -959,16 +959,51 @@ static int faultin_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>>>    	return 0;
>>>    }
>>>
>>> +/*
>>> + * Writing to file-backed mappings which require folio dirty tracking using GUP
>>> + * is a fundamentally broken operation, as kernel write access to GUP mappings
>>> + * do not adhere to the semantics expected by a file system.
>>> + *
>>> + * Consider the following scenario:-
>>> + *
>>> + * 1. A folio is written to via GUP which write-faults the memory, notifying
>>> + *    the file system and dirtying the folio.
>>> + * 2. Later, writeback is triggered, resulting in the folio being cleaned and
>>> + *    the PTE being marked read-only.
>>> + * 3. The GUP caller writes to the folio, as it is mapped read/write via the
>>> + *    direct mapping.
>>> + * 4. The GUP caller, now done with the page, unpins it and sets it dirty
>>> + *    (though it does not have to).
>>> + *
>>> + * This results in both data being written to a folio without writenotify, and
>>> + * the folio being dirtied unexpectedly (if the caller decides to do so).
>>> + */
>>> +static bool writeable_file_mapping_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>>> +					   unsigned long gup_flags)
>>> +{
>>> +	/* If we aren't pinning then no problematic write can occur. */
>>> +	if (!(gup_flags & (FOLL_GET | FOLL_PIN)))
>>> +		return true;
>>
>> FOLL_LONGTERM only applies to FOLL_PIN. This check can be dropped.
> 
> I understand that of course (well maybe not of course, but I mean I do, I
> have oodles of diagrams referencing this int he book :) This is intended to
> document the fact that the check isn't relevant if we don't pin at all,
> e.g. reading this you see:-
> 
> - (implicit) if not writing or anon we're good
> - if not pin we're good
> - ok we are only currently checking one especially egregious case
> - finally, perform the dirty tracking check.
> 
> So this is intentional.
> 
>>
>>> +
>>> +	/* We limit this check to the most egregious case - a long term pin. */
>>> +	if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_LONGTERM))
>>> +		return true;
>>> +
>>> +	/* If the VMA requires dirty tracking then GUP will be problematic. */
>>> +	return vma_needs_dirty_tracking(vma);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>    static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
>>>    {
>>>    	vm_flags_t vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
>>>    	int write = (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE);
>>>    	int foreign = (gup_flags & FOLL_REMOTE);
>>> +	bool vma_anon = vma_is_anonymous(vma);
>>>
>>>    	if (vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
>>>    		return -EFAULT;
>>>
>>> -	if (gup_flags & FOLL_ANON && !vma_is_anonymous(vma))
>>> +	if ((gup_flags & FOLL_ANON) && !vma_anon)
>>>    		return -EFAULT;
>>>
>>>    	if ((gup_flags & FOLL_LONGTERM) && vma_is_fsdax(vma))
>>> @@ -978,6 +1013,10 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
>>>    		return -EFAULT;
>>>
>>>    	if (write) {
>>> +		if (!vma_anon &&
>>> +		    !writeable_file_mapping_allowed(vma, gup_flags))
>>> +			return -EFAULT;
>>> +
>>>    		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
>>>    			if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
>>>    				return -EFAULT;
>>> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
>>> index 536bbb8fa0ae..7b6344d1832a 100644
>>> --- a/mm/mmap.c
>>
>>
>> I'm probably missing something, why don't we have to handle GUP-fast (having
>> said that, it's hard to handle ;) )? The sequence you describe above should
>> apply to GUP-fast as well, no?
>>
>> 1) Pin writable mapped page using GUP-fast
>> 2) Trigger writeback
>> 3) Write to page via pin
>> 4) Unpin and set dirty
> 
> You're right, and this is an excellent point. I worry about other GUP use
> cases too, but we're a bit out of luck there because we don't get to check
> the VMA _at all_ (which opens yet another Pandora's box about how safe it
> is to do unlocked pinning :)
> 
> But again, this comes down to the fact we're trying to make things
> _incrementally__ better rather than throwing our hands up and saying one
> day my ship will come in...

That's not how security fixes are supposed to work IMHO, sorry.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

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