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Message-ID: <20231121165351.GF173820@google.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 16:53:51 +0000
From: Lee Jones <lee@...nel.org>
To: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@...il.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, x86@...nel.org,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [REPORT] BPF: Reproducible triggering of BUG() from userspace PoC
On Thu, 09 Nov 2023, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 08, 2023 at 03:46:26PM +0000, Lee Jones wrote:
> > Good afternoon,
> >
> > After coming across a recent Syzkaller report [0] I thought I'd take
> > some time to firstly reproduce the issue, then see if there was a
> > trivial way to mitigate it. The report suggests that a BUG() in
> > prog_array_map_poke_run() [1] can be trivially and reliably triggered
> > from userspace using the PoC provided [2].
> >
> > ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
> > BPF_MOD_JUMP,
> > old_bypass_addr,
> > poke->bypass_addr);
> > BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
> >
> > Indeed the PoC does seem to be able to consistently trigger the BUG(),
> > not only on the reported kernel (v6.1), but also on linux-next. I went
> > to the trouble of checking LORE, but failed to find any patches which
> > may be attempting to fix this.
> >
> > kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1094!
> > invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> > CPU: 5 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/5:0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-next-20230929-dirty #74
> > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
> > Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred
> > RIP: 0010:prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
> > Code: ff 0f 0b e8 1e 27 e1 ff 48 c7 c7 60 80 93 85 48 c7 c6 00 7f 93 85 48 c7 c2 bb c2 39 86 b9 45 04 00 00 45 89 f8 e8 9c 890
> > RSP: 0018:ffffc9000036fb50 EFLAGS: 00010246
> > RAX: 0000000000000044 RBX: ffff88811f337490 RCX: 63af48a1314f9900
> > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
> > RBP: ffffc9000036fbe8 R08: ffffffff815c23c5 R09: 1ffff11084c14eba
> > R10: dfffe91084c14ebc R11: ffffed1084c14ebb R12: ffff888116517800
> > R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888125a1a400 R15: 00000000fffffff0
> > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888426080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > CR2: 00000000004ab678 CR3: 0000000122ac4000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
> > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> > Call Trace:
> > <TASK>
> > ? __die_body+0x92/0xf0
> > ? die+0xa2/0xe0
> > ? do_trap+0x12f/0x370
> > ? handle_invalid_op+0xa6/0x140
> > ? handle_invalid_op+0xdf/0x140
> > ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
> > ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
> > ? exc_invalid_op+0x32/0x50
> > ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
> > ? __wake_up_klogd+0xd5/0x110
> > ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
> > ? bpf_prog_6781ebc2dae4bad9+0xb/0x53
> > fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x152/0x250
> > prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0xf6/0x210
> > ? __bpf_array_map_seq_show+0xa40/0xa40
> > ? kick_pool+0x164/0x350
> > ? process_one_work+0x57a/0xd00
> > process_one_work+0x5e4/0xd00
> > worker_thread+0x9cf/0xea0
> > kthread+0x2b4/0x350
> > ? pr_cont_work+0x580/0x580
> > ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
> > ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x80
> > ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
> > ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
> > </TASK>
> > Modules linked in:
> > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
> >
> > However, with my very limited BPF subsystem knowledge I was unable to
> > trivially fix the issue. Hopefully some knowledgable person would be
> > kind enough to provide me with some pointers.
> >
> > bpf_arch_text_poke() seems to be returning -EBUSY due to a negative
> > memcmp() result from [3].
> >
> > ret = -EBUSY;
> > mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
> > if (memcmp(ip, old_insn, X86_PATCH_SIZE)) {
> > goto out;
> > [...]
> >
> > When spitting out the memory at those locations, this is the result:
> >
> > ip: e9 06 00 00 00
> > old_insn: 0f 1f 44 00 00
> > nop_insn: 0f 1f 44 00 00
> >
> > As you can see, the information stored in 'ip' does not match that of
> > the data stored in 'old_insn', causing bpf_arch_text_poke() to return
> > early with the error -EBUSY, suggesting that the data pointed to by
> > 'old_insn', and by extension 'prog' should have been changed when
> > emit_call()ing, to the value of 'ip', but wasn't.
>
> hi,
> thanks for the report.. I can reproduce that easily with [2]
>
> AFAICS it looks like previous update fails because we use bpf_arch_text_poke,
> which can't find poke->tailcall_bypass value as bpf program symbol and fails
> with -EINVAL
>
> then the following update fails to find expected jmp/nop because it was never
> updated.. I think we should use __bpf_arch_text_poke like we do in
> bpf_tail_call_direct_fixup and skip the bpf symbol check
>
> with the patch below I can't reproduce the issue anymore, I'll do some more
> checking though
The patch below seems to be working for me also:
Tested-by: Lee Jones <lee@...nel.org>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> index 8c10d9abc239..35c2988caf29 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> @@ -391,8 +391,8 @@ static int emit_jump(u8 **pprog, void *func, void *ip)
> return emit_patch(pprog, func, ip, 0xE9);
> }
>
> -static int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
> - void *old_addr, void *new_addr)
> +int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
> + void *old_addr, void *new_addr)
> {
> const u8 *nop_insn = x86_nops[5];
> u8 old_insn[X86_PATCH_SIZE];
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
> index eb84caf133df..0d7b8311fada 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -3172,6 +3172,8 @@ enum bpf_text_poke_type {
>
> int bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
> void *addr1, void *addr2);
> +int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
> + void *old_addr, void *new_addr);
>
> void *bpf_arch_text_copy(void *dst, void *src, size_t len);
> int bpf_arch_text_invalidate(void *dst, size_t len);
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> index 2058e89b5ddd..4ab5864746ce 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> @@ -1073,33 +1073,33 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key,
> new_addr = new ? (u8 *)new->bpf_func + poke->adj_off : NULL;
>
> if (new) {
> - ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
> + ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
> BPF_MOD_JUMP,
> old_addr, new_addr);
> BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
> if (!old) {
> - ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
> + ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
> BPF_MOD_JUMP,
> poke->bypass_addr,
> NULL);
> - BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
> + BUG_ON(ret < 0);
> }
> } else {
> - ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
> + ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
> BPF_MOD_JUMP,
> old_bypass_addr,
> poke->bypass_addr);
> - BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
> + BUG_ON(ret < 0);
> /* let other CPUs finish the execution of program
> * so that it will not possible to expose them
> * to invalid nop, stack unwind, nop state
> */
> if (!ret)
> synchronize_rcu();
> - ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
> + ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
> BPF_MOD_JUMP,
> old_addr, NULL);
> - BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
> + BUG_ON(ret < 0);
> }
> }
> }
--
Lee Jones [李琼斯]
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