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Date: Thu, 09 Nov 2023 00:10:59 +0100
From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
To: "Nelson, Shannon" <shannon.nelson@....com>, Jesper Dangaard Brouer
 <hawk@...nel.org>, David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>, Jakub Kicinski
 <kuba@...nel.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org, Daniel
 Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
 Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: BPF/XDP: kernel panic when removing an interface that is an
 xdp_redirect target

"Nelson, Shannon" <shannon.nelson@....com> writes:

> On 11/7/2023 7:31 AM, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen wrote:
>> 
>> "Nelson, Shannon" <shannon.nelson@....com> writes:
>> 
>>> While testing new code to support XDP in the ionic driver we found that
>>> we could panic the kernel by running a bind/unbind loop on the target
>>> interface of an xdp_redirect action.  Obviously this is a stress test
>>> that is abusing the system, but it does point to a window of opportunity
>>> in bq_enqueue() and bq_xmit_all().  I believe that while the validity of
>>> the target interface has been checked in __xdp_enqueue(), the interface
>>> can be unbound by the time either bq_enqueue() or bq_xmit_all() tries to
>>> use the interface.  There is no locking or reference taken on the
>>> interface to hold it in place before the target’s ndo_xdp_xmit() is called.
>>>
>>> Below is a stack trace that our tester captured while running our test
>>> code on a RHEL 9.2 kernel – yes, I know, unpublished driver code on a
>>> non-upstream kernel.  But if you look at the current upstream code in
>>> kernel/bpf/devmap.c I think you can see what we ran into.
>>>
>>> Other than telling users to not abuse the system with a bind/unbind
>>> loop, is there something we can do to limit the potential pain here?
>>> Without knowing what interfaces might be targeted by the users’ XDP
>>> programs, is there a step the originating driver can do to take
>>> precautions?  Did we simply miss a step in the driver, or is this an
>>> actual problem in the devmap code?
>> 
>> Sounds like a driver bug :)
>
> Entirely possible, wouldn't be our first ... :-)
>
>> 
>> The XDP redirect flow guarantees that all outstanding packets are
>> flushed within a single NAPI cycle, as documented here:
>> https://docs.kernel.org/bpf/redirect.html
>> 
>> So basically, the driver should be doing a two-step teardown: remove
>> global visibility of the resource in question, wait for all concurrent
>> users to finish, and *then* free the data structure. This corresponds to
>> the usual RCU protection: resources should be kept alive until all
>> concurrent RCU critical sections have exited on all CPUs. So if your
>> driver is removing an interface's data structure without waiting for
>> concurrent NAPI cycles to finish, that's a bug in the driver.
>> 
>> This kind of thing is what the synchronize_net() function is for; for a
>> usage example, see veth_napi_del_range(). My guess would be that you're
>> missing this as part of your driver teardown flow?
>
> Essentially, the first thing we do in the remove function is to call 
> unregister_netdev(), which has synchronize_net() in the path, so I don't 
> think this is missing from our scenario, but thanks for the hint, I'll 
> keep this in mind.  I do see there are a couple of net drivers that are 
> more aggressive about calling it directly in some other parts of the 
> logic - I don't think that has a bearing on this issue, but I'll keep it 
> in mind.

Hmm, right, in fact unregister_netdev() has two such synchronize_net()
calls. The XDP queue is only guaranteed to be flushed after the second
one of those, though, and there's an 'ndo_uninit()' callback in-between
them. So I don't suppose your driver implements that ndo and does
something there that could cause the crash you're seeing?

Otherwise, the one thing I can think of is that maybe it can be related
to the fact that synchronize_net() turns into a
synchronize_rcu_expedited() if the rtnl lock is held (which it is in
this case if you're calling the parameter-less unregister_netdev()). I'm
not quite sure I grok the expedited wait thing, but it should be pretty
easy to check if this is the cause by making a change like the one below
and seeing if the issue goes away.

-Toke

diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index e28a18e7069b..1a035a5f0b0e 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -10932,7 +10932,7 @@ void synchronize_net(void)
 {
        might_sleep();
        if (rtnl_is_locked())
-               synchronize_rcu_expedited();
+               synchronize_rcu();
        else
                synchronize_rcu();
 }


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