lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <3e306b0a-24b8-60d4-c516-1db738d79e92@alu.unizg.hr>
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 11:43:23 +0200
From: Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>
To: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Cc: nic_swsd@...ltek.com, Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>,
 "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll

On 9/18/23 09:41, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 18, 2023 at 8:15 AM Mirsad Todorovac
> <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr> wrote:
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> In the vanilla torvalds tree kernel on Ubuntu 22.04, commit 6.6.0-rc1-kcsan-00269-ge789286468a9,
>> KCSAN discovered a data-race in rtl8169_poll():
>>
>> [ 9591.740976] ==================================================================
>> [ 9591.740990] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4430 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4583) r8169
>>
>> [ 9591.741060] race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff888109773130 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 21:
>> [ 9591.741073] rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4430 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4583) r8169
>> [ 9591.741135] __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6527)
>> [ 9591.741149] net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6596 net/core/dev.c:6727)
>> [ 9591.741161] __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:553)
>> [ 9591.741175] __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:632)
>> [ 9591.741185] irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:647)
>> [ 9591.741194] common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 (discriminator 14))
>> [ 9591.741206] asm_common_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:636)
>> [ 9591.741217] cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:291)
>> [ 9591.741227] cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:390)
>> [ 9591.741237] call_cpuidle (kernel/sched/idle.c:135)
>> [ 9591.741249] do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:219 kernel/sched/idle.c:282)
>> [ 9591.741259] cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:378 (discriminator 1))
>> [ 9591.741268] start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:210 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:294)
>> [ 9591.741281] secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:433)
>>
>> [ 9591.741300] value changed: 0x80003fff -> 0x34044510
>>
>> [ 9591.741314] Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
>> [ 9591.741322] CPU: 21 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/21 Tainted: G             L     6.6.0-rc1-kcsan-00269-ge789286468a9-dirty #4
>> [ 9591.741334] Hardware name: ASRock X670E PG Lightning/X670E PG Lightning, BIOS 1.21 04/26/2023
>> [ 9591.741343] ==================================================================
>>
>> (The taint is not from the proprietary module, but triggered from the previous reported and unfixed bug.)
>>
>> Apparently, it is this code:
>>
>> static int rtl8169_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
>> {
>>          struct rtl8169_private *tp = container_of(napi, struct rtl8169_private, napi);
>>          struct net_device *dev = tp->dev;
>>          int work_done;
>>
>>          rtl_tx(dev, tp, budget);
>>
>> →       work_done = rtl_rx(dev, tp, budget);
>>
>>          if (work_done < budget && napi_complete_done(napi, work_done))
>>                  rtl_irq_enable(tp);
>>
>>          return work_done;
>> }
>>
>> and
>>
>> static int rtl_rx(struct net_device *dev, struct rtl8169_private *tp, int budget)
>> {
>>          struct device *d = tp_to_dev(tp);
>>          int count;
>>
>>          for (count = 0; count < budget; count++, tp->cur_rx++) {
>>                  unsigned int pkt_size, entry = tp->cur_rx % NUM_RX_DESC;
>>                  struct RxDesc *desc = tp->RxDescArray + entry;
>>                  struct sk_buff *skb;
>>                  const void *rx_buf;
>>                  dma_addr_t addr;
>>                  u32 status;
>>
>> →               status = le32_to_cpu(desc->opts1);
>>                  if (status & DescOwn)
>>                          break;
>>
>>                  /* This barrier is needed to keep us from reading
>>                   * any other fields out of the Rx descriptor until
>>                   * we know the status of DescOwn
>>                   */
>>                  dma_rmb();
>>
>>                  if (unlikely(status & RxRES)) {
>> .
>> .
>> .
>>
>> The reason isn't obvious, so it might be interesting if this is a valid report and whether it caused spurious corruption
>> of the network data on Realtek 8169 compatible cards ...
>>
> 
> I think this is pretty much expected.
> 
> Driver reads a piece of memory that the hardware can modify.
> 
> Adding data_race() annotations could avoid these false positives.
> 
>> Hope this helps.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Mirsad Todorovac

Well, another approach was this quick fix that eliminated all those rtl8169_poll() KCSAN warnings.

If READ_ONCE(desc->opts1) fixed it, then maybe there is more to this than meets the eye?

-------------------------------------------------
  drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
index 6351a2dc13bc..051551ee2a15 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
@@ -4427,7 +4427,7 @@ static int rtl_rx(struct net_device *dev, struct rtl8169_private *tp, int budget
                 dma_addr_t addr;
                 u32 status;
  
-               status = le32_to_cpu(desc->opts1);
+               status = le32_to_cpu(READ_ONCE(desc->opts1));
                 if (status & DescOwn)
                         break;
  

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ