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Message-ID: <20230510013022.2602474-2-benedictwong@google.com>
Date: Wed, 10 May 2023 01:30:21 +0000
From: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@...gle.com>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org, steffen.klassert@...unet.com,
martin@...ongswan.org
Cc: nharold@...gle.com, benedictwong@...gle.com, evitayan@...gle.com
Subject: [PATCH ipsec 1/2] xfrm: Treat already-verified secpath entries as optional
This change allows inbound traffic through nested IPsec tunnels to
successfully match policies and templates, while retaining the secpath
stack trace as necessary for netfilter policies.
Specifically, this patch marks secpath entries that have already matched
against a relevant policy as having been verified, allowing it to be
treated as optional and skipped after a tunnel decapsulation (during
which the src/dst/proto/etc may have changed, and the correct policy
chain no long be resolvable).
This approach is taken as opposed to the iteration in b0355dbbf13c,
where the secpath was cleared, since that breaks subsequent validations
that rely on the existence of the secpath entries (netfilter policies, or
transport-in-tunnel mode, where policies remain resolvable).
Fixes: b0355dbbf13c ("Fix XFRM-I support for nested ESP tunnels")
Test: Tested against Android Kernel Unit Tests
Test: Tested against Android CTS
Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@...gle.com>
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 1 +
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 1 +
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 3e1f70e8e424..47ecf1d4719b 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1049,6 +1049,7 @@ struct xfrm_offload {
struct sec_path {
int len;
int olen;
+ int verified_cnt;
struct xfrm_state *xvec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_offload ovec[XFRM_MAX_OFFLOAD_DEPTH];
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index 436d29640ac2..9f294a20dcec 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ struct sec_path *secpath_set(struct sk_buff *skb)
memset(sp->ovec, 0, sizeof(sp->ovec));
sp->olen = 0;
sp->len = 0;
+ sp->verified_cnt = 0;
return sp;
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 6d15788b5123..ff58ce6c030c 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -3349,6 +3349,13 @@ xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int star
if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family, if_id))
return ++idx;
if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
+ if (idx < sp->verified_cnt) {
+ /* Secpath entry previously verified, consider optional and
+ * continue searching
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (start == -1)
start = -2-idx;
break;
@@ -3723,6 +3730,9 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
* Order is _important_. Later we will implement
* some barriers, but at the moment barriers
* are implied between each two transformations.
+ * Upon success, marks secpath entries as having been
+ * verified to allow them to be skipped in future policy
+ * checks (e.g. nested tunnels).
*/
for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family, if_id);
@@ -3741,6 +3751,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
xfrm_pols_put(pols, npols);
+ sp->verified_cnt = k;
+
return 1;
}
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLBLOCK);
--
2.40.1.521.gf1e218fcd8-goog
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