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Message-ID: <61db29bc-2c95-49e3-8ecc-fa5485b8919d@nvidia.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 18:46:59 +0200
From: Shahar Shitrit <shshitrit@...dia.com>
To: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, davem@...emloft.net
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, edumazet@...gle.com, pabeni@...hat.com,
borisp@...dia.com, john.fastabend@...il.com, Gal Pressman <gal@...dia.com>,
Tariq Toukan <tariqt@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] tls: strp: make sure the TCP skbs do not have
overlapping data
On 13/10/2022 1:55, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> TLS tries to get away with using the TCP input queue directly.
> This does not work if there is duplicated data (multiple skbs
> holding bytes for the same seq number range due to retransmits).
> Check for this condition and fall back to copy mode, it should
> be rare.
>
> Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> ---
> net/tls/tls_strp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_strp.c b/net/tls/tls_strp.c
> index 9b79e334dbd9..955ac3e0bf4d 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls_strp.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_strp.c
> @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int tls_strp_read_copyin(struct tls_strparser *strp)
> return desc.error;
> }
>
> -static int tls_strp_read_short(struct tls_strparser *strp)
> +static int tls_strp_read_copy(struct tls_strparser *strp, bool qshort)
> {
> struct skb_shared_info *shinfo;
> struct page *page;
> @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static int tls_strp_read_short(struct tls_strparser *strp)
> * to read the data out. Otherwise the connection will stall.
> * Without pressure threshold of INT_MAX will never be ready.
> */
> - if (likely(!tcp_epollin_ready(strp->sk, INT_MAX)))
> + if (likely(qshort && !tcp_epollin_ready(strp->sk, INT_MAX)))
> return 0;
>
> shinfo = skb_shinfo(strp->anchor);
> @@ -315,6 +315,27 @@ static int tls_strp_read_short(struct tls_strparser *strp)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static bool tls_strp_check_no_dup(struct tls_strparser *strp)
> +{
> + unsigned int len = strp->stm.offset + strp->stm.full_len;
> + struct sk_buff *skb;
> + u32 seq;
> +
> + skb = skb_shinfo(strp->anchor)->frag_list;
Our regression tests identified a null pointer dereference in this line.
It has reproduced only once so far. Upon reviewing the code, I noticed
that the frag_list is assigned the next skb that TCP receives (in
tls_strp_load_anchor_with_queue()). This could explain why there is no
null check before accessing the frag_list.
I would like to confirm please that frag_list == NULL is never expected
here (hence no need for a NULL check), i.e. the tls_strp anchor should
always have the frag_list at this point, and any frag_list == NULL is
considered a bug.
> + seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
> +
> + while (skb->len < len) {
> + seq += skb->len;
> + len -= skb->len;
> + skb = skb->next;
> +
> + if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != seq)
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> static void tls_strp_load_anchor_with_queue(struct tls_strparser *strp, int len)
> {
> struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(strp->sk);
> @@ -373,7 +394,7 @@ static int tls_strp_read_sock(struct tls_strparser *strp)
> return tls_strp_read_copyin(strp);
>
> if (inq < strp->stm.full_len)
> - return tls_strp_read_short(strp);
> + return tls_strp_read_copy(strp, true);
>
> if (!strp->stm.full_len) {
> tls_strp_load_anchor_with_queue(strp, inq);
> @@ -387,9 +408,12 @@ static int tls_strp_read_sock(struct tls_strparser *strp)
> strp->stm.full_len = sz;
>
> if (!strp->stm.full_len || inq < strp->stm.full_len)
> - return tls_strp_read_short(strp);
> + return tls_strp_read_copy(strp, true);
> }
>
> + if (!tls_strp_check_no_dup(strp))
> + return tls_strp_read_copy(strp, false);
> +
> strp->msg_ready = 1;
> tls_rx_msg_ready(strp);
>
Thank you
Shahar Shitrit
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