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Message-ID: <20240811162850.GE13736@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2024 18:28:50 +0200
From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
To: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>,
syzbot+8ea26396ff85d23a8929@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
davem@...emloft.net, dsahern@...nel.org, edumazet@...gle.com,
kuba@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, pabeni@...hat.com,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [net?] WARNING: refcount bug in inet_twsk_kill
Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de> wrote:
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=117f3182980000
>
> ... shows at two cores racing:
>
> [ 3127.234402][ T1396] CPU: 3 PID: 1396 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not
> and
> [ 3127.257864][ T13] CPU: 1 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkalle (netns cleanup net).
>
>
> first splat backtrace shows invocation of tcp_sk_exit_batch() from
> netns error unwinding code.
>
> Second one lacks backtrace, but its also in tcp_sk_exit_batch(),
... which doesn't work. Does this look like a plausible
theory/exlanation?
Given:
1 exiting netns, has >= 1 tw sk.
1 (unrelated) netns that failed in setup_net
... we run into following race:
exiting netns, from cleanup wq, calls tcp_sk_exit_batch(), which calls
inet_twsk_purge(&tcp_hashinfo).
At same time, from error unwinding code, we also call tcp_sk_exit_batch().
Both threads walk tcp_hashinfo ehash buckets.
>From work queue (normal netns exit path), we hit
303 if (state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
304 inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
Because both threads operate on tcp_hashinfo, the unrelated
struct net (exiting net) is also visible to error-unwinding thread.
So, error unwinding code will call
303 if (state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
304 inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
for the same tw sk and both threads do
218 void inet_twsk_deschedule_put(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
219 {
220 if (del_timer_sync(&tw->tw_timer))
221 inet_twsk_kill(tw);
Error unwind path cancel timer, calls inet_twsk_kill, while
work queue sees timer as already shut-down so it ends up
returning to tcp_sk_exit_batch(), where it will WARN here:
WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount));
... because the supposedly-last tw_refcount decrement did not drop
it down to 0.
Meanwhile, error unwiding thread calls refcount_dec() on
tw_refcount, which now drops down to 0 instead of 1, which
provides another warn splat.
I'll ponder on ways to fix this tomorrow unless someone
else already has better theory/solution.
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