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Message-ID: <8d9a15ac-5d95-4267-bbf2-5820d0a71a4e@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2023 09:50:00 +0200
From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
To: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: nic_swsd@...ltek.com, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/1] r8169: Coalesce RTL8411b PHY power-down
recovery programming instructions to reduce spinlock stalls (v2)
On 28.10.2023 02:51, Mirsad Goran Todorovac wrote:
> On RTL8411b the RX unit gets confused if the PHY is powered-down.
> This was reported in [0] and confirmed by Realtek. Realtek provided
> a sequence to fix the RX unit after PHY wakeup.
>
v1 and 1/1 aren't needed. And that it's v2 you don't have to add
to the patch title.
> A series of about 130 r8168_mac_ocp_write() calls is performed to
> program the RTL registers for recovery.
>
> Each call looks like this:
>
> static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data)
> {
> if (rtl_ocp_reg_failure(reg))
> return;
>
> RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (reg << 15) | data);
> }
>
> static void r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data)
> {
> unsigned long flags;
>
> raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
> __r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, reg, data);
> raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
> }
>
> Register programming is done through RTL_W32() macro which expands into
>
> #define RTL_W32(tp, reg, val32) writel((val32), tp->mmio_addr + (reg))
>
> which is further:
>
> extern inline void writel(u32 b, volatile void __iomem *addr)
> {
> mb();
> __raw_writel(b, addr);
> }
>
> mb() expands into this on x86_64:
>
> #define mb() asm volatile("lock; addl $0,0(%%esp)" ::: "memory")
>
> This means a whole lot of memory bus stalls: for spin_lock_irqsave(),
> memory barrier, writel(), and spin_unlock_irqrestore().
>
> With about 130 of these sequential calls to r8168_mac_ocp_write() this looks like
> a lock storm that will stall all of the cores and CPUs on the same memory controller
> for certain time I/O takes to finish.
>
Do you have a system with this NIC version and/or are you aware of any
actual issue?
> In a sequential case of RTL register programming, the writes to RTL registers
> can be coalesced under a same raw spinlock. This can dramatically decrease the
> number of bus stalls in a multicore or multi-CPU system:
>
> static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
> const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
> {
> struct recover_8411b_info const *p = array;
>
> while (p->reg) {
> if (!rtl_ocp_reg_failure(p->reg))
> RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (p->reg << 15) | p->data);
> p++;
> }
> }
>
> static void r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
> const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
> {
> unsigned long flags;
>
> raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
> __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, array);
> raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
> }
>
> static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
> {
>
> ...
>
> /* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
> * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
> */
>
> static const struct recover_8411b_info init_zero_seq[] = {
> { 0xFC28, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2A, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0000 },
> { 0xFC30, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC32, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC34, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC36, 0x0000 },
> { 0x0000, 0x0000 },
> };
>
> static const struct recover_8411b_info recover_seq[] = {
> { 0xF800, 0xE008 }, { 0xF802, 0xE00A }, { 0xF804, 0xE00C }, { 0xF806, 0xE00E },
> { 0xF808, 0xE027 }, { 0xF80A, 0xE04F }, { 0xF80C, 0xE05E }, { 0xF80E, 0xE065 },
> { 0xF810, 0xC602 }, { 0xF812, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF814, 0x0000 }, { 0xF816, 0xC502 },
> { 0xF818, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF81A, 0x074C }, { 0xF81C, 0xC302 }, { 0xF81E, 0xBB00 },
> { 0xF820, 0x080A }, { 0xF822, 0x6420 }, { 0xF824, 0x48C2 }, { 0xF826, 0x8C20 },
> { 0xF828, 0xC516 }, { 0xF82A, 0x64A4 }, { 0xF82C, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF82E, 0xF009 },
> { 0xF830, 0x74A2 }, { 0xF832, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF834, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF836, 0xC50E },
> { 0xF838, 0x9CA2 }, { 0xF83A, 0x1C11 }, { 0xF83C, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF83E, 0xE006 },
> { 0xF840, 0x74F8 }, { 0xF842, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF844, 0x8CF8 }, { 0xF846, 0xC404 },
> { 0xF848, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84A, 0xC403 }, { 0xF84C, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84E, 0x0BF2 },
> { 0xF850, 0x0C0A }, { 0xF852, 0xE434 }, { 0xF854, 0xD3C0 }, { 0xF856, 0x49D9 },
> { 0xF858, 0xF01F }, { 0xF85A, 0xC526 }, { 0xF85C, 0x64A5 }, { 0xF85E, 0x1400 },
> { 0xF860, 0xF007 }, { 0xF862, 0x0C01 }, { 0xF864, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF866, 0x1C15 },
> { 0xF868, 0xC51B }, { 0xF86A, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF86C, 0xE013 }, { 0xF86E, 0xC519 },
> { 0xF870, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF872, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF874, 0x8CA0 }, { 0xF876, 0xC516 },
> { 0xF878, 0x74A4 }, { 0xF87A, 0x48C8 }, { 0xF87C, 0x48CA }, { 0xF87E, 0x9CA4 },
> { 0xF880, 0xC512 }, { 0xF882, 0x1B00 }, { 0xF884, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF886, 0x1B1C },
> { 0xF888, 0x483F }, { 0xF88A, 0x9BA2 }, { 0xF88C, 0x1B04 }, { 0xF88E, 0xC508 },
> { 0xF890, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF892, 0xC505 }, { 0xF894, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF896, 0xC502 },
> { 0xF898, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF89A, 0x0300 }, { 0xF89C, 0x051E }, { 0xF89E, 0xE434 },
> { 0xF8A0, 0xE018 }, { 0xF8A2, 0xE092 }, { 0xF8A4, 0xDE20 }, { 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0 },
> { 0xF8A8, 0xC50F }, { 0xF8AA, 0x76A4 }, { 0xF8AC, 0x49E3 }, { 0xF8AE, 0xF007 },
> { 0xF8B0, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF8B2, 0xF103 }, { 0xF8B4, 0xC607 }, { 0xF8B6, 0xBE00 },
> { 0xF8B8, 0xC606 }, { 0xF8BA, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF8BC, 0xC602 }, { 0xF8BE, 0xBE00 },
> { 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C }, { 0xF8C2, 0x0C28 }, { 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C }, { 0xF8C6, 0xDC00 },
> { 0xF8C8, 0xC707 }, { 0xF8CA, 0x1D00 }, { 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2 }, { 0xF8CE, 0x48C1 },
> { 0xF8D0, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8D2, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8D4, 0x00AA }, { 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0 },
> { 0xF8D8, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8DA, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8DC, 0x0132 },
> { 0x0000, 0x0000 },
> };
>
> static const struct recover_8411b_info final_seq[] = {
> { 0xFC2A, 0x0743 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0801 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9 }, { 0xFC30, 0x02FD },
> { 0xFC32, 0x0C25 }, { 0xFC34, 0x00A9 }, { 0xFC36, 0x012D },
> { 0x0000, 0x0000 },
> };
>
> r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, init_zero_seq);
> mdelay(3);
> r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
> r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, recover_seq);
> r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
> r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, final_seq);
> }
>
Putting the whole code sequence in the commit description isn't benefitial IMO.
> The hex data is preserved intact through s/r8168_mac_ocp_write[(]tp,/{ / and s/[)];/ },/
> functions that only changed the function names and the ending of the line, so the actual
> hex data is unchanged.
>
> Note that the original reason for the introduction of the commit fe4e8db0392a6
> was to enable recovery of the RX unit on the RTL8411b which was confused by the
> powered-down PHY. This sequence of r8168_mac_ocp_write() calls amplifies the problem
You state "amplifies the problem" which means that the original problem
isn't solved. Is this what you want to say and is there evidence?
Or did you mean that the original problem was replaced with a different problem?
> into a series of about 500+ memory bus locks, most waiting for the main memory read,
> modify and write under a LOCK. The memory barrier in RTL_W32 should suffice for
> the programming sequence to reach RTL NIC registers.
>
> [0] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1692075
>
> Fixes: fe4e8db0392a6 ("r8169: fix issue with confused RX unit after PHY power-down on RTL8411b")
> Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> Cc: nic_swsd@...ltek.com
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>
> ---
> drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 200 ++++++++--------------
> 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> index 361b90007148..c0a1f08f7667 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> @@ -3085,6 +3085,31 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8168g_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
> rtl_ephy_init(tp, e_info_8168g_2);
> }
>
> +struct recover_8411b_info {
> + u32 reg;
> + u32 data;
> +};
> +
> +static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp, const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
> +{
> + struct recover_8411b_info const *p = array;
> +
> + while (p->reg) {
> + if (!rtl_ocp_reg_failure(p->reg))
> + RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (p->reg << 15) | p->data);
Better use __r8168_mac_ocp_write() here. Duplicating the code of
this function adds unnecessary complexity.
> + p++;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp, const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
> +{
> + unsigned long flags;
> +
> + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
> + __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, array);
> + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
> +}
> +
Maybe sooner or later we use this in other places too. So we should:
- put it before any usage of r8168_mac_ocp_write()
- remove references to RTL8411b
> static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
> {
> static const struct ephy_info e_info_8411_2[] = {
> @@ -3107,138 +3132,61 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
> /* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
> * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
> */
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC28, 0x0000);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0000);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0000);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0000);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x0000);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0000);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x0000);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x0000);
> +
> + static const struct recover_8411b_info init_zero_seq[] = {
> + { 0xFC28, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2A, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0000 },
> + { 0xFC30, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC32, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC34, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC36, 0x0000 },
> + { 0x0000, 0x0000 },
The sentinel can be simply written as {}
> + };
> +
> + static const struct recover_8411b_info recover_seq[] = {
> + { 0xF800, 0xE008 }, { 0xF802, 0xE00A }, { 0xF804, 0xE00C }, { 0xF806, 0xE00E },
> + { 0xF808, 0xE027 }, { 0xF80A, 0xE04F }, { 0xF80C, 0xE05E }, { 0xF80E, 0xE065 },
> + { 0xF810, 0xC602 }, { 0xF812, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF814, 0x0000 }, { 0xF816, 0xC502 },
> + { 0xF818, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF81A, 0x074C }, { 0xF81C, 0xC302 }, { 0xF81E, 0xBB00 },
> + { 0xF820, 0x080A }, { 0xF822, 0x6420 }, { 0xF824, 0x48C2 }, { 0xF826, 0x8C20 },
> + { 0xF828, 0xC516 }, { 0xF82A, 0x64A4 }, { 0xF82C, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF82E, 0xF009 },
> + { 0xF830, 0x74A2 }, { 0xF832, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF834, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF836, 0xC50E },
> + { 0xF838, 0x9CA2 }, { 0xF83A, 0x1C11 }, { 0xF83C, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF83E, 0xE006 },
> + { 0xF840, 0x74F8 }, { 0xF842, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF844, 0x8CF8 }, { 0xF846, 0xC404 },
> + { 0xF848, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84A, 0xC403 }, { 0xF84C, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84E, 0x0BF2 },
> + { 0xF850, 0x0C0A }, { 0xF852, 0xE434 }, { 0xF854, 0xD3C0 }, { 0xF856, 0x49D9 },
> + { 0xF858, 0xF01F }, { 0xF85A, 0xC526 }, { 0xF85C, 0x64A5 }, { 0xF85E, 0x1400 },
> + { 0xF860, 0xF007 }, { 0xF862, 0x0C01 }, { 0xF864, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF866, 0x1C15 },
> + { 0xF868, 0xC51B }, { 0xF86A, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF86C, 0xE013 }, { 0xF86E, 0xC519 },
> + { 0xF870, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF872, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF874, 0x8CA0 }, { 0xF876, 0xC516 },
> + { 0xF878, 0x74A4 }, { 0xF87A, 0x48C8 }, { 0xF87C, 0x48CA }, { 0xF87E, 0x9CA4 },
> + { 0xF880, 0xC512 }, { 0xF882, 0x1B00 }, { 0xF884, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF886, 0x1B1C },
> + { 0xF888, 0x483F }, { 0xF88A, 0x9BA2 }, { 0xF88C, 0x1B04 }, { 0xF88E, 0xC508 },
> + { 0xF890, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF892, 0xC505 }, { 0xF894, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF896, 0xC502 },
> + { 0xF898, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF89A, 0x0300 }, { 0xF89C, 0x051E }, { 0xF89E, 0xE434 },
> + { 0xF8A0, 0xE018 }, { 0xF8A2, 0xE092 }, { 0xF8A4, 0xDE20 }, { 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0 },
> + { 0xF8A8, 0xC50F }, { 0xF8AA, 0x76A4 }, { 0xF8AC, 0x49E3 }, { 0xF8AE, 0xF007 },
> + { 0xF8B0, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF8B2, 0xF103 }, { 0xF8B4, 0xC607 }, { 0xF8B6, 0xBE00 },
> + { 0xF8B8, 0xC606 }, { 0xF8BA, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF8BC, 0xC602 }, { 0xF8BE, 0xBE00 },
> + { 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C }, { 0xF8C2, 0x0C28 }, { 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C }, { 0xF8C6, 0xDC00 },
> + { 0xF8C8, 0xC707 }, { 0xF8CA, 0x1D00 }, { 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2 }, { 0xF8CE, 0x48C1 },
> + { 0xF8D0, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8D2, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8D4, 0x00AA }, { 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0 },
> + { 0xF8D8, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8DA, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8DC, 0x0132 },
> + { 0x0000, 0x0000 },
> + };
> +
> + static const struct recover_8411b_info final_seq[] = {
> + { 0xFC2A, 0x0743 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0801 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9 }, { 0xFC30, 0x02FD },
> + { 0xFC32, 0x0C25 }, { 0xFC34, 0x00A9 }, { 0xFC36, 0x012D },
> + { 0x0000, 0x0000 },
> + };
> +
> + r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, init_zero_seq);
> mdelay(3);
> r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
>
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF800, 0xE008);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF802, 0xE00A);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF804, 0xE00C);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF806, 0xE00E);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF808, 0xE027);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80A, 0xE04F);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80C, 0xE05E);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80E, 0xE065);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF810, 0xC602);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF812, 0xBE00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF814, 0x0000);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF816, 0xC502);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF818, 0xBD00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81A, 0x074C);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81C, 0xC302);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81E, 0xBB00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF820, 0x080A);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF822, 0x6420);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF824, 0x48C2);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF826, 0x8C20);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF828, 0xC516);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82A, 0x64A4);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82C, 0x49C0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82E, 0xF009);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF830, 0x74A2);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF832, 0x8CA5);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF834, 0x74A0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF836, 0xC50E);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF838, 0x9CA2);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83A, 0x1C11);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83C, 0x9CA0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83E, 0xE006);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF840, 0x74F8);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF842, 0x48C4);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF844, 0x8CF8);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF846, 0xC404);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF848, 0xBC00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84A, 0xC403);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84C, 0xBC00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84E, 0x0BF2);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF850, 0x0C0A);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF852, 0xE434);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF854, 0xD3C0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF856, 0x49D9);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF858, 0xF01F);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85A, 0xC526);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85C, 0x64A5);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85E, 0x1400);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF860, 0xF007);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF862, 0x0C01);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF864, 0x8CA5);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF866, 0x1C15);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF868, 0xC51B);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86A, 0x9CA0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86C, 0xE013);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86E, 0xC519);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF870, 0x74A0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF872, 0x48C4);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF874, 0x8CA0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF876, 0xC516);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF878, 0x74A4);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87A, 0x48C8);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87C, 0x48CA);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87E, 0x9CA4);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF880, 0xC512);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF882, 0x1B00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF884, 0x9BA0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF886, 0x1B1C);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF888, 0x483F);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88A, 0x9BA2);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88C, 0x1B04);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88E, 0xC508);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF890, 0x9BA0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF892, 0xC505);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF894, 0xBD00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF896, 0xC502);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF898, 0xBD00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89A, 0x0300);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89C, 0x051E);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89E, 0xE434);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A0, 0xE018);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A2, 0xE092);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A4, 0xDE20);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A8, 0xC50F);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AA, 0x76A4);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AC, 0x49E3);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AE, 0xF007);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B0, 0x49C0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B2, 0xF103);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B4, 0xC607);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B6, 0xBE00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B8, 0xC606);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BA, 0xBE00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BC, 0xC602);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BE, 0xBE00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C2, 0x0C28);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C6, 0xDC00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C8, 0xC707);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CA, 0x1D00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CE, 0x48C1);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D0, 0xC502);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D2, 0xBD00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D4, 0x00AA);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D8, 0xC502);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DA, 0xBD00);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DC, 0x0132);
> + r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, recover_seq);
>
> r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
>
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0743);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0801);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x02FD);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0C25);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x00A9);
> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x012D);
> + r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, final_seq);
> +
> }
>
> static void rtl_hw_start_8168h_1(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
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