netdev - [PATCH net v2 3/4] net/sched: sch_qfq: account for stab overhead in qfq

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Fri,  7 Jul 2023 18:59:59 -0300
From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@...atatu.com>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: jhs@...atatu.com,
	xiyou.wangcong@...il.com,
	jiri@...nulli.us,
	davem@...emloft.net,
	edumazet@...gle.com,
	kuba@...nel.org,
	pabeni@...hat.com,
	shuah@...nel.org,
	shaozhengchao@...wei.com,
	victor@...atatu.com,
	simon.horman@...igine.com,
	paolo.valente@...more.it,
	Pedro Tammela <pctammela@...atatu.com>,
	Lion <nnamrec@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH net v2 3/4] net/sched: sch_qfq: account for stab overhead in qfq_enqueue

Lion says:
-------
In the QFQ scheduler a similar issue to CVE-2023-31436
persists.

Consider the following code in net/sched/sch_qfq.c:

static int qfq_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
                struct sk_buff **to_free)
{
     unsigned int len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb), gso_segs;

    // ...

     if (unlikely(cl->agg->lmax < len)) {
         pr_debug("qfq: increasing maxpkt from %u to %u for class %u",
              cl->agg->lmax, len, cl->common.classid);
         err = qfq_change_agg(sch, cl, cl->agg->class_weight, len);
         if (err) {
             cl->qstats.drops++;
             return qdisc_drop(skb, sch, to_free);
         }

    // ...

     }

Similarly to CVE-2023-31436, "lmax" is increased without any bounds
checks according to the packet length "len". Usually this would not
impose a problem because packet sizes are naturally limited.

This is however not the actual packet length, rather the
"qdisc_pkt_len(skb)" which might apply size transformations according to
"struct qdisc_size_table" as created by "qdisc_get_stab()" in
net/sched/sch_api.c if the TCA_STAB option was set when modifying the qdisc.

A user may choose virtually any size using such a table.

As a result the same issue as in CVE-2023-31436 can occur, allowing heap
out-of-bounds read / writes in the kmalloc-8192 cache.
-------

We can create the issue with the following commands:

tc qdisc add dev $DEV root handle 1: stab mtu 2048 tsize 512 mpu 0 \
overhead 999999999 linklayer ethernet qfq
tc class add dev $DEV parent 1: classid 1:1 htb rate 6mbit burst 15k
tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1: matchall classid 1:1
ping -I $DEV 1.1.1.2

This is caused by incorrectly assuming that qdisc_pkt_len() returns a
length within the QFQ_MIN_LMAX < len < QFQ_MAX_LMAX.

Fixes: 462dbc9101ac ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost")
Reported-by: Lion <nnamrec@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@...atatu.com>
---
 net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c
index 63a5b277c117..befaf74b33ca 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c
@@ -381,8 +381,13 @@ static int qfq_change_agg(struct Qdisc *sch, struct qfq_class *cl, u32 weight,
 			   u32 lmax)
 {
 	struct qfq_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
-	struct qfq_aggregate *new_agg = qfq_find_agg(q, lmax, weight);
+	struct qfq_aggregate *new_agg;
 
+	/* 'lmax' can range from [QFQ_MIN_LMAX, pktlen + stab overhead] */
+	if (lmax > QFQ_MAX_LMAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	new_agg = qfq_find_agg(q, lmax, weight);
 	if (new_agg == NULL) { /* create new aggregate */
 		new_agg = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_agg), GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (new_agg == NULL)
-- 
2.39.2