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Message-ID: <20241209064243.20600-1-kuniyu@amazon.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2024 15:42:43 +0900
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
To: <kuniyu@...zon.com>
CC: <davem@...emloft.net>, <david.laight@...lab.com>, <edumazet@...gle.com>,
<kuba@...nel.org>, <kuni1840@...il.com>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
<pabeni@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 net-next 00/15] treewide: socket: Clean up sock_create() and friends.
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2024 14:26:43 +0900
> > > 2) some subsystems use sock_create(), but most of the sockets are
> > > not exposed to userspace via file descriptors but are exposed
> > > to some BPF hooks (most likely unintentionally)
> >
> > AFAIR the 'kern' flag removes some security/permission checks.
>
> Right.
This wasn't always true.
Currently, SELinux and AppArmor supports the socket_create hook
and do nothing if kern=0, but Smack supporting socket_post_create
does not care about kern.
Also, we can enforce security for kernel sockets with BPF LSM.
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