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Message-ID: <37597ead-9c2e-44d4-9c72-ee0bf1d2a946@yandex.ru>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 18:42:52 +0300
From: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@...dex.ru>
To: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
lvc-project@...uxtesting.org,
Allison Henderson <allison.henderson@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC net] net: sockmap: avoid race between
sock_map_destroy() and sk_psock_put()
+CC Allison
On 9/14/24 3:34 AM, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 06:59:39PM +0300, Dmitry Antipov wrote:
>> On 9/11/24 7:45 PM, Cong Wang wrote:
>>
>>> I guess you totally misunderstand my point. As a significant sockmap
>>> contributor, I am certainly aware of sockmap users. My point is that I
>>> needed to narrow down the problem to CONFIG_RDS when I was debugging it.
>>
>> I've narrowed down the problem to possible race condition between two
>> functions. "Narrowing down" the problem to a 17.5Kloc-sized subsystem
>> is not too helpful.
>
> Narrowing down from more 30 millions lines of code to 17.5K is already a huge
> win to me, maybe not for you. :)
>
>>
>>> So, please let me know if you can still reproduce this after disabling
>>> CONFIG_RDS, because I could not reproduce it any more. If you can,
>>> please kindly share the stack trace without rds_* functions.
>>
>> Yes, this issue requires CONFIG_RDS and CONFIG_RDS_TCP to reproduce. But
>> syzbot reproducer I'm working with doesn't create RDS sockets explicitly
>> (with 'socket(AF_RDS, ..., ...)' or so). When two options above are enabled,
>> the default network namespace has special kernel-space socket which is
>> created in 'rds_tcp_listen_init()' and (if my understanding of the namespaces
>> is correct) may be inherited with 'unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)'. So just enabling
>> these two options makes the kernel vulnerable.
>
> Thanks for confirming it.
>
> I did notice the RDS kernel socket, but, without my patch, we can still
> use sockops to hook TCP socket under the RDS socket and add it to a
> sockmap, hence the conflict of sock->sk->sk_user_data.
>
> My patch basically prevents such TCP socket under RDS socket from being
> added to any sockmap.
>
>>
>> So I'm still gently asking you to check whether there is a race condition
>> I've talked about. Hopefully this shouldn't be too hard for a significant
>> sockmap contributor.
>
> If you can kindly explain why this race condition is not related to RDS
> despite the fact it only happens with CONFIG_RDS enabled, I'd happy to
> review it. Otherwise, I feel like you may head to a wrong direction.
>
> Thanks.
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