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Message-ID: <CAF=yD-Lb2k02TLaCQHwFSG=eQrWCnvqHVaWuK2viGqiCdwAxwg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 22:01:57 -0400
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
To: Yan Zhai <yan@...udflare.com>
Cc: "open list:NETWORKING [TCP]" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-team@...udflare.com,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>, Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, Andrew Melnychenko <andrew@...nix.com>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>, open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:SCTP PROTOCOL" <linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] gso: fix GSO_DODGY bit handling for related protocols
On Wed, Jul 12, 2023 at 9:55 PM Yan Zhai <yan@...udflare.com> wrote:
>
> SKB_GSO_DODGY bit indicates a GSO packet comes from an untrusted source.
> The canonical way is to recompute the gso_segs to avoid device driver
> issues. Afterwards, the DODGY bit can be removed to avoid re-check at the
> egress of later devices, e.g. packets can egress to a vlan device backed
> by a real NIC.
>
> Commit 1fd54773c267 ("udp: allow header check for dodgy GSO_UDP_L4
> packets.") checks DODGY bit for UDP, but for packets that can be fed
> directly to the device after gso_segs reset, it actually falls through
> to fragmentation [1].
>
> Commit 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") and commit 3820c3f3e417
> ("[TCP]: Reset gso_segs if packet is dodgy") both didn't remove the DODGY
> bit after recomputing gso_segs.
>
> This change fixes the GSO_UDP_L4 handling case, and remove the DODGY bit
> at other places.
These two things should not be conflated.
Only the USO fix is strictly needed to fix the reported issue.
> Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support")
> Fixes: 3820c3f3e417 ("[TCP]: Reset gso_segs if packet is dodgy")
> Fixes: 1fd54773c267 ("udp: allow header check for dodgy GSO_UDP_L4 packets.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAJPywTKDdjtwkLVUW6LRA2FU912qcDmQOQGt2WaDo28KzYDg+A@mail.gmail.com/
> Signed-off-by: Yan Zhai <yan@...udflare.com>
>
> ---
> [1]:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAJPywTKDdjtwkLVUW6LRA2FU912qcDmQOQGt2WaDo28KzYDg+A@mail.gmail.com/
>
> ---
> net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c | 1 +
> net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
> net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
> net/sctp/offload.c | 2 ++
> 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
> index 8311c38267b5..f9b93708c22e 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
> @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
> /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
>
> skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
> + skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &= ~SKB_GSO_DODGY;
>
> segs = NULL;
> goto out;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
> index 75aa4de5b731..bd29cf19bb6b 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
> @@ -388,11 +388,22 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp4_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
> if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
> goto out;
>
> - if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 &&
> - !skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST))
> - return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, false);
> -
> mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
Why move the block below this line?
> +
> + if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4) {
> + if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
> + /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset actual gso_segs */
> + skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - sizeof(*uh),
> + mss);
> + skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &= ~SKB_GSO_DODGY;
> +
> + segs = NULL;
> + goto out;
> + } else {
> + return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, false);
> + }
> + }
> +
The validation should take place inside __udp_gso_segment.
Revert the previous patch to always enter that function for USO packets:
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4)
return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, false);
And in that function decide to return NULL after validation.
> if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
> goto out;
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
> index ad3b8726873e..6857d9f7bd06 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
> @@ -43,11 +43,22 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
> if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
> goto out;
>
> - if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 &&
> - !skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST))
> - return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, true);
> -
> mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
> +
> + if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4) {
> + if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
> + /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset actual gso_segs */
> + skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - sizeof(*uh),
> + mss);
> + skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &= ~SKB_GSO_DODGY;
> +
> + segs = NULL;
> + goto out;
> + } else {
> + return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, true);
> + }
> + }
> +
> if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
> goto out;
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/offload.c b/net/sctp/offload.c
> index 502095173d88..3d2b44db0d42 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/offload.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/offload.c
> @@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *sctp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
> skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter)
> pinfo->gso_segs++;
>
> + pinfo->gso_type &= ~SKB_GSO_DODGY;
> +
> segs = NULL;
> goto out;
> }
> --
> 2.30.2
>
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