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Message-ID: <7f704401-8fe8-487f-8d45-397e3a88417f@suse.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2023 12:45:53 +0100
From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.com>
To: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@...il.com>
Cc: "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
USB list <linux-usb@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: possible proble with skb_pull() in smsc75xx_rx_fixup()
Hi,
looking at your security fixes, it seems to me that there
is a further issue they do not cover.
If we look at this:
while (skb->len > 0) {
len is positive ...
u32 rx_cmd_a, rx_cmd_b, align_count, size;
struct sk_buff *ax_skb;
unsigned char *packet;
rx_cmd_a = get_unaligned_le32(skb->data);
skb_pull(skb, 4);
... but it may be smaller than 4
If that happens skb_pull() is a nop.
rx_cmd_b = get_unaligned_le32(skb->data);
skb_pull(skb, 4 + RXW_PADDING);
Then this is a nop, too.
That means that rx_cmd_a and rx_cmd_b are identical and garbage.
packet = skb->data;
/* get the packet length */
size = (rx_cmd_a & RX_CMD_A_LEN) - RXW_PADDING;
In that case size is unpredictable.
align_count = (4 - ((size + RXW_PADDING) % 4)) % 4;
if (unlikely(size > skb->len)) {
That means that this check may or may not work.
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net,
"size err rx_cmd_a=0x%08x\n",
rx_cmd_a);
return 0;
}
There is also an error case where 4 <= skb->len < 4 + RXW_PADDING
I think we really need to check for the amount of buffer that is pulled.
Something like this:
static int smsc75xx_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ u32 rx_cmd_a, rx_cmd_b, align_count, size;
+
/* This check is no longer done by usbnet */
if (skb->len < dev->net->hard_header_len)
return 0;
- while (skb->len > 0) {
- u32 rx_cmd_a, rx_cmd_b, align_count, size;
+ while (skb->len > (sizeof(rx_cmd_a) + sizeof(rx_cmd_b) + RXW_PADDING)) {
Regards
Oliver
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