netdev - [PATCH net-next] netfilter: conntrack: avoid sending RST to reply out-of-window skb

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Message-Id: <20240307090732.56708-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
Date: Thu,  7 Mar 2024 17:07:32 +0800
From: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>
To: edumazet@...gle.com,
	pablo@...filter.org,
	kadlec@...filter.org,
	fw@...len.de,
	kuba@...nel.org,
	pabeni@...hat.com,
	davem@...emloft.net
Cc: netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org,
	coreteam@...filter.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	kerneljasonxing@...il.com,
	Jason Xing <kernelxing@...cent.com>
Subject: [PATCH net-next] netfilter: conntrack: avoid sending RST to reply out-of-window skb

From: Jason Xing <kernelxing@...cent.com>

Supposing we set DNAT policy converting a_port to b_port on the
server at the beginning, the socket is set up by using 4-turple:

client_ip:client_port <--> server_ip:b_port

Then, some strange skbs from client or gateway, say, out-of-window
skbs are sent to the server_ip:a_port (not b_port) due to DNAT
clearing skb->_nfct value in nf_conntrack_in() function. Why?
Because the tcp_in_window() considers the incoming skb as an
invalid skb by returning NFCT_TCP_INVALID.

At last, the TCP layer process the out-of-window
skb (client_ip,client_port,server_ip,a_port) and try to look up
such an socket in tcp_v4_rcv(), as we can see, it will fail for sure
and send back an RST to the client.

The detailed call graphs go like this:
1)
nf_conntrack_in()
  -> nf_conntrack_handle_packet()
    -> nf_conntrack_tcp_packet()
      -> tcp_in_window() // tests if the skb is out-of-window
      -> return -NF_ACCEPT;
  -> skb->_nfct = 0; // if the above line returns a negative value
2)
tcp_v4_rcv()
  -> __inet_lookup_skb() // fails, then jump to no_tcp_socket
  -> tcp_v4_send_reset()

The moment the client receives the RST, it will drop. So the RST
skb doesn't hurt the client (maybe hurt some gateway which cancels
the session when filtering the RST without validating
the sequence because of performance reason). Well, it doesn't
matter. However, we can see many RST in flight.

The key reason why I wrote this patch is that I don't think
the behaviour is expected because the RFC 793 defines this
case:

"If the connection is in a synchronized state (ESTABLISHED,
 FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT),
 any unacceptable segment (out of window sequence number or
 unacceptible acknowledgment number) must elicit only an empty
 acknowledgment segment containing the current send-sequence number
 and an acknowledgment..."

I think, even we have set DNAT policy, it would be better if the
whole process/behaviour adheres to the original TCP behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@...cent.com>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
index ae493599a3ef..3f3e620f3969 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
@@ -1253,13 +1253,11 @@ int nf_conntrack_tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 	res = tcp_in_window(ct, dir, index,
 			    skb, dataoff, th, state);
 	switch (res) {
-	case NFCT_TCP_IGNORE:
-		spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
-		return NF_ACCEPT;
 	case NFCT_TCP_INVALID:
 		nf_tcp_handle_invalid(ct, dir, index, skb, state);
+	case NFCT_TCP_IGNORE:
 		spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
-		return -NF_ACCEPT;
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
 	case NFCT_TCP_ACCEPT:
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.37.3