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Message-ID: <ZijcY_DHlmP84U4S@hog>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 12:18:11 +0200
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
To: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@...dia.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Gal Pressman <gal@...dia.com>,
Tariq Toukan <tariqt@...dia.com>,
Yossi Kuperman <yossiku@...dia.com>,
Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@...dia.com>,
Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 2/3] macsec: Detect if Rx skb is macsec-related
for offloading devices that update md_dst
2024-04-22, 22:55:02 -0700, Rahul Rameshbabu wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Apr, 2024 11:23:05 +0200 Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net> wrote:
> > 2024-04-19, 11:01:20 -0700, Rahul Rameshbabu wrote:
> >> On Fri, 19 Apr, 2024 17:05:52 +0200 Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net> wrote:
> >> > 2024-04-18, 18:17:16 -0700, Rahul Rameshbabu wrote:
> >> <snip>
> >> >> + /* This datapath is insecure because it is unable to
> >> >> + * enforce isolation of broadcast/multicast traffic and
> >> >> + * unicast traffic with promiscuous mode on the macsec
> >> >> + * netdev. Since the core stack has no mechanism to
> >> >> + * check that the hardware did indeed receive MACsec
> >> >> + * traffic, it is possible that the response handling
> >> >> + * done by the MACsec port was to a plaintext packet.
> >> >> + * This violates the MACsec protocol standard.
> >> >> + */
> >> >> + DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
> >> >
> >> > If you insist on this warning (and I'm not convinced it's useful,
> >> > since if the HW is already built and cannot inform the driver, there's
> >> > nothing the driver implementer can do), I would move it somewhere into
> >> > the config path. macsec_update_offload would be a better location for
> >> > this kind of warning (maybe with a pr_warn (not limited to debug
> >> > configs) saying something like "MACsec offload on devices that don't
> >> > support md_dst are insecure: they do not provide proper isolation of
> >> > traffic"). The comment can stay here.
> >> >
> >>
> >> I do not like the warning either. I left it mainly if it needed further
> >> discussion on the mailing list. Will remove it in my next revision. That
> >> said, it may make sense to advertise rx_uses_md_dst over netlink to
> >> annotate what macsec offload path a device uses? Just throwing out an
> >> idea here.
> >
> > Maybe. I was also thinking about adding a way to restrict offloading
> > only to devices with rx_uses_md_dst.
>
> That's an option. Basically, devices that do not support rx_uses_md_dst
> really only just do SW MACsec but do not return an error if the offload
> parameter is passed over netlink so user scripts do not break?
Forcing a fallback to SW could be considered a breakage because of the
performance regression, so I don't think we can turn this on by
default. Then I would simply reject offload on those devices. We could
have a compat mode that does the SW fallback you suggest. I don't know
if it would be used.
> > (Slightly related) I also find it annoying that users have to tell the
> > kernel whether to use PHY or MAC offload, but have no way to know
> > which one their HW supports. That should probably have been an
> > implementation detail that didn't need to be part of uapi :/
>
> We could leave the phy / mac netlink keywords and introduce an "on"
> option. We deduce whether the device is a phydev or not when on is
> passed and set the macsec->offload flag based on that. The phy and mac
> options for offload in ip-macsec can then be deprecated.
I thought about doing exactly that, and then dropped the idea because
it would only help with newer kernels.
--
Sabrina
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