netdev - Re: [PATCH bpf-next 08/15] bpf: Assign ID to scalars on spill

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Date: Mon, 25 Dec 2023 23:11:30 +0200
From: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxtram95@...il.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
	Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@...com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
	Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@...nel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
	"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@...valent.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 08/15] bpf: Assign ID to scalars on spill

On Sun, 24 Dec 2023 at 19:15:42 -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 20, 2023 at 1:40 PM Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxtram95@...il.com> wrote:
> >
> > From: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@...valent.com>
> >
> > Currently, when a scalar bounded register is spilled to the stack, its
> > ID is preserved, but only if was already assigned, i.e. if this register
> > was MOVed before.
> >
> > Assign an ID on spill if none is set, so that equal scalars could be
> > tracked if a register is spilled to the stack and filled into another
> > register.
> >
> > One test is adjusted to reflect the change in register IDs.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@...valent.com>
> > ---
> >  kernel/bpf/verifier.c                                     | 8 +++++++-
> >  .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_direct_packet_access.c   | 2 +-
> >  2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > index b757fdbbbdd2..caa768f1e369 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > @@ -4503,9 +4503,15 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> >
> >         mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
> >         if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) && env->bpf_capable) {
> > +               bool reg_value_fits;
> > +
> > +               reg_value_fits = get_reg_width(reg) <= BITS_PER_BYTE * size;
> > +               /* Make sure that reg had an ID to build a relation on spill. */
> > +               if (reg_value_fits)
> > +                       assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, reg);
> 
> Thanks.
> I just debugged this issue as part of my bpf_cmp series.
> 
> llvm generated:
> 
> 1093: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -96) = r0     ;
> R0_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-4095,smax=smax32=256) R10=fp0
> fp-96_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-4095,smax=smax32=256)
> ; if (bpf_cmp(filepart_length, >, MAX_PATH))
> 1094: (25) if r0 > 0x100 goto pc+903          ;
> R0_w=scalar(id=53,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=256,var_off=(0x0;
> 0x1ff))
> 
> the verifier refined the range of 'r0' here,
> but the code just read spilled value from stack:
> 
> 1116: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -64)     ; R1_w=map_value
> ; payload += filepart_length;
> 1117: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -96)     ;
> R2_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-4095,smax=smax32=256) R10=fp0
> fp-96=scalar(smin=smin32=-4095,smax=smax32=256)
> 1118: (0f) r1 += r2 ;
> R1_w=map_value(map=data_heap,ks=4,vs=23040,off=148,smin=smin32=-4095,smax=smax32=3344)
> 
> And later errors as:
> "R1 min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index
> >=0) check."
> 
> This verifier improvement is certainly necessary.

Glad that you found it useful!

> Since you've analyzed this issue did you figure out a workaround
> for C code on existing and older kernels?

Uhm... in my case (Cilium, it was a while ago) I did some big change
(reorganized function calls and revalidate_data() calls) that changed
codegen significantly, and the problematic pattern disappeared.

I can suggest trying to play with volatile, e.g., declare
filepart_length as volatile; if it doesn't help, create another volatile
variable and copy filepart_length to it before doing bpf_cmp (copying
reg->reg will assign an ID, but I'm not sure if they'll still be in
registers after being declared as volatile).

Unfortunately, I couldn't reproduce your issue locally, so I couldn't
try these suggestions myself. Is this the right code, or should I take
it from elsewhere?

https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=812010

What LLVM version do you see the issue on? I can try to look for a
specific C workaround if I reproduce it locally.

BTW, the asm workaround is obvious (copy reg to another reg to assign an
ID), so maybe an inline asm like this would do the thing?

asm volatile("r8 = %0" :: "r"(filepart_length) : "r8");