netdev - [PATCH bpf-next 1/3] skmsg: Calculate the data length in ingress

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Message-Id: <1699962120-3390-2-git-send-email-yangpc@wangsu.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 19:41:58 +0800
From: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@...gsu.com>
To: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
	bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@...gsu.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 1/3] skmsg: Calculate the data length in ingress_msg

Currently we cannot get the data length in ingress_msg,
we introduce sk_msg_queue_len() to do this.

Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@...gsu.com>
---
 include/linux/skmsg.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 net/core/skmsg.c      |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h
index c1637515a8a4..3023a573859d 100644
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct sk_psock {
 	u32				apply_bytes;
 	u32				cork_bytes;
 	u32				eval;
+	u32				msg_len;
 	bool				redir_ingress; /* undefined if sk_redir is null */
 	struct sk_msg			*cork;
 	struct sk_psock_progs		progs;
@@ -131,6 +132,11 @@ int sk_msg_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		   int len, int flags);
 bool sk_msg_is_readable(struct sock *sk);
 
+static inline void sk_msg_queue_consumed(struct sk_psock *psock, u32 len)
+{
+	psock->msg_len -= len;
+}
+
 static inline void sk_msg_check_to_free(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 i, u32 bytes)
 {
 	WARN_ON(i == msg->sg.end && bytes);
@@ -311,9 +317,10 @@ static inline void sk_psock_queue_msg(struct sk_psock *psock,
 				      struct sk_msg *msg)
 {
 	spin_lock_bh(&psock->ingress_lock);
-	if (sk_psock_test_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED))
+	if (sk_psock_test_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED)) {
 		list_add_tail(&msg->list, &psock->ingress_msg);
-	else {
+		psock->msg_len += msg->sg.size;
+	} else {
 		sk_msg_free(psock->sk, msg);
 		kfree(msg);
 	}
@@ -368,6 +375,19 @@ static inline void kfree_sk_msg(struct sk_msg *msg)
 	kfree(msg);
 }
 
+static inline u32 sk_msg_queue_len(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_psock *psock;
+	u32 len = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	psock = sk_psock(sk);
+	if (psock)
+		len = psock->msg_len;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return len;
+}
+
 static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c
index 6c31eefbd777..b3de17e99b67 100644
--- a/net/core/skmsg.c
+++ b/net/core/skmsg.c
@@ -481,6 +481,8 @@ int sk_msg_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		msg_rx = sk_psock_peek_msg(psock);
 	}
 out:
+	if (likely(!peek) && copied > 0)
+		sk_msg_queue_consumed(psock, copied);
 	return copied;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sk_msg_recvmsg);
@@ -771,9 +773,11 @@ static void __sk_psock_purge_ingress_msg(struct sk_psock *psock)
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(msg, tmp, &psock->ingress_msg, list) {
 		list_del(&msg->list);
+		sk_msg_queue_consumed(psock, msg->sg.size);
 		sk_msg_free(psock->sk, msg);
 		kfree(msg);
 	}
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(psock->msg_len != 0);
 }
 
 static void __sk_psock_zap_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock)
-- 
2.38.1