netdev - Re: [PATCH net] xfrm: fix one more kernel-infoleak in algo dumping

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Message-ID: <20241003155202.GT1310185@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2024 16:52:02 +0100
From: Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>
To: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@...co.ru>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
	Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>,
	Antony Antony <antony.antony@...unet.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, lvc-project@...uxtesting.org,
	stable@...r.kernel.org, Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@...co.ru>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] xfrm: fix one more kernel-infoleak in algo dumping

On Wed, Oct 02, 2024 at 11:17:24AM +0500, Petr Vaganov wrote:
> During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
> 
> BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30

...

> Fixes copying of xfrm algorithms where some random
> data of the structure fields can end up in userspace.
> Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve)
> data and should never be given directly to user-space.
> 
> A similar issue was resolved in the commit
> 8222d5910dae ("xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap")
> 
> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
> 
> Fixes: c7a5899eb26e ("xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Co-developed-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@...co.ru>
> Signed-off-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@...co.ru>
> Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@...co.ru>
> ---
>  net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 4 +++-
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> index 55f039ec3d59..97faeb3574ea 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> @@ -1098,7 +1098,9 @@ static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	if (!nla)
>  		return -EMSGSIZE;
>  	ap = nla_data(nla);
> -	memcpy(ap, auth, sizeof(struct xfrm_algo_auth));
> +	strscpy_pad(ap->alg_name, auth->alg_name, sizeof(sizeof(ap->alg_name)));

Hi Petr and Boris,

The nested sizeof doesn't look right to me.
I expect the length of the destination is simply sizeof(ap->alg_name).

And given that ap->alg_name is an array (which is why using sizeof is
correct here), I believe the two-argument variant of strscpy_pad() can be
used:

	strscpy_pad(ap->alg_name, auth->alg_name);

As an aside, and not for this patch, there is a usage of strncpy() just
above this hunk which looks like it could be converted to the two-argument
variant of strscpy() or strncpy_pad() if it ought to be zero-padded.


> +	ap->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
> +	ap->alg_trunc_len = auth->alg_trunc_len;
>  	if (redact_secret && auth->alg_key_len)
>  		memset(ap->alg_key, 0, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
>  	else
> -- 
> 2.46.1
> 
>