netdev - [PATCH v3 6/6] Landlock: Document LANDLOCK_SCOPED

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Message-Id: <193b5874eab4dca132ae3c71d44adfc21022a0ad.1723680305.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 12:29:25 -0600
From: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
To: outreachy@...ts.linux.dev
Cc: mic@...ikod.net,
	gnoack@...gle.com,
	paul@...l-moore.com,
	jmorris@...ei.org,
	serge@...lyn.com,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com,
	jannh@...gle.com,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 6/6] Landlock: Document LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL

Improving Landlock ABI version 6 to support signal scoping
with LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL.

Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
---
v3:
- update date
---
 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 0582f93bd952..01e4d50851af 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
 =====================================
 
 :Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: July 2024
+:Date: August 2024
 
 The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
 filesystem or network access) for a set of processes.  Because Landlock
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
         .scoped =
-            LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+            LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
+            LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL,
     };
 
 Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
@@ -123,7 +124,8 @@ version, and only use the available subset of access rights:
         ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
     case 5:
         /* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET for ABI < 6 */
-        ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
+        ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
+                                 LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL);
     }
 
 This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -319,11 +321,15 @@ interactions between sandboxes. Each Landlock domain can be explicitly scoped
 for a set of actions by specifying it on a ruleset. For example, if a sandboxed
 process should not be able to :manpage:`connect(2)` to a non-sandboxed process
 through abstract :manpage:`unix(7)` sockets, we can specify such restriction
-with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``.
+with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``. Moreover, if a sandboxed process
+should not be able to send a signal to a non-sandboxed process, we can specify
+this restriction with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL``.
 
 A sandboxed process can connect to a non-sandboxed process when its domain is
 not scoped. If a process's domain is scoped, it can only connect to sockets
-created by processes in the same scoped domain.
+created by processes in the same scoped domain. Moreover, If a process is
+scoped to send signal to a non-scoped process, it can only send signals to
+processes in the same scoped domain.
 
 IPC scoping does not support Landlock rules, so if a domain is scoped, no rules
 can be added to allow accessing to a resource outside of the scoped domain.
@@ -563,12 +569,17 @@ earlier ABI.
 Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the use of
 :manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right.
 
+<<<<<<< current
 Abstract UNIX sockets Restriction  (ABI < 6)
 --------------------------------------------
+=======
+Abstract Unix sockets and Signal Restriction  (ABI < 6)
+-------------------------------------------------------
+>>>>>>> patched
 
 With ABI version 6, it is possible to restrict connection to an abstract Unix socket
-through ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``, thanks to the ``scoped`` ruleset
-attribute.
+through ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET`` and sending signal through
+``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL``, thanks to the ``scoped`` ruleset attribute.
 
 .. _kernel_support:
 
-- 
2.34.1