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Message-ID: <20240530131510.21243c94@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2024 13:15:10 -0700
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, pabeni@...hat.com, borisp@...dia.com,
gal@...dia.com, cratiu@...dia.com, rrameshbabu@...dia.com,
steffen.klassert@...unet.com, tariqt@...dia.com
Subject: Re: [RFC net-next 01/15] psp: add documentation
On Thu, 30 May 2024 12:51:20 -0700 Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> > I've mostly been concerned about the below edge cases.
> >
> > If both peers are in TCP_ESTABLISHED for the during of the upgrade,
> > and data is aligned on message boundary, things are straightforward.
> >
> > The retransmit logic is clear, as this is controlled by skb->decrypted
> > on the individual skbs on the retransmit queue.
> >
> > That also solves another edge case: skb geometry changes on retransmit
> > (due to different MSS or segs, using tcp_fragment, tso_fragment,
> > tcp_retrans_try_collapse, ..) maintain skb->decrypted. It's not
> > possible that skb is accidentally created that combines plaintext and
> > ciphertext content.
> >
> > Although.. does this require adding that skb->decrypted check to
> > tcp_skb_can_collapse?
>
> Good catch. The TLS checks predate tcp_skb_can_collapse() (and MPTCP).
> We've grown the check in tcp_shift_skb_data() and the logic
> in tcp_grow_skb(), both missing the decrypted check.
>
> I'll send some fixes, these are existing bugs :(
I take that back, we can depend on EOR like TLS does.
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