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Message-ID: <20241017110454.265818-7-ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 19:04:52 +0800
From: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
To: <mic@...ikod.net>, <gnoack@...gle.com>
CC: <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>, <matthieu@...fet.re>,
	<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	<netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <yusongping@...wei.com>,
	<artem.kuzin@...wei.com>, <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 6/8] selftests/landlock: Test consistency of errors for TCP actions

Add tcp_errors_consistency fixture for TCP errors consistency tests.

Add 6 test suits for this fixture to configure tested address family of
socket (ipv4 or ipv6), sandboxed mode and whether TCP action is allowed
in a sandboxed mode.

Add tests which validate errors consistency provided by Landlock for
bind(2) and connect(2) restrictable TCP actions.

Add sys_bind(), sys_connect() helpers for convenient checks of bind(2)
and connect(2). Add set_ipv4_tcp_address(), set_ipv6_tcp_address()
helpers.

Add CONFIG_LSM="landlock" option in config. Some LSMs (e.g. SElinux)
can be loaded before Landlock and return inconsistent error code for
bind(2) and connect(2) calls.

Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config     |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 329 +++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
index a8982da4acbd..52988e8a56cc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED=y
 CONFIG_INET=y
 CONFIG_IPV6=y
 CONFIG_KEYS=y
+CONFIG_LSM="landlock"
 CONFIG_MPTCP=y
 CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6=y
 CONFIG_NET=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index d9de0ee49ebc..30b29bf10bdc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -36,6 +36,22 @@ enum sandbox_type {
 	TCP_SANDBOX,
 };
 
+static void set_ipv4_tcp_address(const struct service_fixture *const srv,
+				 struct sockaddr_in *ipv4_addr)
+{
+	ipv4_addr->sin_family = srv->protocol.domain;
+	ipv4_addr->sin_port = htons(srv->port);
+	ipv4_addr->sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+}
+
+static void set_ipv6_tcp_address(const struct service_fixture *const srv,
+				 struct sockaddr_in6 *ipv6_addr)
+{
+	ipv6_addr->sin6_family = srv->protocol.domain;
+	ipv6_addr->sin6_port = htons(srv->port);
+	inet_pton(AF_INET6, loopback_ipv6, &ipv6_addr->sin6_addr);
+}
+
 static int set_service(struct service_fixture *const srv,
 		       const struct protocol_variant prot,
 		       const unsigned short index)
@@ -56,15 +72,11 @@ static int set_service(struct service_fixture *const srv,
 	switch (prot.domain) {
 	case AF_UNSPEC:
 	case AF_INET:
-		srv->ipv4_addr.sin_family = prot.domain;
-		srv->ipv4_addr.sin_port = htons(srv->port);
-		srv->ipv4_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+		set_ipv4_tcp_address(srv, &srv->ipv4_addr);
 		return 0;
 
 	case AF_INET6:
-		srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_family = prot.domain;
-		srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_port = htons(srv->port);
-		inet_pton(AF_INET6, loopback_ipv6, &srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_addr);
+		set_ipv6_tcp_address(srv, &srv->ipv6_addr);
 		return 0;
 
 	case AF_UNIX:
@@ -181,6 +193,17 @@ static uint16_t get_binded_port(int socket_fd,
 	}
 }
 
+static int sys_bind(const int sock_fd, const struct sockaddr *addr,
+		    socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = bind(sock_fd, addr, addrlen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -errno;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int bind_variant_addrlen(const int sock_fd,
 				const struct service_fixture *const srv,
 				const socklen_t addrlen)
@@ -217,6 +240,17 @@ static int bind_variant(const int sock_fd,
 	return bind_variant_addrlen(sock_fd, srv, get_addrlen(srv, false));
 }
 
+static int sys_connect(const int sock_fd, const struct sockaddr *addr,
+		       socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = connect(sock_fd, addr, addrlen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -errno;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int connect_variant_addrlen(const int sock_fd,
 				   const struct service_fixture *const srv,
 				   const socklen_t addrlen)
@@ -923,6 +957,289 @@ TEST_F(protocol, connect_unspec)
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
 }
 
+FIXTURE(tcp_errors_consistency)
+{
+	struct service_fixture srv0, srv1;
+	struct sockaddr *inval_addr_p0;
+	socklen_t addrlen_min;
+
+	struct sockaddr_in inval_ipv4_addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 inval_ipv6_addr;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(tcp_errors_consistency)
+{
+	const enum sandbox_type sandbox;
+	const int domain;
+	bool allowed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, no_sandbox_with_ipv4) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.sandbox = NO_SANDBOX,
+	.domain = AF_INET,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, no_sandbox_with_ipv6) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.sandbox = NO_SANDBOX,
+	.domain = AF_INET6,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, denied_with_ipv4) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
+	.domain = AF_INET,
+	.allowed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, allowed_with_ipv4) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
+	.domain = AF_INET,
+	.allowed = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, denied_with_ipv6) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
+	.domain = AF_INET6,
+	.allowed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, allowed_with_ipv6) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
+	.domain = AF_INET6,
+	.allowed = true,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(tcp_errors_consistency)
+{
+	const struct protocol_variant tcp_prot = {
+		.domain = variant->domain,
+		.type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	};
+
+	disable_caps(_metadata);
+
+	set_service(&self->srv0, tcp_prot, 0);
+	set_service(&self->srv1, tcp_prot, 1);
+
+	if (variant->domain == AF_INET) {
+		set_ipv4_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &self->inval_ipv4_addr);
+		self->inval_ipv4_addr.sin_family = AF_INET6;
+
+		self->inval_addr_p0 = (struct sockaddr *)&self->inval_ipv4_addr;
+		self->addrlen_min = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+	} else {
+		set_ipv6_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &self->inval_ipv6_addr);
+		self->inval_ipv6_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET;
+
+		self->inval_addr_p0 = (struct sockaddr *)&self->inval_ipv6_addr;
+		self->addrlen_min = SIN6_LEN_RFC2133;
+	}
+
+	setup_loopback(_metadata);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(tcp_errors_consistency)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validates that Landlock provides errors consistency for bind(2) operation
+ * (not restricted, allowed and denied).
+ *
+ * Error consistency implies that in sandboxed process, bind(2) returns the same
+ * errors and in the same order (assuming multiple errors) as during normal
+ * execution.
+ */
+TEST_F(tcp_errors_consistency, bind)
+{
+	if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+		const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+			.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		};
+		int ruleset_fd;
+
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+						     sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		if (variant->allowed) {
+			const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_bind_p0 = {
+				.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+				.port = self->srv0.port,
+			};
+
+			/* Allows bind for the first port. */
+			ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
+						       &tcp_bind_p0, 0));
+		}
+
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+	}
+	int sock_fd;
+
+	sock_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sock_fd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Tries to bind socket to address with invalid sa_family value
+	 * (AF_INET for ipv6 socket and AF_INET6 for ipv4 socket).
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT,
+		  sys_bind(sock_fd, self->inval_addr_p0, self->addrlen_min));
+
+	if (variant->domain == AF_INET) {
+		struct sockaddr_in ipv4_unspec_addr;
+
+		set_ipv4_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &ipv4_unspec_addr);
+		ipv4_unspec_addr.sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+		/*
+		 * Ipv4 bind(2) accepts AF_UNSPEC family in address only if address is
+		 * INADDR_ANY. Otherwise, returns -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+		 */
+		EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT,
+			  sys_bind(sock_fd,
+				   (struct sockaddr *)&ipv4_unspec_addr,
+				   self->addrlen_min));
+	}
+
+	/* Tries to bind with too small addrlen (Cf. inet_bind_sk). */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_bind(sock_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+				    self->addrlen_min - 1));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sock_fd));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validates that Landlock provides errors consistency for connect(2) operation
+ * (not restricted, allowed and denied).
+ *
+ * Error consistency implies that in sandboxed process, connect(2) returns the
+ * same errors and in the same order (assuming multiple errors) as during normal
+ * execution.
+ */
+TEST_F(tcp_errors_consistency, connect)
+{
+	int nonblock_p0_fd;
+
+	nonblock_p0_fd = socket(variant->domain,
+				SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC | SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, nonblock_p0_fd);
+
+	/* Tries to connect nonblocking socket before establishing ruleset. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(-EINPROGRESS, connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
+
+	if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+		const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+			.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+		};
+		const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_connect_p1 = {
+			.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+			.port = self->srv1.port,
+		};
+		int ruleset_fd;
+
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+						     sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		/* Allows connect for the second port. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0,
+			  landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
+					    &tcp_connect_p1, 0));
+
+		if (variant->allowed) {
+			const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_connect_p0 = {
+				.allowed_access =
+					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+				.port = self->srv0.port,
+			};
+
+			/* Allows connect for the first port. */
+			ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
+						       &tcp_connect_p0, 0));
+		}
+
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+	}
+	int client_p0_fd, client_p1_fd, server_p0_fd, server_p1_fd;
+
+	client_p0_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, client_p0_fd);
+	/*
+	 * Tries to connect socket to address with invalid sa_family value
+	 * (AF_INET for ipv6 socket and AF_INET6 for ipv4 socket).
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+					     self->addrlen_min));
+
+	/* Tries to connect with too small addrlen. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+				       self->addrlen_min - 1));
+
+	/* Creates socket listening on zero port. */
+	server_p0_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, server_p0_fd);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(server_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(server_p0_fd, backlog));
+	/* Tries to connect listening socket. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EISCONN, sys_connect(server_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+					self->addrlen_min - 1));
+
+	/* Creates socket listening on first port. */
+	server_p1_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv1);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, server_p1_fd);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(server_p1_fd, &self->srv1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(server_p1_fd, backlog));
+
+	client_p1_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv1);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, client_p1_fd);
+
+	/* Connects to server_p1_fd. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(client_p1_fd, &self->srv1));
+	/* Tries to connect already connected socket. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EISCONN, sys_connect(client_p1_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+					self->addrlen_min - 1));
+
+	/*
+	 * connect(2) is called upon nonblocking socket and previous connection
+	 * attempt was closed by RST packet. Landlock cannot provide error
+	 * consistency in this case (Cf. check_tcp_connect_consistency_and_get_port()).
+	 */
+	if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES,
+			  connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
+	} else {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-ECONNREFUSED,
+			  connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
+	}
+
+	/* Tries to connect with zero as addrlen. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0, 0));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(client_p1_fd));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(server_p1_fd));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(server_p0_fd));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(client_p0_fd));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(nonblock_p0_fd));
+}
+
 FIXTURE(ipv4)
 {
 	struct service_fixture srv0, srv1;
-- 
2.34.1


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