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Message-ID: <20231013220433.70792-9-kuniyu@amazon.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2023 15:04:30 -0700
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Eric Dumazet
	<edumazet@...gle.com>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni
	<pabeni@...hat.com>, David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov
	<ast@...nel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Andrii Nakryiko
	<andrii@...nel.org>, Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>, Song Liu
	<song@...nel.org>, Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>, John Fastabend
	<john.fastabend@...il.com>, KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Stanislav Fomichev
	<sdf@...gle.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@...com>
CC: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>, Kuniyuki Iwashima
	<kuni1840@...il.com>, <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v1 bpf-next 08/11] bpf: tcp: Make TS available for SYN Cookie storage.

BPF_SOCK_OPS_GEN_SYNCOOKIE_CB can now encode more information into
TS value via bpf_sock_ops.replylong[1], which will be looped back to
bpf_sock_ops.args[1] of BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB to validate.

After invoking BPF_SOCK_OPS_GEN_SYNCOOKIE_CB hook, we set 1 to
inet_rsk(req)->bpf_cookie and saves bpf_sock_ops.replylong[1] in
inet_rsk(req)->bpf_cookie_tsval.  Later in cookie_init_timestamp(),
we use bpf_cookie_tsval as TS value if bpf_cookie is 1.

Also, we set 0 to tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off so that the generated TS value is
sent as is.  This is to remove host-specific bits from SYN Cookie for
scalability.  However, ts_off is implemented to randomise TS value for
each peer for security reasons.  Thus, the TS value must look like a
random number.  For example, init TS with a random number first and use
a few bits to encode client information.

Before invoking BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB hook, we need not adjust
tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr as ts_off was 0 when sending the timestamp.  Also, we
need to initialise tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off with tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr -
tcp_ns_to_ts(tcp_clock_ns()) so that the timestamp after 3WHS will be the
initial TS + delta.

  SYN+ACK    : Initial TS

  After 3WHS : tcp_ns_to_ts(tcp_clock_ns()) + tp->tsoffset
               = tcp_ns_to_ts(tcp_clock_ns())   <-- In tcp_established_options()
                 + tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr
                 - tcp_ns_to_ts(tcp_clock_ns()) <-- When validating ACK
               = Initial TS + delta

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
---
 include/net/inet_sock.h        |  4 ++-
 include/net/tcp.h              |  5 ++--
 include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       | 12 ++++++---
 net/ipv4/syncookies.c          | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c           |  4 +++
 net/ipv6/syncookies.c          | 23 +++++++++--------
 tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 12 ++++++---
 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/inet_sock.h b/include/net/inet_sock.h
index 98e11958cdff..19b3ddcda0f8 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_sock.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_sock.h
@@ -87,8 +87,10 @@ struct inet_request_sock {
 				ecn_ok	   : 1,
 				acked	   : 1,
 				no_srccheck: 1,
-				smc_ok	   : 1;
+				smc_ok	   : 1,
+				bpf_cookie : 1;
 	u32                     ir_mark;
+	u32			bpf_cookie_tsval;
 	union {
 		struct ip_options_rcu __rcu	*ireq_opt;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 90d95acdc34a..4fe19917db6c 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -2161,10 +2161,11 @@ static inline __u32 cookie_init_sequence(const struct tcp_request_sock_ops *ops,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
 int bpf_skops_cookie_check(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
-			   struct sk_buff *skb);
+			   struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt);
 #else
 static inline int bpf_skops_cookie_check(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
-					 struct sk_buff *skb)
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index e6f1507d7895..24f673d88c0d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -6865,16 +6865,22 @@ enum {
 					 * earlier bpf-progs.
 					 */
 	BPF_SOCK_OPS_GEN_SYNCOOKIE_CB,	/* Generate SYN Cookie (ISN of
-					 * SYN+ACK).
+					 * SYN+ACK) and value of Timestamps
+					 * option.
 					 *
 					 * args[0]: MSS
 					 *
 					 * replylong[0]: ISN
+					 * replylong[1]: TS
+					 *
+					 * TS value must look like random
+					 * for security reasons.
 					 */
-	BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB,/* Validate SYN Cookie and set
-					 * MSS.
+	BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB,/* Validate SYN Cookie and TS and
+					 * set MSS.
 					 *
 					 * args[0]: ISN
+					 * args[1]: TS
 					 *
 					 * replylong[0]: MSS
 					 */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
index b1dd415863ff..f78566991e08 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
@@ -62,11 +62,12 @@ static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
  */
 u64 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req, u64 now)
 {
-	struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
-	u32 ts, ts_now = tcp_ns_to_ts(now);
-	u32 options = 0;
+	struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
+	u32 ts, ts_now;
+	u32 options;
 
-	ireq = inet_rsk(req);
+	if (ireq->bpf_cookie)
+		return ireq->bpf_cookie_tsval * (NSEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ);
 
 	options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK;
 	if (ireq->sack_ok)
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ u64 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req, u64 now)
 	if (ireq->ecn_ok)
 		options |= TS_OPT_ECN;
 
+	ts_now = tcp_ns_to_ts(now);
 	ts = ts_now & ~TSMASK;
 	ts |= options;
 	if (ts > ts_now) {
@@ -318,15 +320,25 @@ struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(const struct request_sock_ops *ops,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc);
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES)
-int bpf_skops_cookie_check(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req, struct sk_buff *skb)
+int bpf_skops_cookie_check(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			   struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt)
 {
 	struct bpf_sock_ops_kern sock_ops;
+	struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+
+	if (tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) {
+		if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps))
+			goto err;
+
+		tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr - tcp_ns_to_ts(tcp_clock_ns());
+	}
 
 	memset(&sock_ops, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern, temp));
 
 	sock_ops.op = BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB;
 	sock_ops.sk = req_to_sk(req);
 	sock_ops.args[0] = tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn;
+	sock_ops.args[1] = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr;
 
 	bpf_skops_init_skb(&sock_ops, skb, tcp_hdrlen(skb));
 
@@ -393,15 +405,17 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
 	tcp_parse_options(net, skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
 
-	if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
-		tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(net,
-					  ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
-					  ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
-		tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
-	}
+	if (!bpf_cookie) {
+		if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
+			tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(net,
+						  ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+						  ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
+			tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
+		}
 
-	if (!bpf_cookie && !cookie_timestamp_decode(net, &tcp_opt))
-		goto out;
+		if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(net, &tcp_opt))
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	req = cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops,
 				     &tcp_request_sock_ipv4_ops, sk, skb);
@@ -418,11 +432,13 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	sk_daddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
 
 	if (bpf_cookie) {
-		mss = bpf_skops_cookie_check(sk, req, skb);
+		mss = bpf_skops_cookie_check(sk, req, skb, &tcp_opt);
 		if (!mss) {
 			reqsk_free(req);
 			goto out;
 		}
+	} else {
+		treq->ts_off = tsoff;
 	}
 
 	req->mss		= mss;
@@ -433,7 +449,6 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	ireq->tstamp_ok		= tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
 	req->ts_recent		= tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
 	treq->rcv_isn		= ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
-	treq->ts_off		= tsoff;
 	treq->txhash		= net_tx_rndhash();
 	treq->snt_synack	= 0;
 	treq->tfo_listener	= false;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index c86a737e4fe6..feb44bff29ef 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -6987,6 +6987,10 @@ static int bpf_skops_cookie_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *
 
 	*isn = sock_ops.replylong[0];
 
+	inet_rsk(req)->bpf_cookie = 1;
+	inet_rsk(req)->bpf_cookie_tsval = sock_ops.replylong[1];
+	tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = 0;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 #else
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index 3e920e7eb5d3..b0a7ea75a504 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -165,15 +165,17 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
 	tcp_parse_options(net, skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
 
-	if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
-		tsoff = secure_tcpv6_ts_off(net,
-					    ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
-					    ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32);
-		tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
-	}
+	if (!bpf_cookie) {
+		if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
+			tsoff = secure_tcpv6_ts_off(net,
+						    ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
+						    ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32);
+			tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
+		}
 
-	if (!bpf_cookie && !cookie_timestamp_decode(net, &tcp_opt))
-		goto out;
+		if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(net, &tcp_opt))
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	req = cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(&tcp6_request_sock_ops,
 				     &tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops, sk, skb);
@@ -190,11 +192,13 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	treq->snt_isn = cookie;
 
 	if (bpf_cookie) {
-		mss = bpf_skops_cookie_check(sk, req, skb);
+		mss = bpf_skops_cookie_check(sk, req, skb, &tcp_opt);
 		if (!mss) {
 			reqsk_free(req);
 			goto out;
 		}
+	} else {
+		treq->ts_off = tsoff;
 	}
 
 	if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req))
@@ -226,7 +230,6 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	treq->tfo_listener = false;
 	treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
 	treq->snt_isn = cookie;
-	treq->ts_off = tsoff;
 	treq->txhash = net_tx_rndhash();
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC))
 		ireq->smc_ok = 0;
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index e6f1507d7895..24f673d88c0d 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -6865,16 +6865,22 @@ enum {
 					 * earlier bpf-progs.
 					 */
 	BPF_SOCK_OPS_GEN_SYNCOOKIE_CB,	/* Generate SYN Cookie (ISN of
-					 * SYN+ACK).
+					 * SYN+ACK) and value of Timestamps
+					 * option.
 					 *
 					 * args[0]: MSS
 					 *
 					 * replylong[0]: ISN
+					 * replylong[1]: TS
+					 *
+					 * TS value must look like random
+					 * for security reasons.
 					 */
-	BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB,/* Validate SYN Cookie and set
-					 * MSS.
+	BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB,/* Validate SYN Cookie and TS and
+					 * set MSS.
 					 *
 					 * args[0]: ISN
+					 * args[1]: TS
 					 *
 					 * replylong[0]: MSS
 					 */
-- 
2.30.2


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