netdev - Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] mm/slab: Introduce kmem_buckets

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Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 16:29:26 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
	"GONG, Ruiqi" <gongruiqi@...weicloud.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	jvoisin <julien.voisin@...tri.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>,
	Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>,
	Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>,
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
	Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@...ux.dev>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@...gle.com>,
	Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
	linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] mm/slab: Introduce kmem_buckets_create() and
 family

On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 03:48:24PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org> writes:
> 
> > Dedicated caches are available for fixed size allocations via
> > kmem_cache_alloc(), but for dynamically sized allocations there is only
> > the global kmalloc API's set of buckets available. This means it isn't
> > possible to separate specific sets of dynamically sized allocations into
> > a separate collection of caches.
> >
> > This leads to a use-after-free exploitation weakness in the Linux
> > kernel since many heap memory spraying/grooming attacks depend on using
> > userspace-controllable dynamically sized allocations to collide with
> > fixed size allocations that end up in same cache.
> >
> > While CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES provides a probabilistic defense
> > against these kinds of "type confusion" attacks, including for fixed
> > same-size heap objects, we can create a complementary deterministic
> > defense for dynamically sized allocations that are directly user
> > controlled. Addressing these cases is limited in scope, so isolating these
> > kinds of interfaces will not become an unbounded game of whack-a-mole. For
> > example, many pass through memdup_user(), making isolation there very
> > effective.
> 
> Isn't the attack still possible if the attacker can free the slab page
> during the use-after-free period with enough memory pressure?
> 
> Someone else might grab the page that was in the bucket for another slab
> and the type confusion could hurt again.
> 
> Or is there some other defense against that, other than
> CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC or full slab poisoning? And how expensive
> does it get when any of those are enabled?
> 
> I remember reading some paper about a apple allocator trying similar
> techniques and it tried very hard to never reuse memory (probably
> not a good idea for Linux though)
> 
> I assume you thought about this, but it would be good to discuss such
> limitations and interactions in the commit log.

Yup! It's in there; it's just after what you quoted above. Here it is:

> > Memory allocation pinning[2] is still needed to plug the Use-After-Free
> > cross-allocator weakness, but that is an existing and separate issue
> > which is complementary to this improvement. Development continues for
> > that feature via the SLAB_VIRTUAL[3] series (which could also provide
> > guard pages -- another complementary improvement).
> > [...]
> > Link: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/how-simple-linux-kernel-memory.html [2]
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230915105933.495735-1-matteorizzo@google.com/ [3]

Let me know if you think this description needs to be improved...

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook