Message-ID: <45ab87a3-beba-b5f6-ef25-8b19a4b1dcee@huawei-partners.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2024 15:17:50 +0300
From: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
To: Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>
CC: <mic@...ikod.net>, <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>,
	<gnoack3000@...il.com>, <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
	<yusongping@...wei.com>, <artem.kuzin@...wei.com>,
	<konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 14/19] selftests/landlock: Test socketpair(2)
 restriction

On 9/23/2024 3:57 PM, Mikhail Ivanov wrote:
> On 9/18/2024 4:47 PM, Günther Noack wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 04, 2024 at 06:48:19PM +0800, Mikhail Ivanov wrote:
>>> Add test that checks the restriction on socket creation using
>>> socketpair(2).
>>>
>>> Add `socket_creation` fixture to configure sandboxing in tests in
>>> which different socket creation actions are tested.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
>>> ---
>>>   .../testing/selftests/landlock/socket_test.c  | 101 ++++++++++++++++++
>>>   1 file changed, 101 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/socket_test.c 
>>> b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/socket_test.c
>>> index 8fc507bf902a..67db0e1c1121 100644
>>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/socket_test.c
>>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/socket_test.c
>>> @@ -738,4 +738,105 @@ TEST_F(packet_protocol, alias_restriction)
>>>       EXPECT_EQ(0, test_socket_variant(&self->prot_tested));
>>>   }
>>> +static int test_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol)
>>> +{
>>> +    int fds[2];
>>> +    int err;
>>> +
>>> +    err = socketpair(family, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, protocol, fds);
>>> +    if (err)
>>> +        return errno;
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Mixing error codes from close(2) and socketpair(2) should not 
>>> lead to
>>> +     * any (access type) confusion for this test.
>>> +     */
>>> +    if (close(fds[0]) != 0)
>>> +        return errno;
>>> +    if (close(fds[1]) != 0)
>>> +        return errno;
>>> +    return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +FIXTURE(socket_creation)
>>> +{
>>> +    bool sandboxed;
>>> +    bool allowed;
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket_creation)
>>> +{
>>> +    bool sandboxed;
>>> +    bool allowed;
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +FIXTURE_SETUP(socket_creation)
>>> +{
>>> +    self->sandboxed = variant->sandboxed;
>>> +    self->allowed = variant->allowed;
>>> +
>>> +    setup_loopback(_metadata);
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(socket_creation)
>>> +{
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +/* clang-format off */
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_creation, no_sandbox) {
>>> +    /* clang-format on */
>>> +    .sandboxed = false,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +/* clang-format off */
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_creation, sandbox_allow) {
>>> +    /* clang-format on */
>>> +    .sandboxed = true,
>>> +    .allowed = true,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +/* clang-format off */
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_creation, sandbox_deny) {
>>> +    /* clang-format on */
>>> +    .sandboxed = true,
>>> +    .allowed = false,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +TEST_F(socket_creation, socketpair)
>>> +{
>>> +    const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>>> +        .handled_access_socket = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE,
>>> +    };
>>> +    struct landlock_socket_attr unix_socket_create = {
>>> +        .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE,
>>> +        .family = AF_UNIX,
>>> +        .type = SOCK_STREAM,
>>> +    };
>>> +    int ruleset_fd;
>>> +
>>> +    if (self->sandboxed) {
>>> +        ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
>>> +                             sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>>> +        ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>>> +
>>> +        if (self->allowed) {
>>> +            ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>>> +                               LANDLOCK_RULE_SOCKET,
>>> +                               &unix_socket_create, 0));
>>> +        }
>>> +        enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>>> +        ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    if (!self->sandboxed || self->allowed) {
>>> +        /*
>>> +         * Tries to create sockets when ruleset is not established
>>> +         * or protocol is allowed.
>>> +         */
>>> +        EXPECT_EQ(0, test_socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0));
>>> +    } else {
>>> +        /* Tries to create sockets when protocol is restricted. */
>>> +        EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0));
>>> +    }
>>
>> I am torn on whether socketpair() should be denied at all --
>>
>>    * on one hand, the created sockets are connected to each other
>>      and the creating process can only talk to itself (or pass one of 
>> them on),
>>      which seems legitimate and harmless.
>>
>>    * on the other hand, it *does* create two sockets, and
>>      if they are datagram sockets, it it probably currently possible
>>      to disassociate them with connect(AF_UNSPEC). >
>> What are your thoughts on that?
> 
> Good catch! According to the discussion that you've mentioned [1] (I
> believe I found correct one), you've already discussed socketpair(2)
> control with Mickaël and came to the conclusion that socketpair(2) and
> unnamed pipes do not give access to new resources to the process,
> therefore should not be restricted.
> 
> [1] 
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/e7e24682-5da7-3b09-323e-a4f784f10158@digikod.net/
> 
> Therefore, this is more like connect(AF_UNSPEC)-related issue. On
> security summit you've mentioned that it will be useful to implement
> restriction of connection dissociation for sockets. This feature will
> solve the problem of reusage of UNIX sockets that were created with
> socketpair(2).

Btw, I can suggest one more scenario, where restriction of
disassociation can be useful.

SMC sockets (AF_SMC+SOCK_STREAM) can fall back to TCP during the
connection (cf. smc_connect_decline_fallback). Then user can call
connect(AF_UNSPEC) to eventually get a TCP socket in the initial
(TCP_CLOSE) state which can be used to establish another connection.

This can be considered as an issue for the current patchset, because
there is a way to "create" a TCP socket while TCP is restricted by
Landlock (if ruleset allows SMC).

Besides it, there is another issue with SMC restriction that I'm going
to fix in the next RFC: recently has been applied patchset that
allows to create SMC sockets via AF_INET [1]. Such creation should be
denied if Landlock restricts SMC.

[1] 
https://lore.kernel.org/all/1718301630-63692-1-git-send-email-alibuda@linux.alibaba.com/

> 
> If we want such feature to be implemented, I suggest leaving current
> implementation as it is (to prevent vulnerable creation of UNIX dgram
> sockets) and enable socketpair(2) in the patchset dedicated to
> connect(AF_UNSPEC) restriction. Also it will be useful to create a
> dedicated issue on github. WDYT?
> 
> (Btw I think that disassociation control can be really useful. If
> it were possible to restrict this action for each protocol, we would
> have stricter control over the protocols used.)
> 
>>
>> Mickaël, I believe we have also discussed similar questions for 
>> pipe(2) in the
>> past, and you had opinions on that?
>>
>>
>> (On a much more technical note; consider replacing self->allowed with
>> self->socketpair_error to directly indicate the expected error? It 
>> feels that
>> this could be more straightforward?)
> 
> I've considered this approach and decided that this would
> * negatively affect the readability of conditional for adding Landlock
>    rule,
> * make checking the test_socketpair() error code less explicit.
> 
>>
>> —Günther

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