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Message-ID: <20231103190523.6353-9-andrii@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2023 12:05:14 -0700
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>
To: <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <paul@...l-moore.com>,
<brauner@...nel.org>
CC: <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
<keescook@...omium.org>, <kernel-team@...a.com>, <sargun@...gun.me>
Subject: [PATCH v9 bpf-next 08/17] bpf: consistently use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic
Remove remaining direct queries to perfmon_capable() and bpf_capable()
in BPF verifier logic and instead use BPF token (if available) to make
decisions about privileges.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 16 ++++++++--------
include/linux/filter.h | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/core.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 13 ++++++-------
net/core/filter.c | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index fae4f780fd82..975aa7790d51 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -2181,24 +2181,24 @@ extern int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
bool bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap);
-static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(void)
+static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(const struct bpf_token *token)
{
- return perfmon_capable();
+ return bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_PERFMON);
}
-static inline bool bpf_allow_uninit_stack(void)
+static inline bool bpf_allow_uninit_stack(const struct bpf_token *token)
{
- return perfmon_capable();
+ return bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_PERFMON);
}
-static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v1(void)
+static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v1(const struct bpf_token *token)
{
- return cpu_mitigations_off() || perfmon_capable();
+ return cpu_mitigations_off() || bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_PERFMON);
}
-static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v4(void)
+static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v4(const struct bpf_token *token)
{
- return cpu_mitigations_off() || perfmon_capable();
+ return cpu_mitigations_off() || bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_PERFMON);
}
int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index a4953fafc8cb..14354605ad26 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ static inline bool bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(struct bpf_prog *prog)
return false;
if (!bpf_jit_harden)
return false;
- if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_capable())
+ if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
return false;
return true;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 2058e89b5ddd..f0c64df6b6ff 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
bool percpu = attr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY;
int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
- bool bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
+ bool bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(NULL);
u64 array_size, mask64;
struct bpf_array *array;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index fc8de25b7948..ce307440fa8d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static bool bpf_prog_kallsyms_candidate(const struct bpf_prog *fp)
void bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
if (!bpf_prog_kallsyms_candidate(fp) ||
- !bpf_capable())
+ !bpf_token_capable(fp->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
return;
bpf_prog_ksym_set_addr(fp);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 2197385d91dc..b70782dffb3e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -20655,7 +20655,12 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3
env->prog = *prog;
env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type];
env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel);
- is_priv = bpf_capable();
+
+ env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(env->prog->aux->token);
+ env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(env->prog->aux->token);
+ env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(env->prog->aux->token);
+ env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(env->prog->aux->token);
+ env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF);
bpf_get_btf_vmlinux();
@@ -20687,12 +20692,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3
if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
env->strict_alignment = false;
- env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
- env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack();
- env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
- env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
- env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
-
if (is_priv)
env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ;
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index cd2ef9fb4f1e..a3de4a7d3733 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -8557,7 +8557,7 @@ static bool cg_skb_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
return false;
case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, data):
case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, data_end):
- if (!bpf_capable())
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
return false;
break;
}
@@ -8569,7 +8569,7 @@ static bool cg_skb_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
case bpf_ctx_range_till(struct __sk_buff, cb[0], cb[4]):
break;
case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, tstamp):
- if (!bpf_capable())
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
return false;
break;
default:
--
2.34.1
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