Message-ID: <CANpmjNP=jY2NzrXX4mgY5cL5tqZeLb18gQkzVhg1OofNtJ1VSw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 08:02:58 +0200
From: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
To: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
Cc: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>, netdev@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, nic_swsd@...ltek.com, 
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, 
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v1 1/3] r8169: fix the KCSAN reported data-race in
 rtl_tx() while reading tp->cur_tx

On Wed, 27 Sept 2023 at 21:52, Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On 27.09.2023 20:41, Mirsad Goran Todorovac wrote:
> > KCSAN reported the following data-race:
> >
> > ==================================================================
> > BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rtl8169_poll [r8169] / rtl8169_start_xmit [r8169]
> >
> > write (marked) to 0xffff888102474b74 of 4 bytes by task 5358 on cpu 29:
> > rtl8169_start_xmit (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4254) r8169
> > dev_hard_start_xmit (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4889 ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 net/core/dev.c:3544 net/core/dev.c:3560)
> > sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:342)
> > __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3817 net/core/dev.c:4306)
> > ip_finish_output2 (./include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 ./include/net/neighbour.h:526 ./include/net/neighbour.h:540 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:233)
> > __ip_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:311 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:293)
> > ip_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:328)
> > ip_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:435)
> > ip_send_skb (./include/net/dst.h:458 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:127 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1486)
> > udp_send_skb (net/ipv4/udp.c:963)
> > udp_sendmsg (net/ipv4/udp.c:1246)
> > inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:840 (discriminator 4))
> > sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:753)
> > __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2177)
> > __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2185)
> > do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
> >
> > read to 0xffff888102474b74 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 21:
> > rtl8169_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4397 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c:4581) r8169
> > __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6527)
> > net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6596 net/core/dev.c:6727)
> > __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:553)
> > __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:632)
> > irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:647)
> > common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 (discriminator 14))
> > asm_common_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:636)
> > cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:291)
> > cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:390)
> > call_cpuidle (kernel/sched/idle.c:135)
> > do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:219 kernel/sched/idle.c:282)
> > cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:378 (discriminator 1))
> > start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:210 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:294)
> > secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:433)
> >
> > value changed: 0x002f4815 -> 0x002f4816
> >
> > Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> > CPU: 21 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/21 Tainted: G             L     6.6.0-rc2-kcsan-00143-gb5cbe7c00aa0 #41
> > Hardware name: ASRock X670E PG Lightning/X670E PG Lightning, BIOS 1.21 04/26/2023
> > ==================================================================
> >
> > The write side of drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c is:
> > ==================
> >    4251         /* rtl_tx needs to see descriptor changes before updated tp->cur_tx */
> >    4252         smp_wmb();
> >    4253
> >  → 4254         WRITE_ONCE(tp->cur_tx, tp->cur_tx + frags + 1);
> >    4255
> >    4256         stop_queue = !netif_subqueue_maybe_stop(dev, 0, rtl_tx_slots_avail(tp),
> >    4257                                                 R8169_TX_STOP_THRS,
> >    4258                                                 R8169_TX_START_THRS);
> >
> > The read side is the function rtl_tx():
> >
> >    4355 static void rtl_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct rtl8169_private *tp,
> >    4356                    int budget)
> >    4357 {
> >    4358         unsigned int dirty_tx, bytes_compl = 0, pkts_compl = 0;
> >    4359         struct sk_buff *skb;
> >    4360
> >    4361         dirty_tx = tp->dirty_tx;
> >    4362
> >    4363         while (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx) {
> >    4364                 unsigned int entry = dirty_tx % NUM_TX_DESC;
> >    4365                 u32 status;
> >    4366
> >    4367                 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->TxDescArray[entry].opts1);
> >    4368                 if (status & DescOwn)
> >    4369                         break;
> >    4370
> >    4371                 skb = tp->tx_skb[entry].skb;
> >    4372                 rtl8169_unmap_tx_skb(tp, entry);
> >    4373
> >    4374                 if (skb) {
> >    4375                         pkts_compl++;
> >    4376                         bytes_compl += skb->len;
> >    4377                         napi_consume_skb(skb, budget);
> >    4378                 }
> >    4379                 dirty_tx++;
> >    4380         }
> >    4381
> >    4382         if (tp->dirty_tx != dirty_tx) {
> >    4383                 dev_sw_netstats_tx_add(dev, pkts_compl, bytes_compl);
> >    4384                 WRITE_ONCE(tp->dirty_tx, dirty_tx);
> >    4385
> >    4386                 netif_subqueue_completed_wake(dev, 0, pkts_compl, bytes_compl,
> >    4387                                               rtl_tx_slots_avail(tp),
> >    4388                                               R8169_TX_START_THRS);
> >    4389                 /*
> >    4390                  * 8168 hack: TxPoll requests are lost when the Tx packets are
> >    4391                  * too close. Let's kick an extra TxPoll request when a burst
> >    4392                  * of start_xmit activity is detected (if it is not detected,
> >    4393                  * it is slow enough). -- FR
> >    4394                  * If skb is NULL then we come here again once a tx irq is
> >    4395                  * triggered after the last fragment is marked transmitted.
> >    4396                  */
> >  → 4397                 if (tp->cur_tx != dirty_tx && skb)
> >    4398                         rtl8169_doorbell(tp);
> >    4399         }
> >    4400 }
> >
> > Obviously from the code, an earlier detected data-race for tp->cur_tx was fixed in the
> > line 4363:
> >
> >    4363         while (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx) {
> >
> > but the same solution is required for protecting the other access to tp->cur_tx:
> >
> >  → 4397                 if (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx && skb)
> >    4398                         rtl8169_doorbell(tp);
> >
> > The write in the line 4254 is protected with WRITE_ONCE(), but the read in the line 4397
> > might have suffered read tearing under some compiler optimisations.
> >
> > The fix eliminated the KCSAN data-race report for this bug.
> >
> > It is yet to be evaluated what happens if tp->cur_tx changes between the test in line 4363
> > and line 4397. This test should certainly not be cached by the compiler in some register
> > for such a long time, while asynchronous writes to tp->cur_tx might have occurred in line
> > 4254 in the meantime.
> >
>
> netif_subqueue_completed_wake() has barriers ensuring that no cached value for tp->cur_tx
> is used in line 4397. I'm not aware of any reported issues with an obvious link to the
> potentential issue you describe.
> I don't have a strong opinion on these patches. They shouldn't hurt, and if they make
> KCSAN happy, why not.

Barries don't protect unmarked accesses from being miscompiled. So the
use of barriers and marked accesses like READ_ONCE() is correct:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/tools/memory-model/Documentation/access-marking.txt
That said, actually encountering a miscompilation depends on
architecture and compiler. Using the right marked accesses just
ensures things don't suddenly break because the compiler decided to be
a little more clever.

> > Fixes: 94d8a98e6235c ("r8169: reduce number of workaround doorbell rings")
> > Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
> > Cc: nic_swsd@...ltek.com
> > Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> > Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
> > Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> > Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
> > Cc: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> > Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/dc7fc8fa-4ea4-e9a9-30a6-7c83e6b53188@alu.unizg.hr/
> > Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>

Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>

> > ---
> > v1:
> >  the initial patch proposal. fixes the KCSAN warning.
> >
> >  drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> > index 6351a2dc13bc..281aaa851847 100644
> > --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> > +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> > @@ -4394,7 +4394,7 @@ static void rtl_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct rtl8169_private *tp,
> >                * If skb is NULL then we come here again once a tx irq is
> >                * triggered after the last fragment is marked transmitted.
> >                */
> > -             if (tp->cur_tx != dirty_tx && skb)
> > +             if (READ_ONCE(tp->cur_tx) != dirty_tx && skb)
> >                       rtl8169_doorbell(tp);
> >       }
> >  }
>

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