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Message-ID: <7154a541-d78c-4560-a6de-90340ce23555@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2024 16:07:26 +0800
From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...weicloud.com>
To: Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>, Eduard Zingerman
<eddyz87@...il.com>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...omium.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
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Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 03/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook
inode_getsecurity
On 7/12/2024 9:31 PM, Simon Horman wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 07:18:51PM +0800, Xu Kuohai wrote:
>> From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...wei.com>
>>
>> To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
>> hook inode_getsecurity to 0 or a negative error code.
>>
>> Before:
>> - Hook inode_getsecurity returns size of buffer on success or a
>> negative error code on failure.
>>
>> After:
>> - Hook inode_getsecurity returns 0 on success or a negative error
>> code on failure. An output parameter @len is introduced to hold
>> the buffer size on success.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...wei.com>
>> ---
>> fs/xattr.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
>> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++-
>> include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++------
>> security/commoncap.c | 9 ++++++---
>> security/security.c | 11 ++++++-----
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++----------
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 +++++++-------
>> 7 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
>> index f8b643f91a98..f4e3bedf7272 100644
>> --- a/fs/xattr.c
>> +++ b/fs/xattr.c
>> @@ -339,27 +339,28 @@ xattr_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
>> const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
>> {
>> void *buffer = NULL;
>> - ssize_t len;
>> + int error;
>> + u32 len;
>>
>> if (!value || !size) {
>> - len = security_inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name,
>> - &buffer, false);
>> + error = security_inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name,
>> + false, &buffer, &len);
>> goto out_noalloc;
>> }
>>
>> - len = security_inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, &buffer,
>> - true);
>> - if (len < 0)
>> - return len;
>> + error = security_inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, true,
>> + &buffer, &len);
>> + if (error)
>> + return error;
>> if (size < len) {
>> - len = -ERANGE;
>> + error = -ERANGE;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> memcpy(value, buffer, len);
>> out:
>> kfree(buffer);
>> out_noalloc:
>> - return len;
>> + return error < 0 ? error : len;
>
> Hi Xu Kuohai,
>
> len is an unsigned 32-bit entity, but the return type of this function
> is an unsigned value (ssize_t). So in theory, if len is very large,
> a negative error value error will be returned.
>
>> }
>
> Similarly for the handling of nattr in lsm_get_self_attr in
> lsm_syscalls.c in a subsequent patch.
>
> Flagged by Smatch.
>
> ...
>
>
OK, indeed there is no standardization that says ssize_t must be wider than u32.
I'll look into adding overflow checks. Thanks.
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