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Message-ID: <30e15e9a-d82e-4d24-be37-1b9d1534c082@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2023 14:17:44 +0100
From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
To: Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: nic_swsd@...ltek.com, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] r8169: Coalesce RTL8411b PHY power-down recovery
programming instructions to reduce spinlock stalls
On 29.10.2023 05:56, Mirsad Todorovac wrote:
>
>
> On 10/28/23 21:21, Heiner Kallweit wrote:
>> On 28.10.2023 13:05, Mirsad Goran Todorovac wrote:
>>> On RTL8411b the RX unit gets confused if the PHY is powered-down.
>>> This was reported in [0] and confirmed by Realtek. Realtek provided
>>> a sequence to fix the RX unit after PHY wakeup.
>>>
>>> A series of about 130 r8168_mac_ocp_write() calls is performed to
>>> program the RTL registers for recovery.
>>>
>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write() expands to this code:
>>>
>>> static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data)
>>> {
>>> if (rtl_ocp_reg_failure(reg))
>>> return;
>>>
>>> RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (reg << 15) | data);
>>> }
>>>
>>> static void r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data)
>>> {
>>> unsigned long flags;
>>>
>>> raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>> __r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, reg, data);
>>> raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>> }
>>>
>>> Register programming is done through RTL_W32() macro which expands into
>>>
>>> #define RTL_W32(tp, reg, val32) writel((val32), tp->mmio_addr + (reg))
>>>
>>> which is further (on Alpha):
>>>
>>> extern inline void writel(u32 b, volatile void __iomem *addr)
>>> {
>>> mb();
>>> __raw_writel(b, addr);
>>> }
>>>
>>> or on i386/x86_64:
>>>
>>> #define build_mmio_write(name, size, type, reg, barrier) \
>>> static inline void name(type val, volatile void __iomem *addr) \
>>> { asm volatile("mov" size " %0,%1": :reg (val), \
>>> "m" (*(volatile type __force *)addr) barrier); }
>>>
>>> build_mmio_write(writel, "l", unsigned int, "r", :"memory")
>>>
>>> This obviously involves iat least a compiler barrier.
>>>
>>> mb() expands into something like this i.e. on x86_64:
>>>
>>> #define mb() asm volatile("lock; addl $0,0(%%esp)" ::: "memory")
>>>
>>> This means a whole lot of memory bus barriers: for spin_lock_irqsave(),
>>> memory barrier, writel(), and spin_unlock_irqrestore().
>>>
>>> With about 130 of these sequential calls to r8168_mac_ocp_write() this looks like
>>> a LOCK storm that will thunder all of the cores and CPUs on the same memory controller
>>> for certain time that locked memory read-modify-write cyclo or I/O takes to finish.
>>>
>>> In a sequential case of RTL register programming, the writes to RTL registers
>>> can be coalesced under a same raw spinlock. This can dramatically decrease the
>>> number of bus stalls in a multicore or multi-CPU system:
>>>
>>> static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>>> const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
>>> {
>>> struct recover_8411b_info const *p = array;
>>>
>>> while (p->reg) {
>>> if (!rtl_ocp_reg_failure(p->reg))
>>> RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (p->reg << 15) | p->data);
>>> p++;
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> static void r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>>> const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
>>> {
>>> unsigned long flags;
>>>
>>> raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>> __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, array);
>>> raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>> }
>>>
>>> static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
>>> {
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>> /* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
>>> * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
>>> */
>>>
>>> static const struct recover_8411b_info init_zero_seq[] = {
>>> { 0xFC28, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2A, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0000 },
>>> ...
>>> };
>>>
>>> static const struct recover_8411b_info recover_seq[] = {
>>> { 0xF800, 0xE008 }, { 0xF802, 0xE00A }, { 0xF804, 0xE00C }, { 0xF806, 0xE00E },
>>> ...
>>> };
>>>
>>> static const struct recover_8411b_info final_seq[] = {
>>> { 0xFC2A, 0x0743 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0801 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9 }, { 0xFC30, 0x02FD },
>>> ...
>>> };
>>>
>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, init_zero_seq);
>>> mdelay(3);
>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, recover_seq);
>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, final_seq);
>>> }
>>>
>>> The hex data is preserved intact through s/r8168_mac_ocp_write[(]tp,/{ / and s/[)];/ },/
>>> functions that only changed the function names and the ending of the line, so the actual
>>> hex data is unchanged.
>>>
>>> Note that the original reason for the introduction of the commit fe4e8db0392a6
>>> was to enable recovery of the RX unit on the RTL8411b which was confused by the
>>> powered-down PHY. This sequence of r8168_mac_ocp_write() calls amplifies the problem
>>
>> I still have a problem with this statement as you're saying that the original
>> problem still exists. I don't think that's the case.
>
> I will not disagree about it.
>
> But we have only reduced the number of spin_lock_irqsave/spin_unlock_irqrestore()
> pairs.
>
> Maybe additionally, on the low level, memory barrier isn't required for each write to
> MMIO?
>
One could argue whether in several places writel_relaxed() could be used.
But it's not really worth it, because we're not in a hot path.
> If it still uses a LOCK addl $0, m32/m64, then it still creates 130 instances of all core
> bus locks for this NIC reset after the lost PHY? I'm just thinking, this is nothing
> authoritative ...
>
>>> into a series of about 500+ memory bus locks, most waiting for the main memory read,
>>> modify and write under a LOCK. The memory barrier in RTL_W32 should suffice for
>>> the programming sequence to reach RTL NIC registers.
>>>
>>> [0] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1692075
>>>
>>> Fixes: fe4e8db0392a6 ("r8169: fix issue with confused RX unit after PHY power-down on RTL8411b")
>>> Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
>>> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
>>> Cc: nic_swsd@...ltek.com
>>> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
>>> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
>>> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
>>> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
>>> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
>>> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231028005153.2180411-1-mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr/
>>> Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>
>>> ---
>>> v3:
>>> removed register/mask pair array sentinels, so using ARRAY_SIZE().
>>> avoided duplication of RTL_W32() call code as advised by Heiner.
>>>
>>> drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 198 ++++++++--------------
>>> 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
>>> index 361b90007148..3b28bec7098b 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
>>> @@ -939,6 +939,32 @@ static void r8168_mac_ocp_modify(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u16 mask,
>>> raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>> }
>>> +struct e_info_regmask_pair {
>>> + u32 reg;
>>> + u32 data;
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>>> + const struct e_info_regmask_pair *array, int len)
>>> +{
>>> + struct e_info_regmask_pair const *p;
>>> +
>>> + for (p = array; len--; p++)
>>> + __r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, p->reg, p->data);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void _r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>>> + const struct e_info_regmask_pair *array, int len)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long flags;
>>> +
>>> + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>> + __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, array, len);
>>> + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +#define r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, a) _r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, a, ARRAY_SIZE(a))
>>> +
>>> /* Work around a hw issue with RTL8168g PHY, the quirk disables
>>> * PHY MCU interrupts before PHY power-down.
>>> */
>>> @@ -3107,138 +3133,58 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
>>> /* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
>>> * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
>>> */
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC28, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x0000);
>>> +
>>> + static const struct e_info_regmask_pair init_zero_seq[] = {
>>> + { 0xFC28, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2A, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0000 },
>>> + { 0xFC30, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC32, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC34, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC36, 0x0000 },
>>> + };
>>> +
>> Don't mix code and variable declarations. Did you run checkpatch?
>> I think it would complain here.
>
> Thank you for the warning, I will fix it.
>
> As I said to Mr. Greg, I will do the required number of iterations to fix this issue.
>
> I will add checkpatch to my routine handling of my submitted patches.
>
> Thanks,
> Mirsad
>
>>> + static const struct e_info_regmask_pair recover_seq[] = {
>>> + { 0xF800, 0xE008 }, { 0xF802, 0xE00A }, { 0xF804, 0xE00C }, { 0xF806, 0xE00E },
>>> + { 0xF808, 0xE027 }, { 0xF80A, 0xE04F }, { 0xF80C, 0xE05E }, { 0xF80E, 0xE065 },
>>> + { 0xF810, 0xC602 }, { 0xF812, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF814, 0x0000 }, { 0xF816, 0xC502 },
>>> + { 0xF818, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF81A, 0x074C }, { 0xF81C, 0xC302 }, { 0xF81E, 0xBB00 },
>>> + { 0xF820, 0x080A }, { 0xF822, 0x6420 }, { 0xF824, 0x48C2 }, { 0xF826, 0x8C20 },
>>> + { 0xF828, 0xC516 }, { 0xF82A, 0x64A4 }, { 0xF82C, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF82E, 0xF009 },
>>> + { 0xF830, 0x74A2 }, { 0xF832, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF834, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF836, 0xC50E },
>>> + { 0xF838, 0x9CA2 }, { 0xF83A, 0x1C11 }, { 0xF83C, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF83E, 0xE006 },
>>> + { 0xF840, 0x74F8 }, { 0xF842, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF844, 0x8CF8 }, { 0xF846, 0xC404 },
>>> + { 0xF848, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84A, 0xC403 }, { 0xF84C, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84E, 0x0BF2 },
>>> + { 0xF850, 0x0C0A }, { 0xF852, 0xE434 }, { 0xF854, 0xD3C0 }, { 0xF856, 0x49D9 },
>>> + { 0xF858, 0xF01F }, { 0xF85A, 0xC526 }, { 0xF85C, 0x64A5 }, { 0xF85E, 0x1400 },
>>> + { 0xF860, 0xF007 }, { 0xF862, 0x0C01 }, { 0xF864, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF866, 0x1C15 },
>>> + { 0xF868, 0xC51B }, { 0xF86A, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF86C, 0xE013 }, { 0xF86E, 0xC519 },
>>> + { 0xF870, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF872, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF874, 0x8CA0 }, { 0xF876, 0xC516 },
>>> + { 0xF878, 0x74A4 }, { 0xF87A, 0x48C8 }, { 0xF87C, 0x48CA }, { 0xF87E, 0x9CA4 },
>>> + { 0xF880, 0xC512 }, { 0xF882, 0x1B00 }, { 0xF884, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF886, 0x1B1C },
>>> + { 0xF888, 0x483F }, { 0xF88A, 0x9BA2 }, { 0xF88C, 0x1B04 }, { 0xF88E, 0xC508 },
>>> + { 0xF890, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF892, 0xC505 }, { 0xF894, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF896, 0xC502 },
>>> + { 0xF898, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF89A, 0x0300 }, { 0xF89C, 0x051E }, { 0xF89E, 0xE434 },
>>> + { 0xF8A0, 0xE018 }, { 0xF8A2, 0xE092 }, { 0xF8A4, 0xDE20 }, { 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0 },
>>> + { 0xF8A8, 0xC50F }, { 0xF8AA, 0x76A4 }, { 0xF8AC, 0x49E3 }, { 0xF8AE, 0xF007 },
>>> + { 0xF8B0, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF8B2, 0xF103 }, { 0xF8B4, 0xC607 }, { 0xF8B6, 0xBE00 },
>>> + { 0xF8B8, 0xC606 }, { 0xF8BA, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF8BC, 0xC602 }, { 0xF8BE, 0xBE00 },
>>> + { 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C }, { 0xF8C2, 0x0C28 }, { 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C }, { 0xF8C6, 0xDC00 },
>>> + { 0xF8C8, 0xC707 }, { 0xF8CA, 0x1D00 }, { 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2 }, { 0xF8CE, 0x48C1 },
>>> + { 0xF8D0, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8D2, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8D4, 0x00AA }, { 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0 },
>>> + { 0xF8D8, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8DA, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8DC, 0x0132 },
>>> + };
>>> +
>>> + static const struct e_info_regmask_pair final_seq[] = {
>>> + { 0xFC2A, 0x0743 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0801 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9 }, { 0xFC30, 0x02FD },
>>> + { 0xFC32, 0x0C25 }, { 0xFC34, 0x00A9 }, { 0xFC36, 0x012D },
>>> + };
>>> +
>>> + r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, init_zero_seq);
>>> mdelay(3);
>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF800, 0xE008);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF802, 0xE00A);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF804, 0xE00C);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF806, 0xE00E);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF808, 0xE027);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80A, 0xE04F);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80C, 0xE05E);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80E, 0xE065);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF810, 0xC602);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF812, 0xBE00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF814, 0x0000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF816, 0xC502);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF818, 0xBD00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81A, 0x074C);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81C, 0xC302);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81E, 0xBB00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF820, 0x080A);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF822, 0x6420);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF824, 0x48C2);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF826, 0x8C20);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF828, 0xC516);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82A, 0x64A4);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82C, 0x49C0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82E, 0xF009);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF830, 0x74A2);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF832, 0x8CA5);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF834, 0x74A0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF836, 0xC50E);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF838, 0x9CA2);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83A, 0x1C11);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83C, 0x9CA0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83E, 0xE006);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF840, 0x74F8);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF842, 0x48C4);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF844, 0x8CF8);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF846, 0xC404);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF848, 0xBC00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84A, 0xC403);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84C, 0xBC00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84E, 0x0BF2);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF850, 0x0C0A);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF852, 0xE434);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF854, 0xD3C0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF856, 0x49D9);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF858, 0xF01F);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85A, 0xC526);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85C, 0x64A5);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85E, 0x1400);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF860, 0xF007);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF862, 0x0C01);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF864, 0x8CA5);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF866, 0x1C15);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF868, 0xC51B);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86A, 0x9CA0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86C, 0xE013);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86E, 0xC519);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF870, 0x74A0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF872, 0x48C4);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF874, 0x8CA0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF876, 0xC516);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF878, 0x74A4);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87A, 0x48C8);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87C, 0x48CA);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87E, 0x9CA4);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF880, 0xC512);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF882, 0x1B00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF884, 0x9BA0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF886, 0x1B1C);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF888, 0x483F);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88A, 0x9BA2);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88C, 0x1B04);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88E, 0xC508);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF890, 0x9BA0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF892, 0xC505);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF894, 0xBD00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF896, 0xC502);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF898, 0xBD00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89A, 0x0300);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89C, 0x051E);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89E, 0xE434);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A0, 0xE018);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A2, 0xE092);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A4, 0xDE20);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A8, 0xC50F);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AA, 0x76A4);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AC, 0x49E3);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AE, 0xF007);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B0, 0x49C0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B2, 0xF103);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B4, 0xC607);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B6, 0xBE00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B8, 0xC606);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BA, 0xBE00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BC, 0xC602);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BE, 0xBE00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C2, 0x0C28);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C6, 0xDC00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C8, 0xC707);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CA, 0x1D00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CE, 0x48C1);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D0, 0xC502);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D2, 0xBD00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D4, 0x00AA);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D8, 0xC502);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DA, 0xBD00);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DC, 0x0132);
>>> + r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, recover_seq);
>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0743);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0801);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x02FD);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0C25);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x00A9);
>>> - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x012D);
>>> + r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, final_seq);
>>> +
>>> }
>>> static void rtl_hw_start_8168h_1(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
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