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Message-ID: <20240821.Ohph8see3ru2@digikod.net>
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 17:59:07 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
Cc: outreachy@...ts.linux.dev, gnoack@...gle.com, paul@...l-moore.com,
jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com, jannh@...gle.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 5/6] sample/Landlock: Support abstract unix socket
restriction
On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 10:08:55PM -0600, Tahera Fahimi wrote:
> A sandboxer can receive the character "a" as input from the environment
> variable LL_SCOPE to restrict the abstract UNIX sockets from connecting
> to a process outside its scoped domain.
>
> Example
> =======
> Create an abstract unix socket to listen with socat(1):
> socat abstract-listen:mysocket -
>
> Create a sandboxed shell and pass the character "a" to LL_SCOPED:
> LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=. LL_SCOPED="a" ./sandboxer /bin/bash
>
> If the sandboxed process tries to connect to the listening socket
> with command "socat - abstract-connect:mysocket", the connection
> will fail.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
> ---
> v10:
> - Minor improvement in code based on v9.
> v9:
> - Add a restrict approach on input of LL_SCOPED, so it only allows zero
> or one "a" to be the input.
> v8:
> - Adding check_ruleset_scope function to parse the scope environment
> variable and update the landlock attribute based on the restriction
> provided by the user.
> - Adding Mickaël Salaün reviews on version 7.
>
> v7:
> - Adding IPC scoping to the sandbox demo by defining a new "LL_SCOPED"
> environment variable. "LL_SCOPED" gets value "a" to restrict abstract
> unix sockets.
> - Change LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST to 6.
> ---
> samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
> index e8223c3e781a..0564d0a40c67 100644
> --- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
> +++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <linux/landlock.h>
> #include <linux/prctl.h>
> +#include <linux/socket.h>
> #include <stddef.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> +#include <stdbool.h>
>
> #ifndef landlock_create_ruleset
> static inline int
> @@ -55,6 +57,7 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
> #define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"
> #define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
> #define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
> +#define ENV_SCOPED_NAME "LL_SCOPED"
> #define ENV_DELIMITER ":"
>
> static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
> @@ -184,6 +187,40 @@ static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr *ruleset_attr)
> +{
> + bool abstract_scoping = false;
> + bool ret = true;
> + char *env_type_scope, *env_type_scope_next, *ipc_scoping_name;
> +
> + ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
This is bug prone because it removes the scope flags but doesn't store
the initial state. It would be better to use the abstract_scoping
variable to unset the related flag at the end of this function.
> + env_type_scope = getenv(env_var);
> + /* scoping is not supported by the user */
> + if (!env_type_scope || strcmp("", env_type_scope) == 0)
> + return true;
> +
> + env_type_scope = strdup(env_type_scope);
> + unsetenv(env_var);
> + env_type_scope_next = env_type_scope;
> + while ((ipc_scoping_name =
> + strsep(&env_type_scope_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
> + if (strcmp("a", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 && !abstract_scoping) {
> + abstract_scoping = true;
> + ruleset_attr->scoped |=
> + LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + } else {
> + fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported scoping \"%s\"\n",
> + ipc_scoping_name);
> + ret = false;
> + goto out_free_name;
> + }
> + }
> +out_free_name:
> + free(env_type_scope);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /* clang-format off */
>
> #define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \
> @@ -208,7 +245,7 @@ static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
>
> /* clang-format on */
>
> -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 5
> +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 6
>
> int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
> {
> @@ -223,14 +260,15 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
> .handled_access_fs = access_fs_rw,
> .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + .scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
> };
>
> if (argc < 2) {
> fprintf(stderr,
> - "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\"%s "
> + "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s "
> "<cmd> [args]...\n\n",
> ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
> - ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
> + ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ENV_SCOPED_NAME, argv[0]);
> fprintf(stderr,
> "Execute a command in a restricted environment.\n\n");
> fprintf(stderr,
> @@ -251,15 +289,18 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
> fprintf(stderr,
> "* %s: list of ports allowed to connect (client).\n",
> ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
> + fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of restrictions on IPCs.\n",
> + ENV_SCOPED_NAME);
> fprintf(stderr,
> "\nexample:\n"
> "%s=\"${PATH}:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
> "%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
> "%s=\"9418\" "
> "%s=\"80:443\" "
> + "%s=\"a\" "
> "%s bash -i\n\n",
> ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
> - ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
> + ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ENV_SCOPED_NAME, argv[0]);
> fprintf(stderr,
> "This sandboxer can use Landlock features "
> "up to ABI version %d.\n",
> @@ -327,6 +368,10 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
> /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV for ABI < 5 */
> ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
>
> + __attribute__((fallthrough));
> + case 5:
> + /* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET for ABI < 6 */
> + ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
> fprintf(stderr,
> "Hint: You should update the running kernel "
> "to leverage Landlock features "
> @@ -358,6 +403,9 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
> ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
> }
>
> + if (abi >= 6 && !check_ruleset_scope(ENV_SCOPED_NAME, &ruleset_attr))
Instead of explicitly re-checking the ABI, check_ruleset_scope() should
check ruleset_attr.scoped & LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
> + return 1;
> +
> ruleset_fd =
> landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
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