netdev - [PATCH 5.15.y v2 4/5] bpf: Fix out of bounds access for ringbuf helpers

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Message-ID: <20240418010723.3069001-5-edliaw@google.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 01:07:13 +0000
From: Edward Liaw <edliaw@...gle.com>
To: stable@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, 
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, 
	Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>, 
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, 
	Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...roid.com, 
	Edward Liaw <edliaw@...gle.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	tr3e.wang@...il.com
Subject: [PATCH 5.15.y v2 4/5] bpf: Fix out of bounds access for ringbuf helpers

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>

Both bpf_ringbuf_submit() and bpf_ringbuf_discard() have ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM
in their bpf_func_proto definition as their first argument. They both expect
the result from a prior bpf_ringbuf_reserve() call which has a return type of
RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL.

Meaning, after a NULL check in the code, the verifier will promote the register
type in the non-NULL branch to a PTR_TO_MEM and in the NULL branch to a known
zero scalar. Generally, pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MEM is allowed, so the
latter could have an offset.

The ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM expects a PTR_TO_MEM register type. However, the non-
zero result from bpf_ringbuf_reserve() must be fed into either bpf_ringbuf_submit()
or bpf_ringbuf_discard() but with the original offset given it will then read
out the struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr mapping.

The verifier missed to enforce a zero offset, so that out of bounds access
can be triggered which could be used to escalate privileges if unprivileged
BPF was enabled (disabled by default in kernel).

Fixes: 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Reported-by: <tr3e.wang@...il.com> (SecCoder Security Lab)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 64620e0a1e712a778095bd35cbb277dc2259281f)
Signed-off-by: Edward Liaw <edliaw@...gle.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 14813fbebc9f..3dfc45ed428a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5153,9 +5153,15 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
 	case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY:
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
+		/* Some of the argument types nevertheless require a
+		 * zero register offset.
+		 */
+		if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM)
+			goto force_off_check;
 		break;
 	/* All the rest must be rejected: */
 	default:
+force_off_check:
 		err = __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno,
 					  type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID);
 		if (err < 0)
-- 
2.44.0.769.g3c40516874-goog