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Message-Id: <eae51cdb1d15c914577a88fb5cd9d1c4b1121642.1691584074.git.sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 14:58:51 +0200
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>,
Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@...ek.ru>,
Frantisek Krenzelok <fkrenzel@...hat.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>,
Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@...zon.com>,
Boris Pismenny <borisp@...dia.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Gal Pressman <gal@...dia.com>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>
Subject: [PATCH net-next v3 2/6] tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending
When a TLS handshake record carrying a KeyUpdate message is received,
all subsequent records will be encrypted with a new key. We need to
stop decrypting incoming records with the old key, and wait until
userspace provides a new key.
Make a note of this in the RX context just after decrypting that
record, and stop recvmsg/splice calls with EKEYEXPIRED until the new
key is available.
v3:
- move key_update_pending check into tls_rx_rec_wait (Jakub)
- TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE was added to include/net/tls_prot.h by
the tls handshake series, drop that from this patch
- move key_update_pending into an existing hole
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
---
include/net/tls.h | 3 +++
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
index 06fca9160346..219a4f38c0e4 100644
--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ extern const struct tls_cipher_size_desc tls_cipher_size_desc[];
#define TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(info) ((info)->cipher_type)
+#define TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEYUPDATE 24 /* rfc8446 B.3: Key update */
+
#define TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE 13
#define MAX_IV_SIZE 16
@@ -141,6 +143,7 @@ struct tls_sw_context_rx {
u8 async_capable:1;
u8 zc_capable:1;
u8 reader_contended:1;
+ bool key_update_pending;
struct tls_strparser strp;
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 2ca0eb90a2a5..497f56c5f169 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1293,6 +1293,10 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
long timeo;
+ /* a rekey is pending, let userspace deal with it */
+ if (unlikely(ctx->key_update_pending))
+ return -EKEYEXPIRED;
+
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {
@@ -1689,6 +1693,33 @@ tls_decrypt_device(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
return 1;
}
+static int tls_check_pending_rekey(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb);
+ const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+
+ if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE) {
+ char hs_type;
+ int err;
+
+ if (rxm->full_len < 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, &hs_type, 1);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ if (hs_type == TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEYUPDATE) {
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
+
+ rx_ctx->key_update_pending = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg)
{
@@ -1708,6 +1739,10 @@ static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx);
+ err = tls_check_pending_rekey(sk, darg->skb);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -2642,6 +2677,7 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list);
skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->async_hold);
aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
+ sw_ctx_rx->key_update_pending = false;
}
switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
--
2.40.1
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