netdev - Re: [PATCH net-next v3 10/24] ovpn: implement basic RX path (UDP)

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Message-ID: <Zpjyg-nO42rA3W_0@hog>
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2024 12:46:27 +0200
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
To: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@...nvpn.net>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
	Sergey Ryazanov <ryazanov.s.a@...il.com>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Andrew Lunn <andrew@...n.ch>, Esben Haabendal <esben@...nix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 10/24] ovpn: implement basic RX path (UDP)

Sorry Antonio, I'm only coming back to this now.

2024-05-10, 16:41:43 +0200, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
> On 10/05/2024 15:45, Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> > 2024-05-06, 03:16:23 +0200, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
> > > diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/io.c b/drivers/net/ovpn/io.c
> > > index 36cfb95edbf4..9935a863bffe 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/net/ovpn/io.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/io.c
> > > +/* Called after decrypt to write the IP packet to the device.
> > > + * This method is expected to manage/free the skb.
> > > + */
> > > +static void ovpn_netdev_write(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb)
> > > +{
> > > +	/* packet integrity was verified on the VPN layer - no need to perform
> > > +	 * any additional check along the stack
> > 
> > But it could have been corrupted before it got into the VPN?
> 
> It could, but I believe a VPN should only take care of integrity along its
> tunnel (and this is guaranteed by the OpenVPN protocol).
> If something corrupted enters the tunnel, we will just deliver it as is to
> the other end. Upper layers (where the corruption actually happened) have to
> deal with that.

I agree with that, but I don't think that's what CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY
(especially with csum_level = MAX) would do. CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY
tells the networking stack that the checksum has been verified (up to
csum_level+1, so 0 means the first level of TCP/UDP type headers has
been validated):

// include/linux/skbuff.h

 * - %CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY
 *
 *   The hardware you're dealing with doesn't calculate the full checksum
 *   (as in %CHECKSUM_COMPLETE), but it does parse headers and verify checksums
 *   for specific protocols. For such packets it will set %CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY
 *   if their checksums are okay.

 *   &sk_buff.csum_level indicates the number of consecutive checksums found in
 *   the packet minus one that have been verified as %CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY.
 *   For instance if a device receives an IPv6->UDP->GRE->IPv4->TCP packet
 *   and a device is able to verify the checksums for UDP (possibly zero),
 *   GRE (checksum flag is set) and TCP, &sk_buff.csum_level would be set to
 *   two. If the device were only able to verify the UDP checksum and not
 *   GRE, either because it doesn't support GRE checksum or because GRE
 *   checksum is bad, skb->csum_level would be set to zero (TCP checksum is
 *   not considered in this case).

I think you want CHECKSUM_NONE:

 *   Device did not checksum this packet e.g. due to lack of capabilities.

Then the stack will check if the packet was corrupted.

> 
> > 
> > > +	 */
> > > +	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
> > > +	skb->csum_level = ~0;
> > > +
> > 

-- 
Sabrina