netdev - Re: [RFC PATCH v7 1/8] net_sched: Introduce eBPF based Qdisc

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Message-ID: <CAMB2axOdeE5dPeFGvgM5QVd9a47srtvDFZd1VUYjSarNJC=T_w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 08:23:23 -0800
From: Amery Hung <ameryhung@...il.com>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, yangpeihao@...u.edu.cn, toke@...hat.com, 
	jhs@...atatu.com, jiri@...nulli.us, sdf@...gle.com, xiyou.wangcong@...il.com, 
	yepeilin.cs@...il.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, 
	Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 1/8] net_sched: Introduce eBPF based Qdisc

On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 10:39 PM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
> >> We can see how those limitations (calling sch_tree_lock() and returning a ptr)
> >> can be addressed in bpf. This will also help other similar use cases.
> >>
> >
> > For kptr, I wonder if we can support the following semantics in bpf if
> > they make sense:
>
> I think they are useful but they are not fully supported now.
>
> Some thoughts below.
>
> > 1. Passing a referenced kptr into a bpf program, which will also need
> > to be released, or exchanged into maps or allocated objects.
>
> "enqueue" should be the one considering here:
>
> struct Qdisc_ops {
>         /* ... */
>         int                     (*enqueue)(struct sk_buff *skb,
>                                            struct Qdisc *sch,
>                                            struct sk_buff **to_free);
>
> };
>
> The verifier only marks the skb as a trusted kptr but does not mark its
> reg->ref_obj_id. Take a look at btf_ctx_access(). In particular:
>
>         if (prog_args_trusted(prog))
>                 info->reg_type |= PTR_TRUSTED;
>
> The verifier does not know the skb ownership is passed into the ".enqueue" ops
> and does not know the bpf prog needs to release it or store it in a map.
>
> The verifier tracks the reference state when a KF_ACQUIRE kfunc is called (just
> an example, not saying we need to use KF_ACQUIRE kfunc). Take a look at
> acquire_reference_state() which is the useful one here.
>
> Whenever the verifier is loading the ".enqueue" bpf_prog, the verifier can
> always acquire_reference_state() for the "struct sk_buff *skb" argument.
>
> Take a look at a recent RFC:
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240122212217.1391878-1-thinker.li@gmail.com/
> which is tagging the argument of an ops (e.g. ".enqueue" here). That RFC patch
> is tagging the argument could be NULL by appending "__nullable" to the argument
> name. The verifier will enforce that the bpf prog must check for NULL first.
>
> The similar idea can be used here but with a different tagging (for example,
> "__must_release", admittedly not a good name). While the RFC patch is
> in-progress, for now, may be hardcode for the ".enqueue" ops in
> check_struct_ops_btf_id() and always acquire_reference_state() for the skb. This
> part can be adjusted later once the RFC patch will be in shape.
>

Make sense. One more thing to consider here is that .enqueue is
actually a reference acquiring and releasing function at the same
time. Assuming ctx written to by a struct_ops program can be seen by
the kernel, another new tag for the "to_free" argument will still be
needed so that the verifier can recognize when writing skb to
"to_free".

>
> Then one more thing is to track when the struct_ops bpf prog is actually reading
> the value of the skb pointer. One thing is worth to mention here, e.g. a
> struct_ops prog for enqueue:
>
> SEC("struct_ops")
> int BPF_PROG(bpf_dropall_enqueue, struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
>              struct sk_buff **to_free)
> {
>         return bpf_qdisc_drop(skb, sch, to_free);
> }
>
> Take a look at the BPF_PROG macro, the bpf prog is getting a pointer to an array
> of __u64 as the only argument. The skb is actually in ctx[0], sch is in
> ctx[1]...etc. When ctx[0] is read to get the skb pointer (e.g. r1 = ctx[0]),
> btf_ctx_access() marks the reg_type to PTR_TRUSTED. It needs to also initialize
> the reg->ref_obj_id by the id obtained earlier from acquire_reference_state()
> during check_struct_ops_btf_id() somehow.
>
>
> > 2. Returning a kptr from a program and treating it as releasing the reference.
>
> e.g. for dequeue:
>
> struct Qdisc_ops {
>         /* ... */
>         struct sk_buff *        (*dequeue)(struct Qdisc *);
> };
>
>
> Right now the verifier should complain on check_reference_leak() if the
> struct_ops bpf prog is returning a referenced kptr.
>
> Unlike an argument, the return type of a function does not have a name to tag.
> It is the first case that a struct_ops bpf_prog returning a pointer. One idea is
> to assume it must be a trusted pointer (PTR_TRUSTED) and the verifier should
> check it is indeed with PTR_TRUSTED flag.
>
> May be release_reference_state() can be called to assume the kernel will release
> it as long as the return pointer type is PTR_TRUSTED and the type matches the
> return type of the ops. Take a look at check_return_code().