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Message-ID: <CANn89iJhX=ck_XD4Gu7B_1401e+y4NSE+8CAD_Yu4PMO4-H-eA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jul 2024 10:44:55 +0200
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
To: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, 
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>, Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@...com>, 
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 net] tcp: Don't drop SYN+ACK for simultaneous connect().

On Thu, Jul 4, 2024 at 5:57 AM Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com> wrote:
>
> RFC 9293 states that in the case of simultaneous connect(), the connection
> gets established when SYN+ACK is received. [0]
>
>       TCP Peer A                                       TCP Peer B
>
>   1.  CLOSED                                           CLOSED
>   2.  SYN-SENT     --> <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN>              ...
>   3.  SYN-RECEIVED <-- <SEQ=300><CTL=SYN>              <-- SYN-SENT
>   4.               ... <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN>              --> SYN-RECEIVED
>   5.  SYN-RECEIVED --> <SEQ=100><ACK=301><CTL=SYN,ACK> ...
>   6.  ESTABLISHED  <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=101><CTL=SYN,ACK> <-- SYN-RECEIVED
>   7.               ... <SEQ=100><ACK=301><CTL=SYN,ACK> --> ESTABLISHED
>
> However, since commit 0c24604b68fc ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 4.2"), such a
> SYN+ACK is dropped in tcp_validate_incoming() and responded with Challenge
> ACK.
>
> For example, the write() syscall in the following packetdrill script fails
> with -EAGAIN, and wrong SNMP stats get incremented.
>
>    0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_NONBLOCK, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
>   +0 connect(3, ..., ...) = -1 EINPROGRESS (Operation now in progress)
>
>   +0 > S  0:0(0) <mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 1000 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8>
>   +0 < S  0:0(0) win 1000 <mss 1000>
>   +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 3308134035 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8>
>   +0 < S. 0:0(0) ack 1 win 1000
>
>   +0 write(3, ..., 100) = 100
>   +0 > P. 1:101(100) ack 1
>
>   --
>
>   # packetdrill cross-synack.pkt
>   cross-synack.pkt:13: runtime error in write call: Expected result 100 but got -1 with errno 11 (Resource temporarily unavailable)
>   # nstat
>   ...
>   TcpExtTCPChallengeACK           1                  0.0
>   TcpExtTCPSYNChallenge           1                  0.0
>
> That said, this is no big deal because the Challenge ACK finally let the
> connection state transition to TCP_ESTABLISHED in both directions.  If the
> peer is not using Linux, there might be a small latency before ACK though.

I suggest removing these 3 lines. Removing a not needed challenge ACK is good
regardless of the 'other peer' behavior.

>
> The problem is that bpf_skops_established() is triggered by the Challenge
> ACK instead of SYN+ACK.  This causes the bpf prog to miss the chance to
> check if the peer supports a TCP option that is expected to be exchanged
> in SYN and SYN+ACK.
>
> Let's accept a bare SYN+ACK for non-TFO TCP_SYN_RECV sockets to avoid such
> a situation.
>
> Link: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.html#section-3.5-7 [0]
> Fixes: 9872a4bde31b ("bpf: Add TCP connection BPF callbacks")
> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
> ---
>  net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 7 ++++++-
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> index 77294fd5fd3e..70595009bb58 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> @@ -5980,6 +5980,11 @@ static bool tcp_validate_incoming(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
>          * RFC 5961 4.2 : Send a challenge ack
>          */
>         if (th->syn) {
> +               if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV && !tp->syn_fastopen && th->ack &&
> +                   TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1 == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq &&
> +                   TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1 == tp->rcv_nxt &&
> +                   TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq == tp->snd_nxt)
> +                       goto pass;
>  syn_challenge:
>                 if (syn_inerr)
>                         TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_INERRS);
> @@ -5990,7 +5995,7 @@ static bool tcp_validate_incoming(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
>         }
>
>         bpf_skops_parse_hdr(sk, skb);
> -
> +pass:

It is not clear to me why we do not call bpf_skops_parse_hdr(sk, skb)
in this case ?


>         return true;
>
>  discard:
> --
> 2.30.2
>

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