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Message-ID: <42d66dde-29d6-f948-bc2e-72465beb800f@linux.dev>
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 14:35:47 -0700
From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
To: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
Cc: andrii@...nel.org, ast@...nel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
daniel@...earbox.net, davem@...emloft.net, dsahern@...nel.org,
edumazet@...gle.com, haoluo@...gle.com, john.fastabend@...il.com,
jolsa@...nel.org, kpsingh@...nel.org, kuba@...nel.org, kuni1840@...il.com,
mykolal@...com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, pabeni@...hat.com, sdf@...gle.com,
sinquersw@...il.com, song@...nel.org, yonghong.song@...ux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 bpf-next 00/11] bpf: tcp: Add SYN Cookie
generation/validation SOCK_OPS hooks.
On 10/20/23 11:48 PM, Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> I think this was doable. With the diff below, I was able to skip
> validation in cookie_v[46]_check() when if skb->sk is not NULL.
>
> The kfunc allocates req and set req->syncookie to 1, which is usually
> set in TX path, so if it's 1 in RX (inet_steal_sock()), we can see
> that req is allocated by kfunc (at least, req->syncookie &&
> req->rsk_listener never be true in the current TCP stack).
>
> The difference here is that req allocated by kfunc holds refcnt of
> rsk_listener (passing true to inet_reqsk_alloc()) to prevent freeing
> the listener until req reaches cookie_v[46]_check().
The cookie_v[46]_check() holds the listener sk refcnt now?
>
> The cookie generation at least should be done at tc/xdp. The
> valdation can be done earlier as well on tc/xdp, but it could
> add another complexity, listener's life cycle if we allocate
> req there.
I think your code below looks pretty close already.
It seems the only concern/complexity is the extra rsk_listener refcnt (btw the
concern is on performance for the extra refcnt? or there is correctness issue?).
Asking because bpf_sk_assign() can already assign a listener to skb->sk and it
also does not take a refcnt on the listener. The same no refcnt needed on
req->rsk_listener should be doable also. sock_pfree may need to be smarter to
check req->syncookie. What else may need to change?
>
> I'm wondering which place to add the validation capability, and
> I think SOCK_OPS is simpler than tc.
>
> #1 validate cookie and allocate req at tc, and skip validation
>
> #2 validate cookie (and update bpf map at xdp/tc, and look up bpf
> map) and allocate req at SOCK_OPS hook
>
> Given SYN proxy is usually on the other node and incoming cookie
> is almost always valid, we might need not validate it in the early
> stage in the stack.
>
> What do you think ?
Yeah, supporting validation in sock_ops is an open option if the tc side is too
hard but I feel you are pretty close on the tc side.
>
> ---8<---
> diff --git a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
> index 3ecfeadbfa06..e5e4627bf270 100644
> --- a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
> +++ b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
> @@ -462,9 +462,19 @@ struct sock *inet_steal_sock(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, int doff,
> if (!sk)
> return NULL;
>
> - if (!prefetched || !sk_fullsock(sk))
> + if (!prefetched)
> return sk;
>
> + if (!sk_fullsock(sk)) {
> + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV && inet_reqsk(sk)->syncookie) {
> + skb->sk = sk;
> + skb->destructor = sock_pfree;
> + sk = inet_reqsk(sk)->rsk_listener;
> + }
> +
> + return sk;
> + }
> +
> if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
> if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
> return sk;
> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> index cc2e4babc85f..bca491ddf42c 100644
> --- a/net/core/filter.c
> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> @@ -11800,6 +11800,71 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_sock_addr_set_sun_path(struct bpf_sock_addr_kern *sa_kern,
>
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_sk_assign_tcp_reqsk(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,
> + struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt,
> + int tcp_opt__sz, u16 mss)
> +{
> + const struct tcp_request_sock_ops *af_ops;
> + const struct request_sock_ops *ops;
> + struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
> + struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
> + struct request_sock *req;
> +
> + if (!sk)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!skb_at_tc_ingress(skb))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (dev_net(skb->dev) != sock_net(sk))
> + return -ENETUNREACH;
> +
> + switch (sk->sk_family) {
> + case AF_INET: /* TODO: MPTCP */
> + ops = &tcp_request_sock_ops;
> + af_ops = &tcp_request_sock_ipv4_ops;
> + break;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> + case AF_INET6:
> + ops = &tcp6_request_sock_ops;
> + af_ops = &tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops;
> + break;
> +#endif
> + default:
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + req = inet_reqsk_alloc(ops, sk, true);
> + if (!req)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + ireq = inet_rsk(req);
> + treq = tcp_rsk(req);
> +
> + refcount_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 1);
> + req->syncookie = 1;
> + req->mss = mss;
> + req->ts_recent = tcp_opt->saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt->rcv_tsval : 0;
> +
> + ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt->snd_wscale;
> + ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt->sack_ok;
> + ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt->wscale_ok;
> + ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt->saw_tstamp;
> +
> + tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific = af_ops;
> + tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr - tcp_ns_to_ts(tcp_clock_ns());
> +
> + skb_orphan(skb);
> + skb->sk = req_to_sk(req);
> + skb->destructor = sock_pfree;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> __diag_pop();
>
> int bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly(struct sk_buff *skb, u64 flags,
> @@ -11828,6 +11893,10 @@ BTF_SET8_START(bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_addr)
> BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_sock_addr_set_sun_path)
> BTF_SET8_END(bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_addr)
>
> +BTF_SET8_START(bpf_kfunc_check_set_tcp_reqsk)
> +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_sk_assign_tcp_reqsk)
> +BTF_SET8_END(bpf_kfunc_check_set_tcp_reqsk)
> +
> static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_skb = {
> .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_skb,
> @@ -11843,6 +11912,11 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_sock_addr = {
> .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_addr,
> };
>
> +static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_tcp_reqsk = {
> + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> + .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_tcp_reqsk,
> +};
> +
> static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void)
> {
> int ret;
> @@ -11858,8 +11932,10 @@ static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void)
> ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, &bpf_kfunc_set_xdp);
> - return ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR,
> - &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_addr);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR,
> + &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_addr);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, &bpf_kfunc_set_tcp_reqsk);
> + return ret;
> }
> late_initcall(bpf_kfunc_init);
>
> ---8<---
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