netdev - Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access

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Message-ID: <CAADnVQ+d3pumHKBA1tTwy-8Vm21xu5Xckqv+4y-27FidBVetvQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2024 16:48:55 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>
Cc: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@...il.com>, Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com>, 
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>, 
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, 
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>, 
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, 
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>, John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, 
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, 
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, 
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, 
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.org>, 
	Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, 
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access

On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 3:30 PM David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com> wrote:
>
> From: Alexei Starovoitov
> > Sent: 24 March 2024 20:43
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 1:05 PM David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Alexei Starovoitov
> > > > Sent: 21 March 2024 06:08
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 3:55 AM Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@...il.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
> > > > > the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
> > > > > as default.
> > > > >
> > > > > The implementation is as follows:
> > > > >
> > > > > REG_AX =  SRC_REG
> > > > > if(offset)
> > > > >         REG_AX += offset;
> > > > > REG_AX >>= 32;
> > > > > if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
> > > > >         DST_REG = 0;
> > > > > else
> > > > >         DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);
> > > >
> > > > The patch looks good, but it seems to be causing s390 CI failures.
> > >
> > > I'm confused by the need for this check (and, IIRC, some other bpf
> > > code that does kernel copies that can fault - and return an error).
> > >
> > > I though that the entire point of bpf was that is sanitised and
> > > verified everything to limit what the 'program' could do in order
> > > to stop it overwriting (or even reading) kernel structures that
> > > is wasn't supposed to access.
> > >
> > > So it just shouldn't have a address that might be (in any way)
> > > invalid.
> >
> > bpf tracing progs can call bpf_probe_read_kernel() which
> > can read any kernel memory.
> > This is nothing but an inlined version of it.
>
> It was the getsockopt() code were I saw the copy_nocheck() calls.
> Those have to be broken.

No. If you mean csum_partial_copy_nocheck() then they're fine.

> Although the way some of the options use the ptr:len supplied by
> the application you stand no chance of do an in-kernel call
> without a proper buffer descriptor argument (with separate optlen
> and bufferlen fields.)
>
> >
> > > The only possible address verify is access_ok() to ensure that
> > > a uses address really is a user address.
> >
> > access_ok() considerations don't apply.
> > We're not dealing with user memory access.
>
> If you do need a check for 'not a user address' don't you want to just
> require access_ok() fail?
> That would be architecture independent.

No. access_ok() can only be used on the user addr.
access_ok() == false on the kernel addr doesn't mean that
it's a kernel addr.