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Message-ID: <Zr79s6C-2FoLhoWj@nanopsycho.orion>
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 09:20:19 +0200
From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>
To: yangzhuorao <alex000young@...il.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, jhs@...atatu.com,
	xiyou.wangcong@...il.com, davem@...emloft.net, security@...nel.org,
	xkaneiki@...il.com, hackerzheng666@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: sched: use-after-free in tcf_action_destroy

Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 03:53:55AM CEST, alex000young@...il.com wrote:
>There is a uaf bug in net/sched/act_api.c.
>When Thread1 call [1] tcf_action_init_1 to alloc act which saves
>in actions array. If allocation failed, it will go to err path.
>Meanwhile thread2 call tcf_del_walker to delete action in idr.
>So thread 1 in err path [3] tcf_action_destroy will cause
>use-after-free read bug.
>
>Thread1                            Thread2
> tcf_action_init
>  for(i;i<TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO;i++)
>   act=tcf_action_init_1 //[1]
>   if(IS_ERR(act))
>    goto err
>   actions[i] = act
>                                   tcf_del_walker
>                                    idr_for_each_entry_ul(idr,p,id)
>                                     __tcf_idr_release(p,false,true)
>                                      free_tcf(p) //[2]
>  err:
>   tcf_action_destroy
>    a=actions[i]
>    ops = a->ops //[3]
>
>We add lock and unlock in tcf_action_init and tcf_del_walker function

Who's "we"? Be imperative, tell the codebase what to do in order to fix
this bug.


>to aviod race condition.
>
>==================================================================
>BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcf_action_destroy+0x138/0x150
>Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806543e100 by task syz-executor156/295
>
>CPU: 0 PID: 295 Comm: syz-executor156 Not tainted 4.19.311 #2
>Call Trace:
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> dump_stack+0xcd/0x110 lib/dump_stack.c:118
> print_address_description+0x60/0x224 mm/kasan/report.c:255
> kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:353 [inline]
> kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:411 [inline]
> kasan_report.cold+0x9e/0x1c6 mm/kasan/report.c:395
> tcf_action_destroy+0x138/0x150 net/sched/act_api.c:664
> tcf_action_init+0x252/0x330 net/sched/act_api.c:961
> tcf_action_add+0xdb/0x370 net/sched/act_api.c:1326
> tc_ctl_action+0x327/0x410 net/sched/act_api.c:1381
> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x79e/0xa40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4793
> netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2459
> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
> netlink_unicast+0x4d6/0x690 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
> netlink_sendmsg+0x6ce/0xce0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1907
> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
> __sock_sendmsg+0x126/0x160 net/socket.c:663
> ___sys_sendmsg+0x7f2/0x920 net/socket.c:2258
> __sys_sendmsg+0xec/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2296
> do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
>RIP: 0033:0x7fc19796b10d
>RSP: 002b:00007fc197910d78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
>RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc1979fe2e0 RCX: 00007fc19796b10d
>RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000480 RDI: 0000000000000004
>RBP: 00007fc1979fe2e8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc1979fe2ec
>R13: 00007fc1979fc010 R14: 5c56ebd45a42de31 R15: 00007fc1979cb008
>
>Allocated by task 295:
> __kmalloc+0x89/0x1d0 mm/slub.c:3808
> kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:520 [inline]
> kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline]
> tcf_idr_create+0x59/0x5e0 net/sched/act_api.c:361
> tcf_nat_init+0x4b7/0x850 net/sched/act_nat.c:63
> tcf_action_init_1+0x981/0xc90 net/sched/act_api.c:879
> tcf_action_init+0x216/0x330 net/sched/act_api.c:945
> tcf_action_add+0xdb/0x370 net/sched/act_api.c:1326
> tc_ctl_action+0x327/0x410 net/sched/act_api.c:1381
> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x79e/0xa40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4793
> netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2459
> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
> netlink_unicast+0x4d6/0x690 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
> netlink_sendmsg+0x6ce/0xce0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1907
> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
> __sock_sendmsg+0x126/0x160 net/socket.c:663
> ___sys_sendmsg+0x7f2/0x920 net/socket.c:2258
> __sys_sendmsg+0xec/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2296
> do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
>
>Freed by task 275:
> slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1391 [inline]
> slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1419 [inline]
> slab_free mm/slub.c:2998 [inline]
> kfree+0x8b/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:3963
> __tcf_action_put+0x114/0x160 net/sched/act_api.c:112
> __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:142 [inline]
> __tcf_idr_release+0x52/0xe0 net/sched/act_api.c:122
> tcf_del_walker net/sched/act_api.c:266 [inline]
> tcf_generic_walker+0x66a/0x9c0 net/sched/act_api.c:292
> tca_action_flush net/sched/act_api.c:1154 [inline]
> tca_action_gd+0x8b6/0x15b0 net/sched/act_api.c:1260
> tc_ctl_action+0x26d/0x410 net/sched/act_api.c:1389
> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x79e/0xa40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4793
> netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2459
> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
> netlink_unicast+0x4d6/0x690 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
> netlink_sendmsg+0x6ce/0xce0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1907
> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
> __sock_sendmsg+0x126/0x160 net/socket.c:663
> ___sys_sendmsg+0x7f2/0x920 net/socket.c:2258
> __sys_sendmsg+0xec/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2296
> do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
>
>The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88806543e100
> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
>The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> 192-byte region [ffff88806543e100, ffff88806543e1c0)
>The buggy address belongs to the page:
>flags: 0x100000000000100(slab)
>page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>
>Memory state around the buggy address:
> ffff88806543e000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff88806543e080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>>ffff88806543e100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>                   ^
> ffff88806543e180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> ffff88806543e200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>

You are missing tags. "Fixes" at least.


>Signed-off-by: yangzhuorao <alex000young@...il.com>

Usually, name starts with capital letter and most often it is multiple
words, yours is different?


>---
> net/sched/act_api.c | 9 ++++++---
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/net/sched/act_api.c b/net/sched/act_api.c
>index ad0773b20d83..d29ea69ba312 100644
>--- a/net/sched/act_api.c
>+++ b/net/sched/act_api.c
>@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int tcf_del_walker(struct tcf_idrinfo *idrinfo, struct sk_buff *skb,
> 		goto nla_put_failure;
> 	if (nla_put_string(skb, TCA_KIND, ops->kind))
> 		goto nla_put_failure;
>-
>+	rcu_read_lock();
> 	idr_for_each_entry_ul(idr, p, id) {
> 		ret = __tcf_idr_release(p, false, true);
> 		if (ret == ACT_P_DELETED) {
>@@ -271,12 +271,14 @@ static int tcf_del_walker(struct tcf_idrinfo *idrinfo, struct sk_buff *skb,
> 			goto nla_put_failure;
> 		}
> 	}
>+	rcu_read_unlock();
> 	if (nla_put_u32(skb, TCA_FCNT, n_i))
> 		goto nla_put_failure;
> 	nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
> 
> 	return n_i;
> nla_put_failure:
>+	rcu_read_unlock();
> 	nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest);
> 	return ret;
> }
>@@ -940,7 +942,7 @@ int tcf_action_init(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct nlattr *nla,
> 	err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO, nla, NULL, extack);
> 	if (err < 0)
> 		return err;
>-
>+	rcu_read_lock();
> 	for (i = 1; i <= TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO && tb[i]; i++) {
> 		act = tcf_action_init_1(net, tp, tb[i], est, name, ovr, bind,
> 					rtnl_held, extack);
>@@ -953,11 +955,12 @@ int tcf_action_init(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct nlattr *nla,
> 		/* Start from index 0 */
> 		actions[i - 1] = act;
> 	}
>-
>+	rcu_read_unlock();


Can you please describe in details, how exactly you fix this issue. I'm
asking because the rcu_read_lock section here looks to me very
suspicious.



> 	*attr_size = tcf_action_full_attrs_size(sz);
> 	return i - 1;
> 
> err:
>+	rcu_read_lock();
> 	tcf_action_destroy(actions, bind);
> 	return err;
> }
>-- 
>2.25.1
>

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