netdev - Re: [PATCH v1 bpf-next 00/11] bpf: tcp: Add SYN Cookie generation/validation SOCK

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Message-ID: <CAF=yD-++2Qr+-T4iGbJc-k0KXk_X6rH5rHoPcCOs6Lxnzu2_GA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 14:41:25 -0400
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
To: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
Cc: andrii@...nel.org, ast@...nel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org, 
	daniel@...earbox.net, davem@...emloft.net, dsahern@...nel.org, 
	edumazet@...gle.com, haoluo@...gle.com, john.fastabend@...il.com, 
	jolsa@...nel.org, kpsingh@...nel.org, kuba@...nel.org, kuni1840@...il.com, 
	martin.lau@...ux.dev, mykolal@...com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, 
	pabeni@...hat.com, sdf@...gle.com, song@...nel.org, yonghong.song@...ux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 bpf-next 00/11] bpf: tcp: Add SYN Cookie
 generation/validation SOCK_OPS hooks.

On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 12:46 PM Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com> wrote:
>
> From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
> Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 10:19:18 -0400
> > Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> > > Under SYN Flood, the TCP stack generates SYN Cookie to remain stateless
> > > for the connection request until a valid ACK is responded to the SYN+ACK.
> > >
> > > The cookie contains two kinds of host-specific bits, a timestamp and
> > > secrets, so only can it be validated by the generator.  It means SYN
> > > Cookie consumes network resources between the client and the server;
> > > intermediate nodes must remember which nodes to route ACK for the cookie.
> > >
> > > SYN Proxy reduces such unwanted resource allocation by handling 3WHS at
> > > the edge network.  After SYN Proxy completes 3WHS, it forwards SYN to the
> > > backend server and completes another 3WHS.  However, since the server's
> > > ISN differs from the cookie, the proxy must manage the ISN mappings and
> > > fix up SEQ/ACK numbers in every packet for each connection.  If a proxy
> > > node is down, all the connections through it are also down.  Keeping a
> > > state at proxy is painful from that perspective.
> > >
> > > At AWS, we use a dirty hack to build truly stateless SYN Proxy at scale.
> > > Our SYN Proxy consists of the front proxy layer and the backend kernel
> > > module.  (See slides of netconf [0], p6 - p15)
> > >
> > > The cookie that SYN Proxy generates differs from the kernel's cookie in
> > > that it contains a secret (called rolling salt) (i) shared by all the proxy
> > > nodes so that any node can validate ACK and (ii) updated periodically so
> > > that old cookies cannot be validated.  Also, ISN contains WScale, SACK, and
> > > ECN, not in TS val.  This is not to sacrifice any connection quality, where
> > > some customers turn off the timestamp option due to retro CVE.
> >
> > If easier: I think it should be possible to make the host secret
> > readable and writable with CAP_NET_ADMIN, to allow synchronizing
> > between hosts.
>
> I think the idea is doable for syncookie_secret and syncookie6_secret.
> However, the cookie timestamp is generated based on jiffies that cannot
> be written.
>
> [ I answered sharing secrets would resolve our issue at netconf, but
>   I was wrong. ]
>
>
> > For similar reasons as suggested here, a rolling salt might be
> > useful more broadly too.
>
> Maybe we need not use jiffies and can create a worker to update the
> secret periodically if it's not configured manually.
>
> The problem here would be that we need to update/read u64[4] atomically
> if we want to use SipHash or HSipHash.  Maybe this also can be changed.
>
> But, we still want to use BPF as we need to encode (at least) WS and
> SACK bits in ISN, not TS and use different MSS candidates rather than
> msstab.
>
> Also, in our use case, the validation for cookie itself is done in
> the front proxy layer, and the kernel will do more light-weight
> validation like checking if the cookie is forwarded from trusted
> nodes.  Then, we can prevent invalid ACK from flowing through the
> backend and consuming some networking entries, and the backend need
> not do full validation.
>
> With BPF, we can get such flexibility at encoding and validation, and
> making cookie generation algorithm private could be good for security.

Thanks for that context. Sounds like it indeed would not be a small
change to support your use case in the existing syncookie C code,
then.