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Message-ID: <6wn6ikteeanqmds2i7ar4wvhgj42pxpo2ejwbzz5t2i5cw3kov@omiadvu6dv6n>
Date: Thu, 23 May 2024 10:45:31 +0200
From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>
To: Alexander Graf <agraf@...raf.de>
Cc: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@...il.com>, 
	virtualization@...ts.linux.dev, kvm@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, 
	Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>, stefanha@...hat.com
Subject: Re: How to implement message forwarding from one CID to another in
 vhost driver

On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 08:50:22AM GMT, Alexander Graf wrote:
>Howdy,
>
>On 20.05.24 14:44, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
>>Hey Stefano,
>>
>>Thanks for the reply.
>>
>>
>>On Mon, May 20, 2024, 2:55 PM Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>Hi Dorjoy,
>>>
>>>On Sat, May 18, 2024 at 04:17:38PM GMT, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
>>>>Hi,
>>>>
>>>>Hope you are doing well. I am working on adding AWS Nitro Enclave[1]
>>>>emulation support in QEMU. Alexander Graf is mentoring me on this work. A v1
>>>>patch series has already been posted to the qemu-devel mailing list[2].
>>>>
>>>>AWS nitro enclaves is an Amazon EC2[3] feature that allows creating isolated
>>>>execution environments, called enclaves, from Amazon EC2 instances, which are
>>>>used for processing highly sensitive data. Enclaves have no persistent storage
>>>>and no external networking. The enclave VMs are based on Firecracker microvm
>>>>and have a vhost-vsock device for communication with the parent EC2 instance
>>>>that spawned it and a Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device for cryptographic
>>>>attestation. The parent instance VM always has CID 3 while the enclave VM gets
>>>>a dynamic CID. The enclave VMs can communicate with the parent instance over
>>>>various ports to CID 3, for example, the init process inside an enclave sends a
>>>>heartbeat to port 9000 upon boot, expecting a heartbeat reply, letting the
>>>>parent instance know that the enclave VM has successfully booted.
>>>>
>>>>The plan is to eventually make the nitro enclave emulation in QEMU standalone
>>>>i.e., without needing to run another VM with CID 3 with proper vsock
>>>If you don't have to launch another VM, maybe we can avoid vhost-vsock
>>>and emulate virtio-vsock in user-space, having complete control over the
>>>behavior.
>>>
>>>So we could use this opportunity to implement virtio-vsock in QEMU [4]
>>>or use vhost-user-vsock [5] and customize it somehow.
>>>(Note: vhost-user-vsock already supports sibling communication, so maybe
>>>with a few modifications it fits your case perfectly)
>>>
>>>[4] https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2095
>>>[5] https://github.com/rust-vmm/vhost-device/tree/main/vhost-device-vsock
>>
>>
>>Thanks for letting me know. Right now I don't have a complete picture
>>but I will look into them. Thank you.
>>>
>>>
>>>>communication support. For this to work, one approach could be to teach the
>>>>vhost driver in kernel to forward CID 3 messages to another CID N
>>>So in this case both CID 3 and N would be assigned to the same QEMU
>>>process?
>>
>>
>>CID N is assigned to the enclave VM. CID 3 was supposed to be the
>>parent VM that spawns the enclave VM (this is how it is in AWS, where
>>an EC2 instance VM spawns the enclave VM from inside it and that
>>parent EC2 instance always has CID 3). But in the QEMU case as we
>>don't want a parent VM (we want to run enclave VMs standalone) we
>>would need to forward the CID 3 messages to host CID. I don't know if
>>it means CID 3 and CID N is assigned to the same QEMU process. Sorry.
>
>
>There are 2 use cases here:
>
>1) Enclave wants to treat host as parent (default). In this scenario, 
>the "parent instance" that shows up as CID 3 in the Enclave doesn't 
>really exist. Instead, when the Enclave attempts to talk to CID 3, it 
>should really land on CID 0 (hypervisor). When the hypervisor tries to 
>connect to the Enclave on port X, it should look as if it originates 
>from CID 3, not CID 0.
>
>2) Multiple parent VMs. Think of an actual cloud hosting scenario. 
>Here, we have multiple "parent instances". Each of them thinks it's 
>CID 3. Each can spawn an Enclave that talks to CID 3 and reach the 
>parent. For this case, I think implementing all of virtio-vsock in 
>user space is the best path forward. But in theory, you could also 
>swizzle CIDs to make random "real" CIDs appear as CID 3.
>

Thank you for clarifying the use cases!

Also for case 1, vhost-vsock doesn't support CID 0, so in my opinion 
it's easier to go into user-space with vhost-user-vsock or the built-in 
device.

Maybe initially with vhost-user-vsock it's easier because we already 
have some thing that works and supports sibling communication (for case 
2).

>
>>
>>>Do you have to allocate 2 separate virtio-vsock devices, one for the
>>>parent and one for the enclave?
>>
>>
>>If there is a parent VM, then I guess both parent and enclave VMs need
>>virtio-vsock devices.
>>
>>>>(set to CID 2 for host) i.e., it patches CID from 3 to N on incoming messages
>>>>and from N to 3 on responses. This will enable users of the
>>>Will these messages have the VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag set?
>>>
>>>We don't support this in vhost-vsock yet, if supporting it helps, we
>>>might, but we need to better understand how to avoid security issues, so
>>>maybe each device needs to explicitly enable the feature and specify
>>>from which CIDs it accepts packets.
>>
>>
>>I don't know about the flag. So I don't know if it will be set. Sorry.
>
>
>>From the guest's point of view, the parent (CID 3) is just another VM. 
>Since Linux as of
>
> https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/20201204170235.84387-4-andraprs@amazon.com/#2594117
>
>always sets VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST when local_CID > 0 && remote_CID > 0, I 
>would say the message has the flag set.
>
>How would you envision the host to implement the flag? Would the host 
>allow user space to listen on any CID and hence receive the respective 
>target connections? And wouldn't listening on CID 0 then mean you're 
>effectively listening to "any" other CID? Thinking about that a bit 
>more, that may be just what we need, yes :)

No, wait. The flag I had guessed only to implement sibling 
communication, so the host doesn't re-forward those packets to sockets 
opened by applications in the host, but only to other VMs in the same 
host. So the host would always only have CID 2 assigned (CID 0 is not 
supported by vhost-vsock).

>
>
>>
>>
>>>>nitro-enclave machine
>>>>type in QEMU to run the necessary vsock server/clients in the host machine
>>>>(some defaults can be implemented in QEMU as well, for example, sending a reply
>>>>to the heartbeat) which will rid them of the cumbersome way of running another
>>>>whole VM with CID 3. This way, users of nitro-enclave machine in QEMU, could
>>>>potentially also run multiple enclaves with their messages for CID 3 forwarded
>>>>to different CIDs which, in QEMU side, could then be specified using a new
>>>>machine type option (parent-cid) if implemented. I guess in the QEMU side, this
>>>>will be an ioctl call (or some other way) to indicate to the host kernel that
>>>>the CID 3 messages need to be forwarded. Does this approach of
>>>What if there is already a VM with CID = 3 in the system?
>>
>>
>>Good question! I don't know what should happen in this case.
>
>
>See case 2 above :). In a nutshell, I don't think it'd be legal to 
>have a real CID 3 in that scenario.

Yeah, with vhost-vsock we can't, but with vhost-user-vsock I think is 
fine since the guest CID is local for each instance. The host only sees
the unix socket (like with firecracker).

>
>
>>
>>
>>>>forwarding CID 3 messages to another CID sound good?
>>>It seems too specific a case, if we can generalize it maybe we could
>>>make this change, but we would like to avoid complicating vhost-vsock
>>>and keep it as simple as possible to avoid then having to implement
>>>firewalls, etc.
>>>
>>>So first I would see if vhost-user-vsock or the QEMU built-in device is
>>>right for this use-case.
>>Thanks you! I will check everything out and reach out if I need
>>further guidance about what needs to be done. And sorry as I wasn't
>>able to answer some of your questions.
>
>
>As mentioned above, I think there is merit for both. I personally care 
>a lot more for case 1 over case 2: We already have a working 
>implementation of Nitro Enclaves in a Cloud setup. What is missing is 
>a way to easily run a Nitro Enclave locally for development.

If both are fine, then I would go more on modifying vhost-user-vsock or 
adding a built-in device in QEMU.
We have more freedom and also easier to update/debug.

Thanks,
Stefano


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