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Message-ID: <ZtWgCv2bH0fCarwq@hog>
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2024 13:22:50 +0200
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
To: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@...nvpn.net>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, kuba@...nel.org, pabeni@...hat.com,
ryazanov.s.a@...il.com, edumazet@...gle.com, andrew@...n.ch
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v6 11/25] ovpn: implement basic RX path (UDP)
2024-08-27, 14:07:51 +0200, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
> +static void ovpn_netdev_write(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> + /* we can't guarantee the packet wasn't corrupted before entering the
> + * VPN, therefore we give other layers a chance to check that
> + */
> + skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
> +
> + /* skb hash for transport packet no longer valid after decapsulation */
> + skb_clear_hash(skb);
> +
> + /* post-decrypt scrub -- prepare to inject encapsulated packet onto the
> + * interface, based on __skb_tunnel_rx() in dst.h
> + */
> + skb->dev = peer->ovpn->dev;
> + skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, 0);
> + skb_scrub_packet(skb, true);
> +
> + skb_reset_network_header(skb);
> + skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
> + skb_probe_transport_header(skb);
> + skb_reset_inner_headers(skb);
> +
> + memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb));
> +
> + /* cause packet to be "received" by the interface */
> + if (likely(gro_cells_receive(&peer->ovpn->gro_cells,
> + skb) == NET_RX_SUCCESS))
> + /* update RX stats with the size of decrypted packet */
> + dev_sw_netstats_rx_add(peer->ovpn->dev, skb->len);
I don't think accessing skb->len after passing the skb to
gro_cells_receive is safe, see
c7cc9200e9b4 ("macsec: avoid use-after-free in macsec_handle_frame()")
[...]
> static void ovpn_struct_free(struct net_device *net)
> {
> + struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = netdev_priv(net);
> +
> + gro_cells_destroy(&ovpn->gro_cells);
> + rcu_barrier();
What's the purpose of this rcu_barrier? I expect it in module_exit,
not when removing one netdevice.
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/skb.h b/drivers/net/ovpn/skb.h
> index 7966a10d915f..e070fe6f448c 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ovpn/skb.h
> +++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/skb.h
> @@ -18,10 +18,7 @@
> #include <linux/types.h>
>
> struct ovpn_cb {
> - struct aead_request *req;
> struct ovpn_peer *peer;
> - struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks;
> - unsigned int payload_offset;
Squashed into the wrong patch?
[...]
> +struct ovpn_struct *ovpn_from_udp_sock(struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + struct ovpn_socket *ovpn_sock;
> +
> + if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(udp_sk(sk)->encap_type) != UDP_ENCAP_OVPNINUDP))
> + return NULL;
> +
> + ovpn_sock = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk);
[1]
> + if (unlikely(!ovpn_sock))
> + return NULL;
> +
> + /* make sure that sk matches our stored transport socket */
> + if (unlikely(!ovpn_sock->sock || sk != ovpn_sock->sock->sk))
> + return NULL;
> +
> + return ovpn_sock->ovpn;
> +}
> +static int ovpn_udp_encap_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> + struct ovpn_peer *peer = NULL;
> + struct ovpn_struct *ovpn;
> + u32 peer_id;
> + u8 opcode;
> +
> + ovpn = ovpn_from_udp_sock(sk);
> + if (unlikely(!ovpn)) {
> + net_err_ratelimited("%s: cannot obtain ovpn object from UDP socket\n",
> + __func__);
> + goto drop;
> + }
[...]
> + /* pop off outer UDP header */
> + __skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
> + ovpn_recv(peer, skb);
> + return 0;
> +
> +drop:
> + if (peer)
> + ovpn_peer_put(peer);
> + dev_core_stats_rx_dropped_inc(ovpn->dev);
If we get here from the first goto, ovpn is NULL. You could add a
drop_noovpn label right here to just do the free+return.
> + kfree_skb(skb);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * ovpn_udp4_output - send IPv4 packet over udp socket
> * @ovpn: the openvpn instance
> @@ -257,8 +342,13 @@ void ovpn_udp_send_skb(struct ovpn_struct *ovpn, struct ovpn_peer *peer,
> */
> int ovpn_udp_socket_attach(struct socket *sock, struct ovpn_struct *ovpn)
> {
> + struct udp_tunnel_sock_cfg cfg = {
> + .sk_user_data = ovpn,
> + .encap_type = UDP_ENCAP_OVPNINUDP,
> + .encap_rcv = ovpn_udp_encap_recv,
> + };
> struct ovpn_socket *old_data;
> - int ret = 0;
> + int ret;
>
> /* sanity check */
> if (sock->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) {
> @@ -272,6 +362,7 @@ int ovpn_udp_socket_attach(struct socket *sock, struct ovpn_struct *ovpn)
> if (!old_data) {
> /* socket is currently unused - we can take it */
> rcu_read_unlock();
> + setup_udp_tunnel_sock(sock_net(sock->sk), sock, &cfg);
This will set sk_user_data to the ovpn_struct, but ovpn_from_udp_sock
expects the ovpn_socket [1], which is stored into sk_user_data a
little bit later by ovpn_socket_new. If a packet reaches
ovpn_udp_encap_recv -> ovpn_from_udp_sock before ovpn_socket_new
overwrites sk_user_data, bad things probably happen.
--
Sabrina
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