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Message-ID: <159abe4c-bf81-e971-d60b-8038be8d8978@huawei-partners.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2024 18:29:46 +0300
From: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, Paul Moore
<paul@...l-moore.com>
CC: <gnoack@...gle.com>, <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>,
<matthieu@...fet.re>, <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
<yusongping@...wei.com>, <artem.kuzin@...wei.com>,
<konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 6/8] selftests/landlock: Test consistency of errors
for TCP actions
On 12/10/2024 9:07 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 07:04:52PM +0800, Mikhail Ivanov wrote:
>> Add tcp_errors_consistency fixture for TCP errors consistency tests.
>>
>> Add 6 test suits for this fixture to configure tested address family of
>> socket (ipv4 or ipv6), sandboxed mode and whether TCP action is allowed
>> in a sandboxed mode.
>>
>> Add tests which validate errors consistency provided by Landlock for
>> bind(2) and connect(2) restrictable TCP actions.
>>
>> Add sys_bind(), sys_connect() helpers for convenient checks of bind(2)
>> and connect(2). Add set_ipv4_tcp_address(), set_ipv6_tcp_address()
>> helpers.
>>
>> Add CONFIG_LSM="landlock" option in config. Some LSMs (e.g. SElinux)
>> can be loaded before Landlock and return inconsistent error code for
>> bind(2) and connect(2) calls.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
>> ---
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 1 +
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 329 +++++++++++++++++++-
>> 2 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>> index a8982da4acbd..52988e8a56cc 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED=y
>> CONFIG_INET=y
>> CONFIG_IPV6=y
>> CONFIG_KEYS=y
>> +CONFIG_LSM="landlock"
>
> We should not force CONFIG_LSM because we may want to test Landlock with
> other LSMs.
Ok, I see
>
> For now, I think we should ignore wrong error codes that may be returned
> by other LSMs but send this patch with a patch series fixing the LSM
> framework as a whole. Feel free to include these patches too:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240327120036.233641-1-mic@digikod.net/
Fix for the whole LSM subsystem ofc looks better. Lets try to make it.
>
>> CONFIG_MPTCP=y
>> CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6=y
>> CONFIG_NET=y
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>> index d9de0ee49ebc..30b29bf10bdc 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>> @@ -36,6 +36,22 @@ enum sandbox_type {
>> TCP_SANDBOX,
>> };
>>
>> +static void set_ipv4_tcp_address(const struct service_fixture *const srv,
>> + struct sockaddr_in *ipv4_addr)
>> +{
>> + ipv4_addr->sin_family = srv->protocol.domain;
>> + ipv4_addr->sin_port = htons(srv->port);
>> + ipv4_addr->sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void set_ipv6_tcp_address(const struct service_fixture *const srv,
>> + struct sockaddr_in6 *ipv6_addr)
>> +{
>> + ipv6_addr->sin6_family = srv->protocol.domain;
>> + ipv6_addr->sin6_port = htons(srv->port);
>> + inet_pton(AF_INET6, loopback_ipv6, &ipv6_addr->sin6_addr);
>> +}
>> +
>> static int set_service(struct service_fixture *const srv,
>> const struct protocol_variant prot,
>> const unsigned short index)
>> @@ -56,15 +72,11 @@ static int set_service(struct service_fixture *const srv,
>> switch (prot.domain) {
>> case AF_UNSPEC:
>> case AF_INET:
>> - srv->ipv4_addr.sin_family = prot.domain;
>> - srv->ipv4_addr.sin_port = htons(srv->port);
>> - srv->ipv4_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
>> + set_ipv4_tcp_address(srv, &srv->ipv4_addr);
>> return 0;
>>
>> case AF_INET6:
>> - srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_family = prot.domain;
>> - srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_port = htons(srv->port);
>> - inet_pton(AF_INET6, loopback_ipv6, &srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_addr);
>> + set_ipv6_tcp_address(srv, &srv->ipv6_addr);
>> return 0;
>>
>> case AF_UNIX:
>> @@ -181,6 +193,17 @@ static uint16_t get_binded_port(int socket_fd,
>> }
>> }
>>
>> +static int sys_bind(const int sock_fd, const struct sockaddr *addr,
>> + socklen_t addrlen)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ret = bind(sock_fd, addr, addrlen);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + return -errno;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> static int bind_variant_addrlen(const int sock_fd,
>> const struct service_fixture *const srv,
>> const socklen_t addrlen)
>> @@ -217,6 +240,17 @@ static int bind_variant(const int sock_fd,
>> return bind_variant_addrlen(sock_fd, srv, get_addrlen(srv, false));
>> }
>>
>> +static int sys_connect(const int sock_fd, const struct sockaddr *addr,
>> + socklen_t addrlen)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ret = connect(sock_fd, addr, addrlen);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + return -errno;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> static int connect_variant_addrlen(const int sock_fd,
>> const struct service_fixture *const srv,
>> const socklen_t addrlen)
>> @@ -923,6 +957,289 @@ TEST_F(protocol, connect_unspec)
>> EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
>> }
>>
>> +FIXTURE(tcp_errors_consistency)
>> +{
>> + struct service_fixture srv0, srv1;
>> + struct sockaddr *inval_addr_p0;
>> + socklen_t addrlen_min;
>> +
>> + struct sockaddr_in inval_ipv4_addr;
>> + struct sockaddr_in6 inval_ipv6_addr;
>> +};
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(tcp_errors_consistency)
>> +{
>> + const enum sandbox_type sandbox;
>> + const int domain;
>> + bool allowed;
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, no_sandbox_with_ipv4) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .sandbox = NO_SANDBOX,
>> + .domain = AF_INET,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, no_sandbox_with_ipv6) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .sandbox = NO_SANDBOX,
>> + .domain = AF_INET6,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, denied_with_ipv4) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
>> + .domain = AF_INET,
>> + .allowed = false,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, allowed_with_ipv4) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
>> + .domain = AF_INET,
>> + .allowed = true,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, denied_with_ipv6) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
>> + .domain = AF_INET6,
>> + .allowed = false,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, allowed_with_ipv6) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
>> + .domain = AF_INET6,
>> + .allowed = true,
>> +};
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_SETUP(tcp_errors_consistency)
>> +{
>> + const struct protocol_variant tcp_prot = {
>> + .domain = variant->domain,
>> + .type = SOCK_STREAM,
>> + };
>> +
>> + disable_caps(_metadata);
>> +
>> + set_service(&self->srv0, tcp_prot, 0);
>> + set_service(&self->srv1, tcp_prot, 1);
>> +
>> + if (variant->domain == AF_INET) {
>> + set_ipv4_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &self->inval_ipv4_addr);
>> + self->inval_ipv4_addr.sin_family = AF_INET6;
>> +
>> + self->inval_addr_p0 = (struct sockaddr *)&self->inval_ipv4_addr;
>> + self->addrlen_min = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
>> + } else {
>> + set_ipv6_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &self->inval_ipv6_addr);
>> + self->inval_ipv6_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET;
>> +
>> + self->inval_addr_p0 = (struct sockaddr *)&self->inval_ipv6_addr;
>> + self->addrlen_min = SIN6_LEN_RFC2133;
>> + }
>> +
>> + setup_loopback(_metadata);
>> +};
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(tcp_errors_consistency)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Validates that Landlock provides errors consistency for bind(2) operation
>> + * (not restricted, allowed and denied).
>> + *
>> + * Error consistency implies that in sandboxed process, bind(2) returns the same
>> + * errors and in the same order (assuming multiple errors) as during normal
>> + * execution.
>> + */
>> +TEST_F(tcp_errors_consistency, bind)
>> +{
>> + if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
>> + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> + };
>> + int ruleset_fd;
>> +
>> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
>> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>> +
>> + if (variant->allowed) {
>> + const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_bind_p0 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> + .port = self->srv0.port,
>> + };
>> +
>> + /* Allows bind for the first port. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
>> + &tcp_bind_p0, 0));
>> + }
>> +
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>> + }
>> + int sock_fd;
>> +
>> + sock_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sock_fd);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Tries to bind socket to address with invalid sa_family value
>> + * (AF_INET for ipv6 socket and AF_INET6 for ipv4 socket).
>> + */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT,
>> + sys_bind(sock_fd, self->inval_addr_p0, self->addrlen_min));
>> +
>> + if (variant->domain == AF_INET) {
>> + struct sockaddr_in ipv4_unspec_addr;
>> +
>> + set_ipv4_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &ipv4_unspec_addr);
>> + ipv4_unspec_addr.sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
>> + /*
>> + * Ipv4 bind(2) accepts AF_UNSPEC family in address only if address is
>> + * INADDR_ANY. Otherwise, returns -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>> + */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT,
>> + sys_bind(sock_fd,
>> + (struct sockaddr *)&ipv4_unspec_addr,
>> + self->addrlen_min));
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Tries to bind with too small addrlen (Cf. inet_bind_sk). */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_bind(sock_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
>> + self->addrlen_min - 1));
>> +
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sock_fd));
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Validates that Landlock provides errors consistency for connect(2) operation
>> + * (not restricted, allowed and denied).
>> + *
>> + * Error consistency implies that in sandboxed process, connect(2) returns the
>> + * same errors and in the same order (assuming multiple errors) as during normal
>> + * execution.
>> + */
>> +TEST_F(tcp_errors_consistency, connect)
>> +{
>> + int nonblock_p0_fd;
>> +
>> + nonblock_p0_fd = socket(variant->domain,
>> + SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC | SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, nonblock_p0_fd);
>> +
>> + /* Tries to connect nonblocking socket before establishing ruleset. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(-EINPROGRESS, connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
>> +
>> + if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
>> + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + };
>> + const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_connect_p1 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + .port = self->srv1.port,
>> + };
>> + int ruleset_fd;
>> +
>> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
>> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>> +
>> + /* Allows connect for the second port. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0,
>> + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
>> + &tcp_connect_p1, 0));
>> +
>> + if (variant->allowed) {
>> + const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_connect_p0 = {
>> + .allowed_access =
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + .port = self->srv0.port,
>> + };
>> +
>> + /* Allows connect for the first port. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
>> + &tcp_connect_p0, 0));
>> + }
>> +
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>> + }
>> + int client_p0_fd, client_p1_fd, server_p0_fd, server_p1_fd;
>> +
>> + client_p0_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, client_p0_fd);
>> + /*
>> + * Tries to connect socket to address with invalid sa_family value
>> + * (AF_INET for ipv6 socket and AF_INET6 for ipv4 socket).
>> + */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
>> + self->addrlen_min));
>> +
>> + /* Tries to connect with too small addrlen. */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
>> + self->addrlen_min - 1));
>> +
>> + /* Creates socket listening on zero port. */
>> + server_p0_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, server_p0_fd);
>> +
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(server_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(server_p0_fd, backlog));
>> + /* Tries to connect listening socket. */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EISCONN, sys_connect(server_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
>> + self->addrlen_min - 1));
>> +
>> + /* Creates socket listening on first port. */
>> + server_p1_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv1);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, server_p1_fd);
>> +
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(server_p1_fd, &self->srv1));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(server_p1_fd, backlog));
>> +
>> + client_p1_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv1);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, client_p1_fd);
>> +
>> + /* Connects to server_p1_fd. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(client_p1_fd, &self->srv1));
>> + /* Tries to connect already connected socket. */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EISCONN, sys_connect(client_p1_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
>> + self->addrlen_min - 1));
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * connect(2) is called upon nonblocking socket and previous connection
>> + * attempt was closed by RST packet. Landlock cannot provide error
>> + * consistency in this case (Cf. check_tcp_connect_consistency_and_get_port()).
>> + */
>> + if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES,
>> + connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
>> + } else {
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-ECONNREFUSED,
>> + connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Tries to connect with zero as addrlen. */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0, 0));
>> +
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(client_p1_fd));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(server_p1_fd));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(server_p0_fd));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(client_p0_fd));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(nonblock_p0_fd));
>> +}
>> +
>> FIXTURE(ipv4)
>> {
>> struct service_fixture srv0, srv1;
>> --
>> 2.34.1
>>
>>
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