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Message-ID: <20241107071117.1022-1-kuniyu@amazon.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 23:11:17 -0800
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
To: <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>
CC: <davem@...emloft.net>, <dsahern@...nel.org>, <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	<horms@...nel.org>, <kernelxing@...cent.com>, <kuba@...nel.org>,
	<kuniyu@...zon.com>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <pabeni@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next] tcp: avoid RST in 3-way shakehands due to failure in tcp_timewait_state_process

From: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 14:51:35 +0800
> On Thu, Nov 7, 2024 at 1:43 PM Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com> wrote:
> >
> > From: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>
> > Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 13:23:50 +0800
> > > On Thu, Nov 7, 2024 at 12:15 PM Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > From: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>
> > > > Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 11:16:04 +0800
> > > > > > Here is how things happen in production:
> > > > > > Time        Client(A)        Server(B)
> > > > > > 0s          SYN-->
> > > > > > ...
> > > > > > 132s                         <-- FIN
> > > > > > ...
> > > > > > 169s        FIN-->
> > > > > > 169s                         <-- ACK
> > > > > > 169s        SYN-->
> > > > > > 169s                         <-- ACK
> > > > >
> > > > > I noticed the above ACK doesn't adhere to RFC 6191. It says:
> > > > > "If the previous incarnation of the connection used Timestamps, then:
> > > > >      if ...
> > > > >      ...
> > > > >      * Otherwise, silently drop the incoming SYN segment, thus leaving
> > > > >          the previous incarnation of the connection in the TIME-WAIT
> > > > >          state.
> > > > > "
> > > > > But the timewait socket sends an ACK because of this code snippet:
> > > > > tcp_timewait_state_process()
> > > > >     -> // the checks of SYN packet failed.
> > > > >     -> if (!th->rst) {
> > > > >         -> return TCP_TW_ACK; // this line can be traced back to 2005
> > > >
> > > > This is a challenge ACK following RFC 5961.
> > >
> > > Please note the idea of challenge ack was proposed in 2010. But this
> > > code snippet has already existed before 2005. If it is a challenge
> > > ack, then at least we need to count it (by using NET_INC_STATS(net,
> > > LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);).
> >
> > The word was not accurate, the behaviour is compliant with RFC 5961.
> > RFC is often formalised based on real implementations.
> >
> > Incrementing the count makes sense to me.
> >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > If SYN is returned here, the client may lose the chance to RST the
> > > > previous connection in TIME_WAIT.
> > > >
> > > > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.html#section-3.10.7.4-2.4.1
> > > > ---8<---
> > > >       -  TIME-WAIT STATE
> > > >
> > > >          o  If the SYN bit is set in these synchronized states, it may
> > > >             be either a legitimate new connection attempt (e.g., in the
> > > >             case of TIME-WAIT), an error where the connection should be
> > > >             reset, or the result of an attack attempt, as described in
> > > >             RFC 5961 [9].  For the TIME-WAIT state, new connections can
> > > >             be accepted if the Timestamp Option is used and meets
> > > >             expectations (per [40]).  For all other cases, RFC 5961
> > > >             provides a mitigation with applicability to some situations,
> > > >             though there are also alternatives that offer cryptographic
> > > >             protection (see Section 7).  RFC 5961 recommends that in
> > > >             these synchronized states, if the SYN bit is set,
> > > >             irrespective of the sequence number, TCP endpoints MUST send
> > > >             a "challenge ACK" to the remote peer:
> > > >
> > > >             <SEQ=SND.NXT><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=ACK>
> > > > ---8<---
> > > >
> > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5961#section-4
> > > > ---8<---
> > > >    1) If the SYN bit is set, irrespective of the sequence number, TCP
> > > >       MUST send an ACK (also referred to as challenge ACK) to the remote
> > > >       peer:
> > > >
> > > >       <SEQ=SND.NXT><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=ACK>
> > > >
> > > >       After sending the acknowledgment, TCP MUST drop the unacceptable
> > > >       segment and stop processing further.
> > > > ---8<---
> > >
> > > The RFC 5961 4.2 was implemented in tcp_validate_incoming():
> > >         /* step 4: Check for a SYN
> > >          * RFC 5961 4.2 : Send a challenge ack
> > >          */
> > >         if (th->syn) {
> > >                 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV && sk->sk_socket && th->ack &&
> > >                     TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1 == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq &&
> > >                     TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1 == tp->rcv_nxt &&
> > >                     TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq == tp->snd_nxt)
> > >                         goto pass;
> > > syn_challenge:
> > >                 if (syn_inerr)
> > >                         TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_INERRS);
> > >                 NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
> > > LINUX_MIB_TCPSYNCHALLENGE);
> > >                 tcp_send_challenge_ack(sk);
> > >                 SKB_DR_SET(reason, TCP_INVALID_SYN);
> > >                 goto discard;
> > >         }
> > >
> > > Also, this quotation you mentioned obviously doesn't match the kernel
> > > implementation:
> > > "If the SYN bit is set, irrespective of the sequence number, TCP MUST
> > > send an ACK"
> > > The tcp_timewait_state_process() does care about the seq number, or
> > > else timewait socket would refuse every SYN packet.
> >
> > That's why I pasted RFC 9293 first that clearly states that we
> > should check seq number and then return ACK for all other cases.
> 
> I don't think so.
> 
> RFC 9293 only states that RFC 5691 provides an approach that mitigates
> the risk by rejecting all the SYN packets if the socket stays in
> synchronized state. It's "For all other cases" in RFC 9293.

RFC 9293 states which RFC to prioritise.  You will find the
link [40] is RFC 6191.

---8<---
For the TIME-WAIT state, new connections can
be accepted if the Timestamp Option is used and meets
expectations (per [40]).  For all other cases, RFC 5961
...
---8<---

> Please loot at "irrespective of the sequence number" in RFC 5691 4.2
> [1]. It means no matter what the seq is we MUST send back an ACK
> instead of establishing a new connection.

RFC 9293 mentions accepatble cases first, so this is only applied
to "all other cases"


> Actually the tcp_timewait_state_process() checks the seq or timestamp
> in the SYN packet.

and this part takes precedence than "all other cases".

Also, you missed that the pasted part is the 4th step of incoming
segment processing.

https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.html#section-3.10.7.4
---8<---
First, check sequence number: ...
Second, check the RST bit: ...
Third, check security: ...
Fourth, check the SYN bit:
...
  TIME-WAIT STATE
    If the SYN bit is set in these synchronized states...
---8<---

So, RFC 9293 says "check seq number, RST, security, then
if the connection is still accepatable for TIME_WAIT based on
RFC 6191, accept it, otherwise, return ACK based on RFC 5691".

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