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Message-Id: <20240408154354.164278-1-aha310510@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2024 00:43:54 +0900
From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@...il.com>
To: edumazet@...gle.com
Cc: aha310510@...il.com,
daan.j.demeyer@...il.com,
davem@...emloft.net,
dsahern@...nel.org,
eric.dumazet@...il.com,
kuba@...nel.org,
kuniyu@...zon.com,
martin.lau@...nel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
pabeni@...hat.com,
willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: implement lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF)
Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 8, 2024 at 4:30 PM Jeongjun Park <aha310510@...il.com> wrote:
> >
> > Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > > syzbot reported a lockdep violation [1] involving af_unix
> > > support of SO_PEEK_OFF.
> > >
> > > Since SO_PEEK_OFF is inherently not thread safe (it uses a per-socket
> > > sk_peek_off field), there is really no point to enforce a pointless
> > > thread safety in the kernel.
> > >
> > > After this patch :
> > >
> > > - setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) no longer acquires the socket lock.
> > >
> > > - skb_consume_udp() no longer has to acquire the socket lock.
> > >
> > > - af_unix no longer needs a special version of sk_set_peek_off(),
> > > because it does not lock u->iolock anymore.
> >
> > The method employed in this patch, which avoids locking u->iolock in
> > SO_PEEK_OFF, appears to have effectively remedied the immediate vulnerability,
> > and the patch itself seems robust.
> >
> > However, if a future scenario arises where mutex_lock(&u->iolock) is required
> > after sk_setsockopt(sk), this patch would become ineffective.
> >
> > In practical testing within my environment, I observed that reintroducing
> > mutex_lock(&u->iolock) within sk_setsockopt() triggered the vulnerability once again.
> >
> > Therefore, I believe it's crucial to address the fundamental cause triggering this vulnerability
> > alongside the current patch.
> >
> > [ 30.537400] ======================================================
> > [ 30.537765] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
> > [ 30.538237] 6.9.0-rc1-00058-g4076fa161217-dirty #8 Not tainted
> > [ 30.538541] ------------------------------------------------------
> > [ 30.538791] poc/209 is trying to acquire lock:
> > [ 30.539008] ffff888007a8cd58 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x37e/0x550
> > [ 30.540060]
> > [ 30.540060] but task is already holding lock:
> > [ 30.540482] ffff888007a8d070 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0xec/0x550
> > [ 30.540871]
> > [ 30.540871] which lock already depends on the new lock.
> > [ 30.540871]
> > [ 30.541341]
> > [ 30.541341] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
> > [ 30.541816]
> > [ 30.541816] -> #1 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
> > [ 30.542411] lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2e0
> > [ 30.542650] __mutex_lock+0x91/0x4b0
> > [ 30.542830] sk_setsockopt+0xae2/0x1510
> > [ 30.543009] do_sock_setsockopt+0x14e/0x180
> > [ 30.543443] __sys_setsockopt+0x73/0xc0
> > [ 30.543635] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1a/0x30
> > [ 30.543859] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x1e0
> > [ 30.544057] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
> > [ 30.544652]
> > [ 30.544652] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}:
> > [ 30.544987] check_prev_add+0xeb/0xa20
> > [ 30.545174] __lock_acquire+0x12fb/0x1740
> > [ 30.545516] lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2e0
> > [ 30.545692] lock_sock_nested+0x2d/0x80
> > [ 30.545871] __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x37e/0x550
> > [ 30.546066] sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0xd0
> > [ 30.546419] ____sys_recvmsg+0x85/0x1d0
> > [ 30.546653] ___sys_recvmsg+0x77/0xc0
> > [ 30.546971] __sys_recvmsg+0x55/0xa0
> > [ 30.547149] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x1e0
> > [ 30.547428] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
> > [ 30.547740]
> > [ 30.547740] other info that might help us debug this:
> > [ 30.547740]
> > [ 30.548217] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
> > [ 30.548217]
> > [ 30.548502] CPU0 CPU1
> > [ 30.548713] ---- ----
> > [ 30.548926] lock(&u->iolock);
> > [ 30.549234] lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX);
> > [ 30.549535] lock(&u->iolock);
> > [ 30.549798] lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX);
> > [ 30.549970]
> > [ 30.549970] *** DEADLOCK ***
> > [ 30.549970]
> > [ 30.550504] 1 lock held by poc/209:
> > [ 30.550681] #0: ffff888007a8d070 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0xec/0x550
> > [ 30.551100]
> > [ 30.551100] stack backtrace:
> > [ 30.551532] CPU: 1 PID: 209 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-00058-g4076fa161217-dirty #8
> > [ 30.551910] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
> > [ 30.552539] Call Trace:
> > [ 30.552788] <TASK>
> > [ 30.552987] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
> > [ 30.553429] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150
> > [ 30.553626] check_prev_add+0xeb/0xa20
> > [ 30.553811] __lock_acquire+0x12fb/0x1740
> > [ 30.553993] lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2e0
> > [ 30.554234] ? __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x37e/0x550
> > [ 30.554543] ? __skb_try_recv_datagram+0xb2/0x190
> > [ 30.554752] lock_sock_nested+0x2d/0x80
> > [ 30.554912] ? __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x37e/0x550
> > [ 30.555097] __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x37e/0x550
> > [ 30.555498] sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0xd0
> > [ 30.555661] ____sys_recvmsg+0x85/0x1d0
> > [ 30.555826] ? __import_iovec+0x177/0x1d0
> > [ 30.555998] ? import_iovec+0x1a/0x20
> > [ 30.556401] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x68/0xa0
> > [ 30.556676] ___sys_recvmsg+0x77/0xc0
> > [ 30.556856] ? __fget_files+0xc8/0x1a0
> > [ 30.557612] ? lock_release+0xbd/0x290
> > [ 30.557799] ? __fget_files+0xcd/0x1a0
> > [ 30.557969] __sys_recvmsg+0x55/0xa0
> > [ 30.558284] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x1e0
> > [ 30.558455] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
> > [ 30.558740] RIP: 0033:0x7f3c14632dad
> > [ 30.559329] Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 6a ef ff ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2f 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 9e ef f8
> > [ 30.560156] RSP: 002b:00007f3c12c43e60 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
> > [ 30.560582] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3c14632dad
> > [ 30.560933] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f3c12c44eb0 RDI: 0000000000000005
> > [ 30.562935] RBP: 00007f3c12c44ef0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f3c12c45700
> > [ 30.565833] R10: fffffffffffff648 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007ffe93a2bfde
> > [ 30.566161] R13: 00007ffe93a2bfdf R14: 00007f3c12c44fc0 R15: 0000000000802000
> > [ 30.569456] </TASK>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > What are your thoughts on this?
>
> You are talking about some unreleased code ?
>
> I can not comment, obviously.
I think it would be prudent to patch __unix_dgram_recvmsg() as
depicted below to ensure its proper functionality, even
in the event of a later addition of mutex_lock in sk_setsockopt().
By implementing this patch, we mitigate the risk of potential deadlock scenarios
in the future by eliminating the condition that could lead to them.
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 5b41e2321209..f102f08f649f 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -2458,11 +2458,14 @@ int __unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
EPOLLWRBAND);
if (msg->msg_name) {
+ mutex_unlock(&u->iolock);
+
unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
-
+
BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_UNIX_RECVMSG_LOCK(sk,
msg->msg_name,
&msg->msg_namelen);
+ mutex_lock(&u->iolock);
}
if (size > skb->len - skip)
@@ -2814,6 +2817,8 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state,
/* Copy address just once */
if (state->msg && state->msg->msg_name) {
+ mutex_unlock(&u->iolock);
+
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_un *, sunaddr,
state->msg->msg_name);
unix_copy_addr(state->msg, skb->sk);
@@ -2823,6 +2828,8 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state,
&state->msg->msg_namelen);
sunaddr = NULL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&u->iolock);
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, unix_skb_len(skb) - skip, size);
--
2.34.1
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