netdev - [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: Check if_id in inbound policy/secpath match

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20230510011414.2599184-1-benedictwong@google.com>
Date: Wed, 10 May 2023 01:14:14 +0000
From: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@...gle.com>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org, steffen.klassert@...unet.com
Cc: nharold@...gle.com, benedictwong@...gle.com, evitayan@...gle.com
Subject: [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: Check if_id in inbound policy/secpath match

This change ensures that if configured in the policy, the if_id set in
the policy and secpath states match during the inbound policy check.
Without this, there is potential for ambiguity where entries in the
secpath differing by only the if_id could be mismatched.

Notably, this is checked in the outbound direction when resolving
templates to SAs, but not on the inbound path when matching SAs and
policies.

Test: Tested against Android kernel unit tests & CTS
Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@...gle.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 21a3a1cd3d6d..6d15788b5123 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -3312,7 +3312,7 @@ xfrm_secpath_reject(int idx, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct flowi *fl)
 
 static inline int
 xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x,
-	      unsigned short family)
+	      unsigned short family, u32 if_id)
 {
 	if (xfrm_state_kern(x))
 		return tmpl->optional && !xfrm_state_addr_cmp(tmpl, x, tmpl->encap_family);
@@ -3323,7 +3323,8 @@ xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x,
 		(tmpl->allalgs || (tmpl->aalgos & (1<<x->props.aalgo)) ||
 		 !(xfrm_id_proto_match(tmpl->id.proto, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY))) &&
 		!(x->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT &&
-		  xfrm_state_addr_cmp(tmpl, x, family));
+		  xfrm_state_addr_cmp(tmpl, x, family)) &&
+		(if_id == 0 || if_id == x->if_id);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3335,7 +3336,7 @@ xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x,
  */
 static inline int
 xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int start,
-	       unsigned short family)
+	       unsigned short family, u32 if_id)
 {
 	int idx = start;
 
@@ -3345,7 +3346,7 @@ xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int star
 	} else
 		start = -1;
 	for (; idx < sp->len; idx++) {
-		if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family))
+		if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family, if_id))
 			return ++idx;
 		if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
 			if (start == -1)
@@ -3724,7 +3725,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		 * are implied between each two transformations.
 		 */
 		for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
-			k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family);
+			k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family, if_id);
 			if (k < 0) {
 				if (k < -1)
 					/* "-2 - errored_index" returned */
-- 
2.40.1.521.gf1e218fcd8-goog