| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <d1a7de68-1e36-42e6-bdc8-4046ea52338a@hallyn.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 08:46:51 -0500 (CDT)
From: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...weicloud.com>
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...omium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@...il.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@...e.com>,
Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@...il.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...merspace.com>,
Anna Schumaker <anna@...nel.org>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM
hook vm_enough_memory
Jul 11, 2024 06:14:08 Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...weicloud.com>:
> From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...wei.com>
>
> To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
> hook vm_enough_memory to 0 or a negative error code.
>
> Before:
> - Hook vm_enough_memory returns 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
> - LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 1.
>
> After:
> - Hook vm_enough_memory reutrns 0 if permission is granted, negative
> error code if not.
> - LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 0.
I haven't done a detailed review yet, but based on the description this is definitely a good change. Thank you.
> Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...wei.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
> security/commoncap.c | 11 +++--------
> security/security.c | 11 +++++------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 ++++-----------
> 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 44488b1ab9a9..e6e6f8473955 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, quota_on, struct dentry *dentry)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, syslog, int type)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, settime, const struct timespec64 *ts,
> const struct timezone *tz)
> -LSM_HOOK(int, 1, vm_enough_memory, struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, vm_enough_memory, struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_for_exec, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index de3af33e6ff5..454f96307cb9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static inline int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts,
>
> static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> {
> - return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages));
> + return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, !cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages));
> }
>
> static inline int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 162d96b3a676..cefad323a0b1 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1396,17 +1396,12 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
> * task is permitted.
> *
> - * Return: 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
> + * Return: 0 if permission granted, negative error code if not.
> */
> int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> {
> - int cap_sys_admin = 0;
> -
> - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns,
> - CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) == 0)
> - cap_sys_admin = 1;
> -
> - return cap_sys_admin;
> + return cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index e5ca08789f74..3475f0cab3da 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1115,15 +1115,14 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> int rc;
>
> /*
> - * The module will respond with a positive value if
> - * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
> - * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
> - * agree that it should be set it will. If any module
> - * thinks it should not be set it won't.
> + * The module will respond with 0 if it thinks the __vm_enough_memory()
> + * call should be made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
> + * agree that it should be set it will. If any module thinks it should
> + * not be set it won't.
> */
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
> rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
> - if (rc <= 0) {
> + if (rc < 0) {
> cap_sys_admin = 0;
> break;
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 7eed331e90f0..9cd5a8f1f6a3 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2202,23 +2202,16 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
> }
>
> /*
> - * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
> - * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
> - * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
> + * Check permission for allocating a new virtual mapping. Returns
> + * 0 if permission is granted, negative error code if not.
> *
> * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
> * processes that allocate mappings.
> */
> static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> {
> - int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
> -
> - rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> - CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
> - if (rc == 0)
> - cap_sys_admin = 1;
> -
> - return cap_sys_admin;
> + return cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
> }
>
> /* binprm security operations */
> --
> 2.30.2
Powered by blists - more mailing lists