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Message-ID: <20230515161339.631577-11-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 00:13:37 +0800
From: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
To: <mic@...ikod.net>
CC: <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>, <gnoack3000@...il.com>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
<netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <yusongping@...wei.com>,
<artem.kuzin@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add 11 new test suites dedicated to network
These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets
bind() and connect() actions.
inet:
* bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
* connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
* bind_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
* connect_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
* ruleset_overlap: Tests with overlapping rules for one port.
* ruleset_expanding: Tests with expanding rulesets in which rules are
gradually added one by one, restricting sockets' connections.
* inval_port_format: Tests with wrong port format for ipv4/ipv6 sockets
and with port values more than U16_MAX.
port:
* inval: Tests with invalid user space supplied data:
- out of range ruleset attribute;
- unhandled allowed access;
- zero port value;
- zero access value;
- legitimate access values;
* bind_connect_inval_addrlen: Tests with invalid address length.
* bind_connect_unix_*_socket: Tests to make sure unix sockets' actions
are not restricted by Landlock rules applied to TCP ones.
layout1:
* with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within
filesystem directory access test.
Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.8% of 934 lines according
to gcc/gcov-11.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
---
Changes since v10:
* Replaces FIXTURE_VARIANT() with struct _fixture_variant_ .
* Changes tests names socket -> inet, standalone -> port.
* Gets rid of some DEFINEs.
* Changes names and groups tests' variables.
* Changes create_socket_variant() helper name to socket_variant().
* Refactors FIXTURE_SETUP(port) logic.
* Changes TEST_F_FORK -> TEST_F since there no teardown.
* Refactors some tests' logic.
* Minor fixes.
* Refactors commit message.
Changes since v9:
* Fixes mixing code declaration and code.
* Refactors FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() with clang-format.
* Replaces struct _fixture_variant_socket with
FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
* Deletes useless condition if (variant->is_sandboxed)
in multiple locations.
* Deletes zero_size argument in bind_variant() and
connect_variant().
* Adds tests for port values exceeding U16_MAX.
Changes since v8:
* Adds is_sandboxed const for FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
* Refactors AF_UNSPEC tests.
* Adds address length checking tests.
* Convert ports in all tests to __be16.
* Adds invalid port values tests.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v7:
* Squashes all selftest commits.
* Adds fs test with network bind() socket action.
* Minor fixes.
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 4 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 64 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 1317 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 1385 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
index 0f0a65287bac..71f7e9a8a64c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+CONFIG_INET=y
+CONFIG_IPV6=y
+CONFIG_NET=y
+CONFIG_NET_NS=y
CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index b762b5419a89..9175ee8adf51 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -17,6 +19,7 @@
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -4413,4 +4416,65 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
}
}
+static const char loopback_ipv4[] = "127.0.0.1";
+const unsigned short sock_port = 15000;
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, with_net)
+{
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = dir_s1d2,
+ .access = ACCESS_RO,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = sock_port,
+ };
+ int sockfd, ruleset_fd, ruleset_fd_net;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+
+ addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr4.sin_port = htons(sock_port);
+ addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+ memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
+
+ /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
+ ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr_net,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
+
+ /* Adds a network rule. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0,
+ landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /* Tests on a directory with the network rule loaded. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
+
+ sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Binds a socket to port 15000. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4)));
+
+ /* Closes bounded socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d4e219e42bba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1317 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock tests - Network
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#define MAX_SOCKET_NUM 10
+
+const short sock_port_start = 3470;
+const short sock_port_add = 10;
+
+static const char loopback_ipv4[] = "127.0.0.1";
+static const char loopback_ipv6[] = "::1";
+static const char unix_address_path[] = "/tmp/unix_addr";
+
+/* Number pending connections queue to be hold. */
+const short backlog = 10;
+
+/* Invalid attribute, out of landlock network access range. */
+const short landlock_inval_attr = 7;
+
+FIXTURE(inet)
+{
+ unsigned short port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+};
+
+/* struct _fixture_variant_inet */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(inet)
+{
+ const bool is_ipv4;
+ const bool is_sandboxed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(inet, ipv4) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_ipv4 = true,
+ .is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(inet, ipv4_sandboxed) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_ipv4 = true,
+ .is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(inet, ipv6) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_ipv4 = false,
+ .is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(inet, ipv6_sandboxed) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_ipv4 = false,
+ .is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+static int socket_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_inet *const variant,
+ const int type)
+{
+ if (variant->is_ipv4)
+ return socket(AF_INET, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ else
+ return socket(AF_INET6, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+}
+
+static int bind_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_inet *const variant,
+ const int sockfd,
+ const struct _test_data_inet *const self,
+ const size_t index)
+{
+ if (variant->is_ipv4)
+ return bind(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
+ sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
+ else
+ return bind(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
+ sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
+}
+
+static int connect_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_inet *const variant,
+ const int sockfd,
+ const struct _test_data_inet *const self,
+ const size_t index)
+{
+ if (variant->is_ipv4)
+ return connect(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
+ sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
+ else
+ return connect(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
+ sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(inet)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
+ /* Initializes socket ports . */
+ self->port[i] = sock_port_start + sock_port_add * i;
+
+ /* Initializes and IPv4 socket addresses. */
+ self->addr4[i].sin_family = AF_INET;
+ self->addr4[i].sin_port = htons(self->port[i]);
+ self->addr4[i].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+ memset(&(self->addr4[i].sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+ /* Initializes IPv6 socket addresses. */
+ self->addr6[i].sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ self->addr6[i].sin6_port = htons(self->port[i]);
+ inet_pton(AF_INET6, loopback_ipv6, &(self->addr6[i].sin6_addr));
+ }
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(inet)
+{
+}
+
+FIXTURE(port)
+{
+ unsigned short port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+};
+
+/* struct _fixture_variant_port */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(port)
+{
+ const bool is_sandboxed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(port, none_sandboxed) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(port, sandboxed) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(port)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Initializes socket ports . */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++)
+ self->port[i] = sock_port_start + sock_port_add * i;
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(port)
+{
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, bind)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_denied = {
+ .allowed_access = 0,
+ .port = self->port[2],
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd, sockfd, ret;
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and denies bind operations to the port[1]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_connect, 0));
+ /*
+ * Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in
+ * network actions for port[2] socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_denied, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Binds a socket to port[0]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Closes bounded socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Binds a socket to port[1]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Binds a socket to port[2]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 2);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, connect)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+ int accept_fd, ruleset_fd, sockfd_1, sockfd_2, status, ret;
+ pid_t child_1, child_2;
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+ /*
+ * Allows bind and denies connect operations to the port[1]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ /* Creates a server socket 1. */
+ sockfd_1 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Makes listening socket 1. */
+ ret = listen(sockfd_1, backlog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ child_1 = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_1);
+ if (child_1 == 0) {
+ int child_sockfd, ret;
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+ /* Creates a stream client socket. */
+ child_sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+ /* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[0]. */
+ ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Accepts connection from the child 1. */
+ accept_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, accept_fd);
+
+ /* Closes connection. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(accept_fd));
+
+ /* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_1, waitpid(child_1, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /* Creates a server socket 2. */
+ sockfd_2 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 2 to address with port[1]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_2, self, 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Makes listening socket 2. */
+ ret = listen(sockfd_2, backlog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ child_2 = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_2);
+ if (child_2 == 0) {
+ int child_sockfd, ret;
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
+ /* Creates a stream client socket. */
+ child_sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+ /* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[1]. */
+ ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 1);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ /* Accepts connection from the child 2. */
+ accept_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, accept_fd);
+
+ /* Closes connection. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(accept_fd));
+ }
+
+ /* Closes listening socket 2 for the parent. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_2, waitpid(child_2, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, bind_afunspec)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd_net, sockfd_unspec, ret;
+
+ if (variant->is_ipv4) {
+ self->addr4[0].sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ self->addr4[0].sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+ }
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
+ ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
+
+ /* Adds a network rule. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
+ }
+
+ sockfd_unspec = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
+
+ /* Binds a socket to the port[0] with INADDR_ANY address. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_unspec, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Closes bounded socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
+
+ if (variant->is_ipv4) {
+ /* Changes to a specific address. */
+ self->addr4[0].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+
+ sockfd_unspec = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
+
+ /* Binds a socket to the port[0] with the specific address. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_unspec, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EAFNOSUPPORT, errno);
+
+ /* Closes bounded socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, connect_afunspec)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_bind = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_bind_connect = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ int sockfd, ruleset_fd_1, ruleset_fd_2, status, ret;
+ struct sockaddr addr_unspec = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC };
+ pid_t child;
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_bind, sizeof(ruleset_attr_bind), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
+
+ /* Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
+ }
+
+ /* Creates a server socket 1. */
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket with port[0]. */
+ ret = connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_bind_connect,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr_bind_connect), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
+
+ /* Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
+ }
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Child tries to disconnect already connected socket. */
+ ret = connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unspec,
+ sizeof(addr_unspec));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, ruleset_overlap)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd, sockfd;
+ int one = 1;
+
+ ruleset_fd =
+ landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind, 0));
+ /* Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Creates a server socket. */
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+ /* Closes socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ /* Creates another ruleset layer. */
+ ruleset_fd =
+ landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket in
+ * the new ruleset layer.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the new ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Creates a server socket. */
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to connect the socket to address with port[0],
+ * as just one ruleset layer has connect() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Closes socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, ruleset_expanding)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_1 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
+ int one = 1;
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_1, sizeof(ruleset_attr_1), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1. */
+ sockfd_1 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /* Closes socket 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 2. */
+ sockfd_2 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+ * since there is no rule with bind() access for port[1].
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_2, self, 1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Expands network mask. */
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_2 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ /* Adds connect() access to port[0]. */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ /* Adds bind() access to port[1]. */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_2, sizeof(ruleset_attr_2), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+ /* Adds rule to port[1] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_3, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_2));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1. */
+ sockfd_1 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /* Closes socket 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 2. */
+ sockfd_2 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+ * because just one layer has bind() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Expands network mask. */
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_3 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ /* Restricts connect() access to port[0]. */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_3 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_3, sizeof(ruleset_attr_3), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_3);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_3, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_4, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_3);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_3));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1. */
+ sockfd_1 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to connect the socket 1 to address with port[0],
+ * as just one layer has connect() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Closes socket 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
+
+#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
+
+/* clang-format on */
+
+TEST_F(port, inval)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP
+ };
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_inval = {
+ .handled_access_net = landlock_inval_attr
+ };
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_all = { .handled_access_net =
+ ACCESS_ALL };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_port_zero = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = 0,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_denied = {
+ .allowed_access = 0,
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[2],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_all_rules = {};
+ __u64 access;
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ /* Checks invalid ruleset attribute. */
+ const int ruleset_fd_inv = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_inval, sizeof(ruleset_attr_inval), 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ruleset_fd_inv);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Gets ruleset. */
+ const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Checks unhandled allowed_access. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Checks zero port value. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_port_zero, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Checks zero access value. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_denied, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
+
+ /* Adds with legitimate values. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_all = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_all, sizeof(ruleset_attr_all), 0);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_all);
+
+ /* Tests access rights for all network rules */
+ for (access = 1; access <= ACCESS_LAST; access <<= 1) {
+ tcp_all_rules.allowed_access = access;
+ tcp_all_rules.port = self->port[3];
+ ASSERT_EQ(0,
+ landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_all,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_all_rules, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_all);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_all));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_F(port, bind_connect_inval_addrlen)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ int sockfd, ruleset_fd, ret;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+ int one = 1;
+
+ addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr4.sin_port = htons(self->port[0]);
+ addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+ memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Allows bind/connect actions for socket with self->port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1. */
+ sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to self->port[0] with zero addrlen. */
+ ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Connects the socket to the listening port with zero addrlen. */
+ ret = connect(sockfd, &addr4, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Binds the socket to self->port[0] with correct addrlen. */
+ ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Connects the socket to the listening port with correct addrlen. */
+ ret = connect(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Closes the connection*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
+TEST_F(port, bind_connect_unix_stream_socket)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ int sockfd, accept_fd, ruleset_fd, status, ret;
+ struct sockaddr_un addr_unix;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Deletes address full path link from previous server launching
+ * if was any.
+ */
+ unlink(unix_address_path);
+
+ /* Creates a server stream unix socket. */
+ sockfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+
+ /* Sets unix socket address parameters */
+ memset(&addr_unix, 0, sizeof(addr_unix));
+ addr_unix.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strcpy(addr_unix.sun_path, unix_address_path);
+
+ /* Binds the socket to unix address */
+ ret = bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unix, SUN_LEN(&addr_unix));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Makes listening socket. */
+ ret = listen(sockfd, backlog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ int child_sockfd, ret;
+ struct sockaddr_un connect_addr;
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ /* Creates a client stream unix socket. */
+ child_sockfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+ /* Sets unix socket address parameters */
+ memset(&connect_addr, 0, sizeof(connect_addr));
+ connect_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strcpy(connect_addr.sun_path, unix_address_path);
+
+ /* Makes connection to the listening unix socket. */
+ ret = connect(child_sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&connect_addr,
+ SUN_LEN(&connect_addr));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Accepts connection from the child. */
+ accept_fd = accept(sockfd, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, accept_fd);
+
+ /* Closes connection. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(accept_fd));
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the parent. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ /* Deletes address full path link. */
+ unlink(unix_address_path);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F(port, bind_connect_unix_dgram_socket)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ int sockfd, ruleset_fd, status, ret;
+ struct sockaddr_un addr_unix;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and bind operations to the self->port[0]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Deletes address full path link from previous server launching
+ * if was any.
+ */
+ unlink(unix_address_path);
+
+ /* Creates a server datagram unix socket. */
+ sockfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+
+ /* Sets unix socket address parameters */
+ memset(&addr_unix, 0, sizeof(addr_unix));
+ addr_unix.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strcpy(addr_unix.sun_path, unix_address_path);
+
+ /* Binds the socket to unix address */
+ ret = bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unix, SUN_LEN(&addr_unix));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ int child_sockfd, ret;
+ struct sockaddr_un connect_addr;
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ /* Creates a client datagram unix socket. */
+ child_sockfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+ /* Sets unix socket address parameters */
+ memset(&connect_addr, 0, sizeof(connect_addr));
+ connect_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strcpy(connect_addr.sun_path, unix_address_path);
+
+ /* Makes connection to the server unix socket. */
+ ret = connect(child_sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&connect_addr,
+ SUN_LEN(&connect_addr));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /* Closes socket for the parent. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ /* Deletes address full path link. */
+ unlink(unix_address_path);
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, inval_port_format)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ /* Wrong port format. */
+ .port = htons(self->port[0]),
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ /* Correct port format. */
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT16_MAX,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT16_MAX + 1,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_5 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT16_MAX + 2,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_6 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT32_MAX + 1UL,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_7 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT32_MAX + 2UL,
+ };
+ int sockfd, ruleset_fd, ret;
+ bool little_endian = false;
+ unsigned int i = 1;
+ int one = 1;
+ char *c;
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Allows bind action for socket with wrong port format. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+
+ /* Allows bind action for socket with correct port format. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+
+ /* Allows bind action for socket with port U16_MAX. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_3, 0));
+
+ /* Denies bind action for socket with port U16_MAX + 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_4, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Denies bind action for socket with port U16_MAX + 2. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_5, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Denies bind action for socket with port U32_MAX + 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_6, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Denies bind action for socket with port U32_MAX + 2. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_7, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ /* Checks endianness. */
+ c = (char *)&i;
+ if (*c)
+ little_endian = true;
+
+ /* Creates a socket. */
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to port[0] with wrong format . */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ if (little_endian) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ /* No error for big-endinan cpu by default. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Closes the connection*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to port[1] with correct format. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ if (little_endian) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ } else {
+ /* No error for big-endinan cpu by default. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Closes the connection*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ if (variant->is_ipv4)
+ self->addr4[0].sin_port = htons(UINT16_MAX);
+ else
+ self->addr6[0].sin6_port = htons(UINT16_MAX);
+
+ /* Creates a socket. */
+ sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to port[0] UINT16_MAX. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Closes the connection*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.25.1
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