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Message-ID: <a6dec380-1ebc-d495-da67-7bd61525d4a8@huawei.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 20:59:51 +0800
From: "liujian (CE)" <liujian56@...wei.com>
To: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
CC: <borisp@...dia.com>, <john.fastabend@...il.com>, <kuba@...nel.org>,
<davem@...emloft.net>, <edumazet@...gle.com>, <pabeni@...hat.com>,
<vfedorenko@...ek.ru>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] tls: do not return error when the tls_bigint
overflows in tls_advance_record_sn()
On 2023/9/6 19:02, Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> 2023-09-06, 14:52:37 +0800, Liu Jian wrote:
>> This is because the value of rec_seq of tls_crypto_info configured by the
>> user program is too large, for example, 0xffffffffffffff. In addition, TLS
>> is asynchronously accelerated. When tls_do_encryption() returns
>> -EINPROGRESS and sk->sk_err is set to EBADMSG due to rec_seq overflow,
>> skmsg is released before the asynchronous encryption process ends. As a
>> result, the UAF problem occurs during the asynchronous processing of the
>> encryption module.
>>
>> I didn't see the rec_seq overflow causing other problems, so let's get rid
>> of the overflow error here.
>>
>> Fixes: 635d93981786 ("net/tls: free record only on encryption error")
>> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56@...wei.com>
>> ---
>> net/tls/tls.h | 3 +--
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/tls/tls.h b/net/tls/tls.h
>> index 28a8c0e80e3c..3f0e10df8053 100644
>> --- a/net/tls/tls.h
>> +++ b/net/tls/tls.h
>> @@ -304,8 +304,7 @@ static inline void
>> tls_advance_record_sn(struct sock *sk, struct tls_prot_info *prot,
>> struct cipher_context *ctx)
>> {
>> - if (tls_bigint_increment(ctx->rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size))
>> - tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
>> + tls_bigint_increment(ctx->rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size);
>
> That seems wrong. We can't allow the record number to wrap, if breaks
> the crypto. See for example:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5288#section-6.1
>
> The real fix would be to stop the caller from freeing the skmsg and
> record if we go async. Once we go through async crypto, the record etc
> don't belong to the caller anymore, they've been transfered to the
> async callback. I'd say we need both tests in bpf_exec_tx_verdict:
> -EINPROGRESS (from before 635d93981786) and EBADMSG (from
> 635d93981786).
Thanks for your review~
By the way, does the return of EBADMSG mean that the tls link needs to
renegotiate the encryption information or re-establish the link?
And is this okay?
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 1ed4a611631f..d1fc295b83b5 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg,
struct sock *sk,
psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
if (!psock || !policy) {
err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
tls_free_open_rec(sk);
err = -sk->sk_err;
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg,
struct sock *sk,
switch (psock->eval) {
case __SK_PASS:
err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
tls_free_open_rec(sk);
err = -sk->sk_err;
>
> Actually we need to check for both -EINPROGRESS and -EBUSY as I've
> recently found out.
>
> I've been running the selftests with async crypto and have collected a
> few fixes that I was going to post this week (but not this one, since
> we don't have a selftest for wrapping rec_seq). One of the patches
> adds -EBUSY checks for all existing -EINPROGRESS, since the crypto API
> can return -EBUSY as well if we're going through the backlog queue.
>
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