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Message-ID: <20240710130514.GQ107163@nvidia.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2024 10:05:14 -0300
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>, ksummit@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-cxl@...r.kernel.org, linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [MAINTAINERS SUMMIT] Device Passthrough Considered Harmful?
On Tue, Jul 09, 2024 at 12:43:50PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> A "Command Effects Log" seems like that starting point, with trust that
> cynical abuses of that contract have a higher cost than benefit, and
> trust that the protocol limits the potential damage of such abuse.
I've taken the view that companies are now very vigilant about
security and often have their own internal incentives and procedures
to do secure things.
If someone does a cynical security breaking thing and deploys it to a
wide user base they are likely to be caught by a security researcher
and embarassed with a CVE and a web site with a snappy name.
Not 100% of course, but it is certainly not a wild west of people just
doing whatever they want.
The other half of this bargin is we have to be much clearer about what
the security model is and what is security breaking. Like Christoph I
often have conversations with people who don't understand the basics
of how the Linux security models should work and are doing device-side
work that has to fit into it.
Jason
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